Until they seek some such remedy, and until a fair settlement npon full accounting can be had, they will be enjoined from attempting to eject the plaintiff, or to seize the property. The demurrer to the bill is overruled.
DEAKIN t1. STANTON,
(Oircuit Oourt, N. D. lilinoil.
surety upon an injunction bond tn. trade-mark case, conditioned for the payment of all damages and cosu to be awarded against the complainant and in favor of the defendant, upon the tria.l or l1nal hearine of the matter referred to in the bill of complaint, is not liable for damages sustained in consequence of the issuing of the injunctlon, unlesa the same were awarded at the t.im. ef the trlal the cause. EM", T. 12 How. 188, followed.
Demurrer to Declaration. Georg, O. Ohristian and Ohotrle, B. Pop" for plaintiff. Henry T. Boger" for defendant. BLODGETT, D. 1. These are two separate cases, npon bond. given by the defendants, Lea &: Perrin and Stanton, to the complainant, upon the issue of an injunction in a cause in which Lea &: Perrin were complainants, and Deakin was defendant, asking that Deakin be enjoined from violating the alleged trade-mark of the complainant on Worcestershire Bauce. The cause in which the injunction was issued was brought to hearing and dismissed for want of equity j and the defendant in that suit now brings suit on this bond to recover damages which he sustained by reason of the issuing of the injunction. The first bond was given in the penal sum of $5,000, and is conditioned for the payment of all dama.ges and costs to be awarded against the complainant and in favor of the defendant upon the trial or final hearing of the matter referred to in the bill of complaint. The second suit is brought upon an additional bond, which was given in the same trade-mark case, upon the suggestion
of the defendant that the security given by the first bOild 'Was not adequate to cover his probable damages in the case. The condition of the bond is substantially the same as the first. The allegations are that, in defending this suit, the complainant was put to a large expense for solicitors' and attorneys' fees, which the obligors have not paid; also, that he sustained a large amount of damage by the breaking up of his business, and that he is entitled to recover the amount of damages sustained in conseqnence of the issuing of the injunction. These are substantially the breaches that are assigned to this bond. The defendant demurs on the ground that no damages , were awarded at the time of the trial of the cause, and therefore the defendant, who, it appears, signed the bond solely as surety,.is not liable. It is easy to see whytbebond was drawn in the manner in which it is. The practice of the state courts in this state since 1861 has been to award such damagas, upon the trial or dissolution of an injunction, as the defendant may have sustained by reason of the issue of the inj'unction; and probably the counsel used the state court form in preparing the bond, and it was not examined by the ,court ; and probby counsel was as to the sufably the only question ficiency of the surety. The demurrer, therefore, goes to the in these two cases is liable question as to whether upon the facts stated in the declaration, it being perhaps conceded that there were no damages awarded by the court to thedefendant at the time of the dissolution of the injunction, or the final hearing of the case. It is not averred any damages were awarded, and it was said on the argument of this demurrer that none were, and that the practice of this court did not allow the awarding of damages under such circumstances. An examination of the authorities which have been cited has satisfied me that this action cannot be maintained against the surety upon this bond. I do not care to cite more than the case of Bein v. Heath, 12 How. 168, which was a case precisely similar to this. The court there says: "But the bond in the case before us is not one to pay the damages
which the opposing party should sustain by reason of injunction, but it is to pay the damages that might be recov. m'ed against them; obviously referring, we think, to the praetice in Louisiana above mentioned. A court, proceeding according to the rules of equity, cannot giv:e a judgment against the obligors in an injunction bond when it dissolves the injunction. It merely orders the dissolution, leaving the obligee to proceed at law against the sureties, if he sustain'S damage from the delay occasioned by the injunction. This was done by the circuit court in the former suit between the parties. No judgment was or could be given against the obligors for debt or damages, and none were recovered against them previously to the institution of this suit. The contingencyon which they agreed to pay has not, therefore,happened, and the condition of the bond is not broken, and consequently no action can pe maintained upon it. It would against the well-established rule of the chancery court to extend the liability of the surety by any equitable construction beyond. the terms of his contract; and in a upon a bond the liability of the principal obligor cannot be extended beyond that of the surety." ld. 179. One of the conditions of both of these bonds is thfllt' the obligor was to pay the defep.dant in the chancery case all costs and damages which t;lhall be awarded. The court will, of course, take notice of its own records, and the averments in the declaration are sufficient to show that the case was so disposed of that an award for costs was made against the complainant in the original bill. If these costs have not been paid, I have no doubt the plaintiff should have leave to amend, by alleging a breach or failure to pay the costs, in which event the plaintiff will have the right to recover on this bond the amount of costs which were awarded. If there is no claiPl for costs, of course there will be no necessity for amending. We have been considerably embarrassed about this case, and in some doubt as to whether the supreme court would strictly follow the case which has been cited, and which we consider, at present, as controlling; and, in order to give the plaintiff the benefit of a writ of error, if he wishes to take the case
further, we wm order a consolidation of the two causes, which I think should have been brought together, as they are against the same pa.dies, and the second bond is only additional security for the damage growing out of the same suit. The order consolidating the two cases, I think, should be ma.de first, and then the nemurrer sustained to the declaration. Therefore, if the plaintiff wishes to amend, or think! he can amend so as to make a better declaration on the facts .r the case, we should feel disposed to allow it. I will say, frankly, we would like, if we could, to so construe the obligations of the bond as to effect the purposes for which it was given, but the authorities which are cited seem to be controlling, a.nd I do not see how we can do otherwise than to SUBtain the demurrer. An order will be made that the causes be consolidated preeeding the disposition of the demurrer, so that error can be assigned upon that question.
J>JW1SIOll OB DBMUBBEB 'fO AMlIlNDBD DEOLAlU'rIOll.
(July 13, 1880.)
D. J. This case is before me on demurrer to an amended declaration, and it is not necessary that I should rehearse to counsel the points that have been raised in the case. It is enough to say that I do not see that, in the amended declaration, any such change has been made as will alter the finding of the court heretofore on demurrer to the original declaration. I still adhere to the conviction that I must be governed by the case of Bein v. Heath, 12 How. 168. It is true, there is a wide conflict of authority between the state courts upon the questions raised on this demurrer. I find that in many of the state courts the rule is held that" Buit at law can be maintained upon a bond of this kind, notwithstanding no assessment of damages had been made by the court-no award of damages-while in other states, as in Kentucky and Maryland, the contrary has been decided. The authorities of Illinois are, perhaps, :with the plaintiff in thia ease; but ihe better a.uthorities, and the authorities of seyBLODGJIl'rI',
HERRING 'V. RICHARDS.
eral other states whflre they have very able courts, are the other way, and I shall therefore sustain the demurrer to the declaration, knowing, as I do, that the case is of sufficient importance to go to' the supreme court.
RICIIARDS and others.
(District Oourt, D. Minnesota.
L VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE-PARENT AND CHILD-FRAUD.-A voluntllrr
conveyance from a parent to bis children, by way of settlement, while solvent and free from debt, and not disproportionate to hiS means, will be sustained, as against subsequent creditors, in the absence of fraud. 2. SAME-SUBSEQUENT IMPROVEMENTS--FRAUD.-Subsequent contribubutions of money, for the purpose of off encumbrances and improving the property, will not render such conveyance void. 3. SAME-PRESUMPTION OF ACCEPTANCE.-In the absence of testimony the acceptance of the grant will be presumed, after the expiration of four years, where the grantees held, owned, controlled, and managed the property from the time of the conveyance, and the only occupancy had been by their tenants, and for their sole and exclusive use.
II. P. Herring, for plaintiff. Ge01'ge B. Young, for defendant.
NELSON, D. J. This suit is brought to recover certain real property alleged to have been conveyed in fraud of creditors. On August 12,1874, William Richards purchased of Aaron S. Everest and wife the property in controversy, and received a deed therefor, which was recorded August 15, 1874. The purchase price was $2,000, and Richards paid $200 in cash, and gave his notes and a mortgage to secure the balance of the purchase money. The notes were four in number, viz.: One for $300, due August 12, 1875; one for $500, due Au. gust 12, 1876; one for $500, due August 12, 1877 j one for $500, due August 12, 1878. On August 14, 1874, Richards conveyed the farm for a consideration, expressed in the deed, of $200, to his daughters, Minnie Richards and Mary Vine Richards, now Ma.ry