KIDD V. HORRY.
(Oircuit Oourt, E. D. Loui,iana. June 12,1881\)
COURTS-FEDERAL COURTS-STATE STATUTES.
The construction of a state statute by the supreme court of that state, when the question is one of local statute, and not of general commercial law, is binding upon the federal court. Raba886 v. Pariah of T6'l"l'ebonne, so La. Ann. 287, followed.
Alfred Goldthwaite, for plaintiff. E. D. White, E. D. Saunders, E. H. Farrar, and E. B. KruttBchnitt, for defendant.
BILLINGS, J. This case was submitted upon an agreement that the facts were to be considered as the same as those stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice MANNING in Rab(jsse v. Parish of Terrebonne, 30 La. Ann. 287. We are of opinion that the construction there given of the statute, authorizing the issue of the bonds in suit,-the additional fact having been found by us that the plaintiff took title after that decision was made public,-is binding upon this court; the question in that respect being one of local statute, and not of general commercial law. We ,are also of opinion that the construction is correct, provided the questions were new. Judgment for defendant.
(Circuit Oourt, E. D. Penn8y1Jvania. October 9,1886.)
CoURTS-UNITED STATES COURTS-JURISDICTI()N-LIBEL-INJUNCTION.
The United l;tates courts have no jurisdiction to interfere, by injunction to restrain the publication of a libel. '
In Equity. tion. plainant.
An ancilla:y bill and motion for preliminary injunc'
Walter George Smith, Francis Rawle, and A. R. Keasby, for com-
Before BRADLEY, Justice, and McKENNAN, J.
E. C. Rhoads and F. Carroll Brewstet', for defendants.
by Joseph P. Hornor, Esq., of the New Orleans bar. · Reported by C. B. Taylor, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.
BRADLEY, Justice. We are asked to grant an injunction in this case to restrain the defendants from publishing certain circular letters which are alleged to bl;l libelous and injurious to the patentrights and business of the complainants, and from making or uttering libelous or slanderous statements, written 01' oral, of or concerning the business of the complainants, or concerning the validity of their letters patent, or of their title thereto, pending the trial and adjudication of the principal suit, which is brought to restrain the infringement of said patents. The application seems to be altogether a novel one, and is urged principally upon a line of recent English authorities, such as Di.xon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 488; Thorley's Cattle100d Co. v. Massam, 14 Oh. Div. 763; Thomas v. Williams, Id. 864; and Loog v. Bean, 26 Oh. Div. 306. An examination of these and other cases relied on convinces us that they depend on certain peculiar acts of parliament of Great Britain. and not on the general principles of equity jurisprudence. By the common-law procedure act of 1854 (17 & 18 Viet. c. 125, §§ 79, 81, 82) it was provided that, "in all cases of breach of contract, or other injury, where the party injured is entitled to maintain and has brought an action, he may * * * claim a writ of injunction against the repetition or continuance of such breach of contract or other injury," etc.; and "in such action judgment may be given that the writ of injunction do or do not issue, as justice may require." And, further, (section 82,) the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of his action, apply. ex pa?'te, for an injunction. This statute gave to the judges of the common-law courts the power to issue injunctions in the cases specified, (i. e., breaches of contract or other injury,) to prevent a repetition or continuance of the injury for which suit was brought. By the judicature act of 1873 (36 & 37 Viet. c. 66, § 16) it was enacted that the high court of justice should have and exercise "the jurisdiction which. at the commencement of this act, was vested in, or capable of being exercised by, all or anyone or more of the judges in [the common-law] courts, respectively, sitting in court, or in chambers, or elsewhere, when acting as judges or a judge in pursuance of any statute, law, or custom ; and all powers given to any such court, or to any such judges or judge by any statute, and also all ministerial powers, duties, and authorities incident to any and every part of the jurisdiction so transferred." As the high court of justice established by tbe judicature act of 1873 was an amalgamation of all the courts of original jurisdiction of Westminster Hall, including the conrt of chancery, which became merely one of the divisions of the high court, it follows that the court of chancery became invested with the jurisdiction which was given to the common-law courts by the common-law procedure act of 1854; Rnd bence became invested with the power to grant injunctions to prevent the continuance or repetition of an injury which was actionable
in any court, and for which an action was brought, although the power to grant injunctions in cases of libel was resisted, in several instances, by very high authority; as in the case of Prudential A8sur. 00. v. Knott, 10 Ch. App. 142, by Lord Chancellor CAIRNS and Lord Justice JAMES, and in that of Beddow v. Beddow, 9 Ch. Div. 89, by Bir GEORGE JESSEL. The practice of issuing such injunctions, however, finally prevailed. This statute law of Great Britain is sufficient to account for the English cases relied on by the complainant, and is undoubtedly the basis on which they really stand. In the case of Thorley'8 Oattle-food 00. v. Ma8sam, 14 Ch. Div.763, a leading case on the subject, MALINS, V. C., says, referring to previous cases:
"I think these cases at law establish this doctrine: that where one man publishes that which is injurious to another in his trade or business, that pUblication is actionable, and, being actionable, will be stayed by injunction, because it is a wrong which ought not to be repeated."
upon interlocutory application, to restrain the publication of a libel. I have no doubt whatever that there is jurisdiction to grant such an injunction. It is plain that the jurisdiction conferred on the common-law courts by the common-law procedure act of 1854 extended to the granting of such an injunction. The seventy-ninth section is as large in terms as can well be, and the eighty-second section allows ex pa1·te injunctions in every case where a final injunction would be granted under the seventy-ninth section. Of course, under the rule of omne ma}u8 continet in 8e minus, if the court can grant an injunction ex parte, ajortiori, it can grant it on notice. It is therefore clear, to my mind, that the common-law courts had this jurisdiction in all common-law actions. That jurisdiction is transferred to the high court, and that would suffice to decide this question of jurisdiction. But by the judicature act of 1873, 25, subs. 8, a larger jurisdiction to grant injunctions than existed before is given in every case; and, in my opinion, that enactment extends the general jurisdiction given in common-law actions to all actions, whether in equity or at common law. The result, therefore. is that there is jurisdiction, in a proper case, upon interlocutory application, to restrain the further publication of a liue!."
This is an evident reference to the common-law proced'ure act; and other cases expressly refer to the act. Thus, in the case of Quartz HiU 00n80lidated Min. Co. v. BeaU, 20 Ch. Div. 501, as late as 1882, Sir GEORGE J ESSEL says: "This is an appeal from Vice Chancellor BAOON, granting an injunction,
But neither the statute law of this country, nor any well-considered' judgment of the courts, has introduced this new branch of equity, into our jurisprudence. There may be a case or two looking that way, but none that we deem of sufficient authority to justify us in assuming the jurisdiction. The authority of the supreme court of Massachusetts in the cases of Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence, 114 Mass. 69, and Whitehead v. Kitson, 119 Mass. 484, is flatly against it. So, also, are the New York cases of New York Juvenile, etc., Soc. v. floo8evelt, 7 Daly, 188; Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige, 24; Mauger v. Dick, 55 How. Pl'. 132. Also the Georgia case of Cas-
well v. Central R. Co., 50 Ga. 70; and the Missouri case of Life Ass'n of America v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173. We do not regard the contrary decision in Croft v. Richardson, 59 How. Pl'. 356, as of sufficient authority to counteract these cases, or to disturb what we consider to be the well-established law on the subject. That law clearly is that the court of chancery will not interfere, by injunction, to restrain the publication of a libel; as was distinctly laid down by Lord Chancellor CAIRNS in the case of Prudential Assltr. Co. v. Knott, 10 Ch. App. 142, where he says, in reference to the application for an injunction to restrain a libel calculated to injure property: "Not merely is there no authority for this application, but the books afford repeated instances of the refusal to exercise jurisdiction;" and then refers to several authorities. If this decision has since been overruled, it is only because of the enlarged jurisdiction conferred upon the English courts by the statutes referred to, and is a standing authority as to the general law independent of legislation. We do not think that the existence of malice in publishing a libel, or uttering slanderous words, can make any difference in the jurisdiction of the court. Malice is charged in almost every case of libel, and no cases of authority can be found, we think, independent of statute, in which the power to issue an injunction to restrain a libel or slanderous words has ever been maintained, whether malice was charged or not. Charges of slander are peculiarly adapted to and require trial by jury; and exercising, as we do, authority under a system of government and law which by a fundamental article secures the right of trial by jury in all cases at common law, and which hy express statute declares that suits in equity shall not be sustained in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete 1'3medy may be had at law, as has always heretofore been considered the case in causes of libel and stander we do not think that we would be justified in extending the remedy of injunction to such cases. The allplication for an injunction must be denied, and the ancillary bill is dismissed, with CQSts.
MERCANTILE NAT. BANK OF' CITY OF NEW YORK V. MAYOR, ETO., OJ' CITY OF NEW YORK and another.
(Oircuit Oourt, S. D. New York.
TAXES-NATIONAL BANK SHAREs-DIscnHUNATION-REV. ST.
jE'cted in a state to a higher rate of taxation than is assessed upon the moneyed capital generally of the tax-payers, there can be no valid assessment of national bank shares for taxation in that state; and these shares will be relieved from any contribution whatever to the general burden of taxation under Rev. St. U. S. § 5219.
U. S. § 5219. If it appear that the capital represented by national bank shares is sub-