freedom frQm parElntal and fiIi.al ties and duties which the·law at the age ofmajority.' An examination of the numerous c1J..ses cited in this opiuipn ,shows that in no case has a, complete, been inferred from the mere acquiescence of the parent in the child's contracting for and receiving his own earnings, nor in any case where the had nElver'left the parental home, at;ld was. employed in the same plaQe and business. as the father. "Emanicipation being the exception,and not the rule, the burden is upon those who asse.rt it. Sumner v. Sebec, 3 Me. 223. The master has already reported that he found no evidence of any intention on the part of the father to der all right to the controtoi his son, and the ll:uthorities cited by the respondent do not satisfy him that there is a legal inference of such emancipation arising from the circumstances. *' *' *' The master is, therefore, of opinion that Elmer H. Grey is still within the authority and. under the control of the respondent. What, then, was the respondent's duty in the premises? 'An order for an injunction or interim restraining order must be implicitly observed,' and every diligence must be eXElrcised to obey it to the letter.' Kerr on Injuncti0ns, 569. "It has been held that it is a violation of an injunction for the defendant to be present at the commision of the act en. joined, aiding and abetting, although not actually taking part in it, (St. John's College v. Carter, 8 Law Jour. Eq.N. S. 218;) or, under some circumstances, to stand by and quietly suffer the injunction to be violated, (Stimpson v. Putnam, 41 Vt. 238, 246; Blood v. Martin, 21 Geo. 127;) or to neglect to countermand a writ of execution after proceedings have been enjoined, (Woodley v. Bodington, 9 Simp. 214;) or to do the act enjoined as agent or servant for another person, (Potter v. Muller, 1 Bond, 601; Sickles v. Borden, 4 Blatch. C. C. 14;) or to work for wages in a factory, the product of which is the prohibited article, (Goodyear v. Mullee, 5 Blatch. C. C. 429;) and defendant is liable to attachment for the acts of his servant, although done without his.knowledge, (Rantzen v. Roths. child, 14 W. R. 96.)
.,DUNXS: ,'V. GEEY.
"The master is of the opinion that, under the principles the ,P9uld not laid down quietly acquiesce in the sale of the prohibited articles by his minor son :iI1the course of a. business in which he was himself employed and fromwpich he drew his sahtry.; ,b,ut that he was bound to have exercised his parental authority to prevent the violation oftlleinjunction, and is liable'to attachment for failure to do so. It may be that if he' can afterto wards show to the court that he has made the ex.ercise such. authority; that he hasex.hausted every means of compelling obedience, and that he is unable to prevent the violation·of the injunctiOn, he may be relieved from further liability;. but up to this time he has mode no such attempt to exercise his authority, even to the extent of remonstrance, and therein, in the master's opinion, he has failed to obey th6 decree of the court. For these reasons the master is of opinion that the attachment should be issued." Both parties filed exceptions to this report-the complainants upon the ground that the testimony showed actual fraud, and the respondents upon the ground that the testimony showed an emancipation of Elmer IT. Grey, and that the latter's actions did not render his father liable to attachment. Thomas J. Grier and George W. Dyer, for complainant. John E. Shaw, for respondent. BUTLER, D: J. The court is of opinion that the exceptions should be dismissed and the master's report confirmed, but will not issue the attacnment if the respondent will obtain from his son, and file in court, an agreement to refrain from hereafter mauufacturing or selling the articles which infringe complainant's patents. Subsequently such an agreement was executed by the son, with the consent of the Boston principal, Mr. Ladd, and was filed by respondent. The court ordered that respondent pay the master's fee, the other costs to abide the final result of the cause.
SCHOONER MARGARET V. STEAMER
(District Oourt, E. D. PennsylfJania.
September 29, 1880.)
BAllE-OBJECT AND EFFECT OF STATUTORY PROVISION.-The object in requiring the torch is to notify approaching vessels that another .is in front. If this knowledge is furnished in any other way, the office of the torch is performed and its exhibition is immaterial.
Libel by the master of the schooner Margaret against the steamer C. Whiting, to recover damages for loss by collision. The facts were as follows: Between 4: and 5 o'clock on the morning of November 2, 1877, the schooner was beating down the Delaware river against the wind and with the flood tide just making. The wind was blowing a whole-sail breeze, there was a drizzling rain, and it was commencing to storm. In tacking from side to side she had reached mid channel on her port tack, sailing close hauled, when she was run into on her port side and sunk by the steamer, which was coming up the river at the rate of about six. knots per hour. The steamer was not observed from the schooner until within about 15 or 20 yards. The schooner had proper lights, but did not exhibit a lighted torch as required by section 4234 of the Revised Statutes, and had no such torch on board. The lookout on board of the steamer first discovered and reported the green light of the schooner off the steamer's starboard bow. According to the testimony of one of respondent's witnesses the schooner was then about a mile distant. The other witnesses could not fix the distance. Upon
"Prepared by Frank P. Prichard, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.