Diu , .,
HINCKLEY, Receiver, etc.
(Circuit Court, 8.
RECEIVER-COMPENSATION -J URISDICTION-HES AD,JUDICATA-STATE
was appointed a receiver of a railroad: first, under a suit instituted by the stockholders; and, second, under a suit brought by the bond holders of a railroad company in a state court. The bond holders' suit was subsequently removed to the federal court, where certain questions connected with the compensation of the receiver were referred to a special master, who found a balance due from the receiver, which he was ordered to pay. Upon appeal this order was affirmed by the United States supreme court. Thereupon the stockholders' suit, which had been stricken from the docket of the state court, was re-instated, and the question of the compensation of the receiver referred to a master by the state court, who found a large amount due to the receiver for compensation and necessary expenditures. The bond holders took no part, however, in these proceedings in the state court. Held, under the circumstances of this case, that, where the receiver had paid into the federal court the amount decreed as due from him in the bond holders' suit, he could not, upon petition to the federal court, have such amonnt appropriated'in part payment of what had been found due to him in the stockholders' suit by the state court.
A.ND FEDERAL COURTS.-A.
the receivership hadbeeh extended'ovedroni. the'auit by·the\ to that of the bond holders, aridihe became flIereby receiver in both suits. 'On December 12,1875, the bondholders' suit was removed' to this court, leaving the Kelly Case in the circuit court of McLean county. After this had taken place, the circuit court of the United States referred to a special: master certain questions connected with the compensation' of the receiver, and the amount that was due from him; and the master made a report to the court, finding a balance due' from the receiver, which he was ordered to pay. From this order Hinckley appealed to the supreme court of the United' States, and that court affirmed the order of the circuit court. 100 U. S. 153. In the meantime the case of Kelly in the state court had been striken from the docket, but was re-instated after the' affirmance Of the decree of this court by the supreme court of the United States. Of course, when the case of the bond holders was transferred from the state to the federal court, all of the property of 'railroad company was administered in and became subject to the order of the lattet 'court. ' 'After' the case of Kelly had been re-instated in the circuit McLean county, the accounts of Hinckley, 'the'questioh f of the compensation to be allowed for his servic'es,wils referred' to a special who repbrted to th,a state court; finding $24,535.80 due to the receiver fljr his servicefl,' and $1,000' for money necessarily paid out by him in the bU'Biness' of the receivership, which report was afterwards confirmed by the state court. Neither the bond holders, nor the trustees, nor any of their counsel took any part in these proceedings in the Kelly, Case touching the compeneatio.n of the receiver, before the state court, or before the special master to whom the matter had been referred. It is upon this state of facts that the petitioner now applies to this court, he having paid into court the amount decreed by this court as due from him; that this sum shall be appro· priated in part payment of what has been found due to him by the state court, and the question is whether he is entitled to the order of this court for that purpose. I am clearly of
opinion that he is not. The parties in this couri who had an interest in the property are not bound by the action of the state court in allowing this compensation to the receiver. In fact, the compensation which was due to the receiver for the services that he had performed came up as a question before the master appointed by this court,and the master made him a certain allowance for his services, which was sanctioned by this court in the order made, from which he took an appeal to the supreme court of the United States. He took possession of the property in December, 1873, and turned it over to the trustees on August 12, 1875. The master of this court allowed him $10,000 for his services as receiver, and after the property has come into, this court, and after this court has passed upon the compensa-' tion which should be allowed him, and that whole question has been determined, to allow him to go to the state court, re-instate the case of Kelly, and ask for and obtain the action of the state court as to his compensation, and then come into this court and request it to treat this as res adjudicata and binding in this court, under the circumstances, would certainly be carrying the principle further than any precedent. that I ever heard of would sanction. The object has been so obviously for the purpose of obtaining money 'from this court which he has once reluctantly and under compulsion paid under its order, that I cannot do .otherwise than dismiss the petition.
BREED V. THE CITY
(Circuit Court, S. D. OMo. - - , 1880.)
1. FIRE INSURANOE-OONTRAOTS-OONSTRUOTION. - Oontracts of insurance are to be construed as other contracts., All parts of the contract are to be taken together; they are to be liberally construed, and such meaning to be given to them as will carry out and effectuate to the fullest extent the intention of the parties, and no portion of it wilt receive such a construction as will tend to defeat the obvious general purpose of the parties entering into the contract. .