while Fig. 3, which illustrates the improvement, shows a tapering screw with a vanishing thread, and a tapering recess with a vanishing thread. Nevertheless, the inquiry is not what:the patentee may havesupposed, but what he has described, his invention to be. He states, in the general state):Uent of the nature of his invention, that the tubes are to have "tapering and vanishing screw-threads," not "tapering or vanishing." IIe points0ut the objections to the use of a "slightly tapering screw" on the tubes in the old coupling, with a socket which did not taper to receive it. Then, :in describing the difference between his old one, he says that he cuts a "tapering screw" on the end Qfchis tube; but, inflteadof cutting his threads at a uniform depth, he:cuts them so that the thread sbaUvanish gradually until it disappears. He thus declares unequivocally that what he has done which is new is to make a tapering screw with a peculiar form of thread. The specification contains no suggestion to insiicate that a rod having a tapering stem, but not a tapering screw, could be em,ployed. Such a stem could not be employed WIth the socket described in the specification.' The specification requires the ends of the rod to be adapted to fit into a tapering recess, (las clearly indicated in the drawing." 'The claim itself makes a tapering element., A tapering socket is one sleeve adapted to receive a tapering screw: Read by the aid of the context, jt does not seem open to fair, doupt that the rods with' tapering ends and tapering. threads specified in the claim are rods with a tapering screw and vanishing threads, upon the ends. Some significance should also be attached to description, of the rods in the claim' by a reference to the drawings, whIch shows a rod with a tapering screw. It follows that the bill must be dismissed.
THE CHADWICKE. BOLCKOW) VAUGHAN
& Cb;, Limited, v.
(lJi8triet Oourt, 8. D. New York. January 19,1887.)
CHARTER PARTY-BII,L OF LADING-INHARMONIOUS CLAUSES-CONSTRUCTION_
Where 'the provisions of a ch1l.rterparty are inharmonious, the generai intent. ali evidenced by its written portions, and its e"lident leading purpose, should control the minpr IRc;>visions. Similar incongruities between the bilI of lading and the charter patty will also be controlled, as between the ship and the charterer, by the'charter-party, as the more deliberate instrument In expressing. the intent. Unless, there is sufficient evidence of a waiver of the provisions of the charter, or of some new contract, mere loose and inharmonious ()xpreasions in the bill of )adin/l.'. which refer to the charter, will not Sll pefsede thEi latter, as' respects matters which the charter was clearly designed,to cover. , On 'January 11, 1886, at Middlesbro' on Tees, the libelants chartered the O. W' take 1,300 tous of iran, and "proceed to the port ofNew Yorki; Pe,rth Am. boy, Hoboken, or Brooklyn, and there to deliver the same as ordfJi'ed on arrival.
ALTERNATIVE PORTS-DIFFERENT COLLECTroN DISTRICTS.
2, SAME-DELIVERY, AT ONE OF SEVERAL PORTS "AS ORDERED C)N ARRIVAL"-
Two days after, the cargo was loaded, and a bill of lading signed by the master, stating that the steamer w&s"boQnd for New York, arid the cargo to be delivered at sllid port of New York to C. L. P., 30 Pine street, or his assigns; all other conditions as per charter-pl),I'ty." The vessel, on arrival at quarantine, New Y9rk', was ordered by the charterer's agents to go to Perth Amboy, a neighboring collection dIstrict. The master refused, and this suit was brought for the difference in price on a sale of the its non-delivery at Perth Amboy. Held that, under the circumstances, York was presumably the primary port at which the order for ultimate delivery, according to the alternative contained in thechl),I'ter-party, was to be given; that the privilege secured by the charter was a valuable one; that the bil.l of lading was intended to be but a receipt for the iron and a direction to the primary port only; that the option as to the place of final delivery was not waived, nor intended to be ·waived. by the bill of lading, and the master was not authorized so to treat it; and that there were no such difficulties, through the naming of different collection districts in the charter, as prevented or excused the ship from delivery at Perth Ambov. as directed at quarantine; and that the ship . was therefore liable.
Wilcox, &- lvIacklin, forIihelants. Butler, Stillman' &I[wbard and 'W. lvIynder88, for claimants.
BRowN,J,. The libel in this 'case was filed to recover damages against Chadwicke, for on arrival at New York, to go to the .. Perth Amboy t9. unload, aEl it is claimed she was bound to do, on request, under a stipuiatiollof theeharter. On .the eleventh of January; 1886, at Middlesbro' on Tees, England, the vessel was chartered to the libelants to take on board 1,300 tons of spiegeliron,' etc., an4, therewith to proceed to the port of New York, Perth Amboy, 'Jersey City, Hoboken, or Brooklyn, and there deliver the same as ordered on arrival." The charter, however, provided that the vessel was "to he addressed to the freighter's agent at the port of discharge; the captain to sign bills of lading as presented, with· out prejudice to this charter." Three days afterward, the cargo being put on board, a bill of lading, in the common printed form, was signed for New York," and by the master, stating the steamer to be that the cargo was to be delivered "at said port of New York, * * * unto C, L. Perkins, Esq., 30 Pille street, or his assigns, * . and all other conditions as per charter-party;" the port arid consignee's name being written in the usual blank spaces. The steamer arrived at the quarantine station of the port .of New York onthe"fifthof February, 1886, where a telegrll,mfrom Mr. Perkins to the master dated January 30, 1886, was awaiting his arrival, and was received by the master, directing the steawer to Lehigh Valley Railroad dock, at Perth Amboy. Instead of going thither, he came up the bay, anchored off the Battery, reported to Mr. Perkins,the charterer's agent inNew York, demandedt<> be unloaded there according to the terms of the bill of lading, and refused to go to Perth Amboy.· After the charter had been signed, the libelants informed Mr. Perkins, by telegram, of the option contained in .the charter. Thereupon the agent obtained an advance of 50 cents a ton upon a contract then pending, in consideration of a delivery of 1,000 tons of the iron at Perth Amboy, instead of "ea:
ship" at New York. The option was worth to the libelants precisely 3500. . , The claimants contend that the bill of lading, in making the port of New York the place of deli\tery, determined the charterer's option; and that he had no right afterwards to direct the vessel elsewhere. Perth Amboy is a different port, and in a different collection district, from New York, although not much further from quarantine, where the master first received his notice, than are the ordinary discharging berths for such cargo in the port of New York. The consular invoices, sworn to by the libelants before the consul· at Middlesbro', declared that the cargo was shipped for New York, and designed to be entered there. The Revised Statutes require that manifests shall be prepared a.t a distance of four leagt/.es from the coast, stating the destination of the cargo, and the intended port of entry, and require the vessel, when ariving within the limits of the 'port, to make entry there; althongh there are provisions under which· goods destined for different ports, or arriving for orders, may, after arrival at'one port, proceed to another port for delivery of the cargo. Sections 2776, 2779, 2807. 2811, 2812. The master in preparing his manifest. stated New York as the only port, and entered his vessel at the New York custom house. . The disposition of the cargo was evidently designed to be left to the charterer's agent in New York. All the other places of alternative delivery named in the charter are in the immediate vicinity of New York. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the shipper, in making out the constilarinvoices and the bill of lading for "the port of NewYork, II actually intended either to waive his option as to the place of final delivery, 01' to charge hirrlself with any irregularity in a delivery at Perth Amboy, shquld that be directed by his agent, even if he ktlew that Perth Amboy was a different collection distri.ct from New York, which he probably did not know, The charter-party provides that the cargo is to be delivered at anyone of the five places named, "as ordered on a1-rival." The very terms of the charter provide, therefore, for an option to be exercised at the end of the voyage; not at the beginning of it. The designation wItS to be made on arrival j but on arrival where? Necessarily there must, be some place short of the ultimate destination where theo'rders were to be received, and the master must have understood that fact. But all the other places named are so near to New York, and New York is so naturally the head-quarters foi-this region, that the master must have understood, when he signed this charter-party, that he was first to go to or near New York, and there await orders as to the particular place of delivery. It is in this Sense that the subsequent printed clause in the charter party must be construed, viz.: "The vessel to be addressed to the freighter's agent at the porto!discharge." Clearly, this printed clause in the charter cannot be construed as intended to take away the option previously stipulated for in the written clause, nor the written clause, making the ultimate place of delivery deto pendent on ditections to be given "on arrival" at the primary port. The words "port of discharge" are not strictly compatible with the prior
clause, and they must to the evident intent of the charter as a whole, alid be construed accordingly. The charterer's agent was at the pqrt of New York, where, under' the circumstances,. the master must have expected to go first; and the intent' of the whole instrument seems clear that the vessel was to be consigned to New York for further orders,-a familiar form of charter, except that in this case the option was limited to a few places within the immediate vicinity of the primary port. in the same sense, and as de., The bill of lading must be signed to indicate the port of New York as the primary port only, where Perkins would direct the place of final deliv:eryaccording to the option provided for in the charter, No doubt the pill of lading omits what ought to hav:e 1)eElll inserted. ilil it in order to make its provisions literally harmonious with the charter, and to make the whole intent clear' that paper alone; and some of the ordinary printed language of the bi]); of lading should also have stficken out. 'Such incompatibilibetween the c4arterand the bill of lading are not in.. , ties of frequellt, Where the charterer's gooqs areJaden on board. Often the two papers wholly fail to be adjusted nicely to each other. A bill of lading referrjng to a charter-party ,is neyerconstrued as intending to express the, whole intent, or to control the charter-party in consequence of mere inharmonious expressions. The, cp;:trter is the deliberate and controlling d()cument; and. where the intent .of the charter is clear, a bill of lading given under it, and referring to it,f\s between the ship and the charterer, not supersede the express Provisions of the charter-party that are' clearly intended to apply to the situation, however inartificially the bill onading ,may be framed. It "little more," says Parsons, (Ship. & .A,dm. 286,) "than evidence ofthi:l delivery and receipt and shipping of merchandise, for the charter-party is the controlling contract as to all the terms or provisions wh,ich itexpresses." Perkina v. DiU, 1 Spr.123; Wag8taffv.Anderson, 5. C. P. Div.171,177; Sewell v. Burdick, WApp. Cas. 74, 105; Gledstanes v. Allen, 12 C. B.. 202; Rodoconachi v. 17'Q. B. Div. 316, 320. · " " " Xo control the charter-party, there must be sufficient evidence of a new c90tmct between the parties pro tanto. In this case there is no evidence of &ny further or different contract. It is the simple case of a loose, incozpplete, and incompatible wording of the bill of lading, but any further negotiation or change in the consideration or inteptof the cllar-ter. The bill of lading says: "All other provisions as per charterparty;" and it thereby adopted all its provisions that were designed by the, charter to become applicable. In Gullischen v. Stewart, 11 Q. B. Div. 186, S.C. 13 Q. B. Div. 317, the bill ofladingwas held controlling, as to payment offreight and demurrage, because the in receiv.. · ing delivery olthe goods, acted in the character of consignees,and not in pf charterers, which alone the charter-party, covered; alld the Cesser, .of the charter-party was held inapplicable. and not within the .. .. . , orighial intent. of several pJaces as the place' of flnal delivery privilege to to SOUle extent, ;
npon the ve!!sel. It is incredible that s4ipper, secured this option" and carefully proVided that it should be exercised" on arrival,· and by presumption of law' P-llrvrng paid for tpis privilege. immediately waived it intentionally, and· then info.rmed bis agent of this option for his future' guidance. IIi .my judgment, therefore, the charter clearly controls. The master was not authorized to treat the bill of lading as waiving the option secured by the charter, or as designating anything more than the primary port where he was to receive from the charterer's agent his final orders as to the particular place of delivery. The manifest sh()uld have stated the provision for final orders at New York, or the several alternative places,' aMording to thecharler. There· would then have been no difficulty in delivering at Perth Amboy; and, even after the vessel had been at New York, though there would have been doubtless ·some inconvenience and delay, I think. there was no insuperable obstacle. Wyncoop, Vessels & Voy.§ 341. No objections of that kind were stated by the master at the time. The complaint made of ice around Perth Amboy seems much more likely to. have been the determming consideration, in connection with the reading of the written documents, in leading the captain to refuse to proceed thither. There iel no evidence, however, that the ice was such as 'to furnish a legal defense, and no such defense is Decree for the libelants, with costs.
THE PLYMOUTH ROOK.
R. Co. v.
(UwlJtl,ie UOfJ,'re, $. D. New York. Dllcember
In view of the rule of the board of auperviaing inapectors and the pal'tlcular circumatancea of thia caae the exchange of sig'llals betweensteaIllers ing through Hell Gate, one of which is astern of' the other, amounted to an agreement that the veaselastem might precede the vessel ahead by passing upon the port side of the overtaken vessel. Such an agreement imphea that the overtaking vessel will in passing fulfill her statutory duty of klleping out of the way of the overtaken vessel, and that the lll.tterwill keep hercourseao , far· practicable consistently with the knowledge that the overtakinq vessel ia to pass her to port. The o'vertaken vessel has the right to keep 10 midchannel so long 8.S there is sufficient room on the port side for the overt8.k:ing vessel to pass her. .
8.uo-RULES OJ' SUPERVISING .INSPECTORS.
The rules of tlle board of supervising inspectOR, when within tlle scope of their authority, have the force of statutory rules; but their violation Win not charge the vessel violating with damages if the proximate cause of the colthe other vessel, the violation of the ru1I lision was a faulty wu a remote and not a cauae. " ,
of the PhillUiCllPJP , _
IRtported b7 Theodore )4; EW,ng,