face. The proper department of the government had examined the case on the evidence presented, adjudged the right to be in Minor, and issued the patent accordingly in due form. The patent could only be assailed by matter resting in parol dehors the record. Innocent parties were entitled to rely upon the record. Croghan, relying upon the record, without any notice of any claim whatever on the part of Spence or of the United States, for a good and valuable considera· tion, and with the utmost good faith, took the mortgage; thereby socuringa valid lien upon the premises in question, that was ulti. mately perfected into a legal title, which he now holds. Being a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of any counter-equities or claims, there appearing no flaw upon the record, his title is im· pregnable. His equities are, at lea.st, equal to those of Spence, and superior to those of the United States, the complainants herein, through whose negligence the patent was issued, by means of which Croghan innocently got into his present position; and, having the legal title, it must prevail. The position of the party having the legal title, with equal or superior eguities, is best. There muat be 80 decree dismissing the bill, with costs; and it is so ordered.
SHATTUO 'D. McARTHUR
and another. 1
(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri. October 1,1886.)
LIBEL-}1EAsURE OF DAMAGES-}1ITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Where a man has to appear in court as plaintiff in a libel suit to vindicate himself against a charge reflecting on his personal or official character, he is only entitled, if there are mitigating circumstances, and not express malice, to such damages as will compensate him and make him whole. In such cases the plaintiff's expenses, and the outrage to his feelings, may be considered.
SAME-ExPENSES-INJURY TO FEELINGS
The fact that the publication,thou/!,'h false, was an honest effort to repel an accusation made by the plaintiff against the defendant, is a mitigating circumstance. s Where a libelous publication is made through spite, personal ill will, or malice, exemplary damages may be allowed as a warning, and as a punishment for the offense. 2 It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the amount of exemplary damages which should be allowed.
SAME-PROVINCE OF JURY.
lEdited by Benj. F. Rex, Esq., of the St. Louis bar. IProvocation goes in mitigation of damages. Warner v. Lockerby, (Minn.) 18 N. W. Rep. 821; Id.145. In the absence of actual malice, punitive damages should not be allowed. Neeb v. Hope, (Pa.) 2 AU. Rep. 568; Templeton v. Graves, (Wis.) 17N. W. Rep. 672. They are not given for implied malice. Eviston v. Cramer, (Wis.) 15 N. W. Rep. 760; S. C. 11 N. W. Rep. 556. See. also, note to Shattuc v. McArthur, 25 Fed. Rep. 133.
SHATTUC 'lI. M'ARTHUR.
6. SAME.:..-STATEMENT HEJ,D LmELous.
The statement that S., the general passenger agent of a railroad company, "has /1:rown rich by making his local ticket agents, or some of them, divide their commissions with him, " is libelous.
At Law. Action for libel. See S. C. 25 Fed. Rep. 133. The petition states that on or about the sixteenth day of May, 1885, the defendants published in a newspaper called the "Railway Register," at the city of St. Louis, in the state of Missouri, the following libelous words concerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning him in his capacity and occupation of general passenger agent of the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company, viz.: "Mr. Shattuc [meaning plaintiff] has grown rich by making his local ticket agents, [meaning the local ticket agents of the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company,] or some of them, divide their commissions with him, [meaning plaintiff;]" thereby meaning that plaintiff had improperly used his position as general passenger agent, as aforesaid, to force the ticket agents under him to divide with him the commissions received for the sale of railway tickets made by them as agents, under the plain. tiff, of the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company. The defendant's answer adDiits the publication, but states that the; commissions referred to were those received by said agents for the sale of railroad tickets over other lines of road, and that the publi-: cation complained of was made of and concerning the plaintiff, in his official capacity, as an officer of a quasi public corporation, and was made without malice, and upon reasonable cause, and was provoked by a statement published by the plaintiff to the effect that the defendant, McArthur, was a and a "blackguard," and "had an itching palm," and by statements that he was a "black· mailer." Krum wJonas and Garland Pollard, for plaintiff. Dyer, Lee wEllis, for defendants. TREAT, J., (charging jwry orally.) Under the pleadings in the case, and the admissions of counsel, your duty is to consider a very limited line of inquiry. It is admitted that the defendants published the alleged libelous matter concerning the plaintiff, which was read to yoti from the paper of the date, I think, of May 16th. That, in the eye of the law, was a libelous publication. The defendants do not attempt, in the language of the law, to justify that publication on the ground that it was true, but admit that it was false. Under the allegations of the pleadings they knew it was false. Consequently your verdict must be for the plaintiff. For what sum? is the inquiry. Ordinarily, in suits for libel, where a man has to appear in court to vindicate himself against a charge reflecting on his personal or official character, the jury will give him such compen· , aation (if there are mitigating circumstances) as will make him whole with regard to the expenses and outraged feelings suffered by him
for the false imputation resting upon him, and no more. But if the publication was made throngbspite, personal ill will, malice "express" in the language of the law, then the jury are justified in awarding "exemplary damages, "-sometimes called, also, "punitive damages" or "smart money." The object of the law in that particular is that One shall 'not falsely, and through malice, stab the reputation of his fellow-citizen, and escape merely because it so happens that the gentleman whose reputation was thus thrust at does not in dollars and cents suffer any injury which you can compute arithmetically. The object of the law, as the term itself implies, "exemplary" or "punitive" damages, is to inflict upon the libeler such a punishment in dollars and cents as will serve as a warning, and also as a ment for such an offense. Now, it is'for you, and it belongs solely to you, to consider whether this was a publication made (it being admittedly false) through mere personal ill-will, spite, or express malice. If sO,you, as 12 gentlemen familiar with the Qrdinary affairs connected with the rights of propt)rty, and the ,rights person and, personal reputation, must determine what you think would be just and proper, under the circumstances, in the nature of exemplary,damages. If, however, ,you reach the conclusion from course of correspondence between these parties ,and their respective connections, one towards the other,thaJthere was nothing but effort to repel accusations made against the defendants themselves by the other party, then you will. allow only what hfl,s been'defined as compensatory damages. There remains, then,jo sum up; this inquiry: First, were these defendants malice or spite or ill-will growing out of this controversy in publishing this libelous ma,tter 'against the plaintiff? If 80, you will awal'd exem.plary or punitive damages. If, on the other in a bitter conhand, you think that these parties, having' troversy between themselves, did say these very improper things one against the other, it is for you to determine what will be a fair measure of compensation,. taking into consideration the outraged feelings of the plaintiff,. and the matters connected' with the transaction,-what, iIi your would fairly him for the wrong done, whereby he was compelled to appear in,the tribunals of his country to vindicate hill character against Buch aspersions.
ONE HUNDRED AND NINE'.rt-SlX MARES.
UNITED STATES V. ONE HUNDRED AND
(Oi'T'cuit OOU'T't, W.
CuSTOMS DUTIES-MARES FOR BREEDING PURPOSES-J:r,,""TENTION OF IMPORTER.
The statute of the United States providing that" animals specially imported for breeding purposes shall be admitted free, upon proof satisfactory to the secretary of the treasury, and under such regulations as he may prescribe, n limits free importation of animals to such as are imported for the particular purpose of breeding; and it is a sufficient compliance with the statute that the importer, in good faith, intends them for that purpose, and it does not prevent his otherwise disposing of them if he afterwards finds it necessary or. desirable to do so.
of Information for the condemnation and sale of property for non-payment .of customs duties. The opinion states the case. Did. A.tty. Kleiberg, for the United States. A. J. Evans, for claimant. TURNER, J. In the month of April, 1886, the claimant in this cause went to the republic of Mexico, and made arrangements to export into the United States mares, horses, and mules. He made application to import same, and claimed that the mares were desired for breeding purposes. He procured his necessary papers, imported the animals, and, after some little time, information was conveyed to the custom officers that the said mares were really intended to be placed upon the market, and sold whenever' a proper opportunity presented itself. Whereupon, by direction of the custom officers, the mares were seized as. forfeited to the United States because of the fraud practiced upon the customs by the claimant in pretending that he desired to im port same for breeding purposes when in fact they were imported for the purpose of sale and profit. The d\strict attorney filed his libel of information with a view of having the said mares duly condemned, and sold as forfeited to the government for non-payment of duties. Mr. Rust, the import'er, filed his claim to the property, denying the fraud. The mares, after seizure, were sold by the order of the court, and the proceeds are now in the hands of the register of the court awaiting judicial action. The question raised, among others, is, what is the true interpretation of the statnte upon the subject? It reads as follows:
co Anhnals specially imported for breeding purposes, shall be admitted free upon proof thereof satisfactory to the secretary of the treasury, and under such regulations as he may prescribe." ' .
. It is contended by counsel that all animalsoftbe sheep, horse, or bovine species, capable of procreation, are to be admitted free of duty unde:t; this law, and counsel for the governmep.t insists that they ar& only admitted free of duty when desired by the importer for breeding purposes.