In 1'e ZIMMERMAN.
(Uirouit (Jourt, No D. (JalifO'7'nia. February 28, 1887.)
' is, the offense of desertion. 2., SAHE.-,.J'U,RISDICTION OF, AND MILITARY COURTS. The civil courts have no /l.uthority to review, control, or in any manner in· , tadere with the action of the milite,ry tribunals, while, regularly, engaged in the e:J;ercise of their apPtopriate jurisdiction. 8. EiAHE.....STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. , The bar of the statute of limitations provided for in the 103d article of war in the Case of a party charged with desertion, is a defense, to be set up in the case, which the military court trying the charge, ha,s jurisdiction to determine for without interference from the civil courts. 4. SAME-TWo YEARS' LWITATION." " ," The provisions of the 103d article of war. providing, that, "no person shall be ,liable to be tried and punished fOr any offense, which appears to have been comlllitted, ,more th/in two years before the o,f the order for such trial," is applicablf3 to:thll offense Qfdesertion; and It is, the duty of 'courts· martial ,as to this offense a,s well as 'iIi all cases within its terms, to give full effebt to this Pfovision of the statlJte; , ,
.A:ro.n-, AND NAVY-COURTS·M:ARTIAL-JURISDICTION-DESERTION. 'The military courts have to try all military offenses, committed by 'parties enlisted in the mIlitary servioe of the United States, among which,
, A minor over 18 and under 21 years of age, who enlists in,the army of th'6 United States, with6utthe consent of his parent or guardian, can commit the military offense, of,desertion. and the military tribunals jurisdiction t() , try a minor so enlisting upon a charge of The civil courts have no Jurisdiction to discharge a'minor, who enlisted 'in the army, in violation of section 1117 of the Revised Statutes, who is in,cus· tody of the military tribuna,ls, awaiting 8 trial, ordered to take place before a. court-martial. upon 8 charge of desertion.
" , ' , ' ",'
b1J the Oourt.)'
On Habeas OOryus. Before SAWYER, circuit judge, and HOFFMAN, district judge. Ward McAUister, Jr., forpetltioner. H. B. Burnham, Dep. Judge Ad; Gen., for
21 years of age, and taking theulrual oath of enlistment'found on page74, par. 76, U. S. Army Regulations of 1881. He was assigned to duty in Company D, Twenty-first United States Infantry. He served as llo soldier, one year, one month, and 2Tdays, receiving the pay, and allowances, provided by law, up to, and including, April 30, 1874. On June10, 1874, he deserted at Camp Warren, Oregon, taking his gun and equipments with hiro. On November 12, 1886, he, voluntarily, surrendered, as a deserter, to the commanding officer at the presidio, and upon said surrender he presented to the officer an affidavit, in which hestated, that he was born in Switzerland on November 2, 1853, and nexed thereto what purported to be, an official certificate of the proper
1873, enlisted as a soldier in the United for the term of five years, at Jersey City , NewJeraey,declaringatthe time, that he was
The petitioner, a native of SWitzerland, on April 17,.
officel', showing that fact; that he came to the United States in 1872, enlisted in 1873, and deserted June 10, 1874, at which time he was still a minor; that, at the time of his enlistment, he was unable to speak, and understand'the English language; did not realize the importance of the act, and was, fraudulently, without the consent of his parents, or guardian, he being a minor, having a father under whose control he was, in New York city; that he had led an honest, industrious life, as evidence of which. he presented certificates of his employers for several years; th!:tt he was engaged ttl be married, a:rid wished to establish hims,elf, I1ndiri order to avoid any complications in the future, arising from and his ullsettied obligation to the United States, he surrf'ndered to be discharged. Whereupon, inste8.d of being distlharged, he was taken into custody; charges and specifications for desertion were presentedagainst hini, and he was ordered by the lieutenant general to those charges.bY a military court. He was in custody , be tried awaiting such trial, when the writ of habeas corpm, issued. So far, there is no 4ispute aboutthe factS: ' ' The petitioner claims, that he was a minor, under the age of 21 years, both he enlisted, and whenpe left the servlC6; that he bad a livi.I)g,in New York, under whose control be was, and that he was enlistedwithotlt the consent of his father; and, 'that, his enlistment was absolutely void,' and c?nsequelltly, there could be no 'legal oft'e118e, of desertion. That he enhsted while under age withoutthe consent or his father, is nofadmitted by the Judge advocate, who declares, that d<?eB not know anything about it.,' From the time of desertion, June 10, 1874, till his surrender, when he was taken into custody, November l2',1886, was ovet 12 years. And the time of the expiration (lithe term for which he enlisted, April 17,1878, till he was taken , into custOdy, upon his surrender, and the order for trial, is eight years and about six months, during all which time, except about six months absence in 1881, on a visit to Mexico, and Switzerland, he was within thejurisdfction of the military authorities, and at all times amenable to arrest and trial for desertion. Upori this point there does not appear to be any dispute. It is not claimed that he was out of the jurisdiction of the military authorities, or that there was any Obstruction to his arrestor trial. Under the l03d article of warwhichprovides, that, "no persoh sha.llbe liable to be tried and 'pufii!!hed for allY offense', which appear!!, to have been committed 'tll<>te-th/tD. two years before issuing of the '6rder forsain trial,'i etc., uI!0n'thle,conceded facts of the case, the petitioner insists, that the mili'tary.couit:has no jurisdiction to try him; and that 'he is, unlawfully, he;Ld _for that 'purpose; arid, therefore. unlawf\illy restrained of his liberty. ,,'. "'" " " .," , " .-' ",' ''In: .Be'Bogart; 2 Sa"'y .397; thiBeourt, the and disfri'ct judgeB fuilitary cOUrt, hadJurisdietion to try military that' a' and :tb'e:#atute Of limitations I were . of dMense, which 'must be investigated and determiIied iuthe exercise of jurisdiction, and not matters upon which the jurisdiction to v.30F.no.3-12
hear and d,eterm.ine tIfe charge depends; that these matters, ,cannot be inquired into on habeas corpus; that tIfe civil courts have no jurisdiction to review the action of the military' courts, acting within their jurisdiction, and, still less, to anticipate, and the latter in exercise of their law.ful jurisdiction. This question was again examined and the decision affirmed, In re White,,9,,'sawy. 49, 17 Fed. Rep. 723, Mr. Justice FIEw,and the circuit Judge concurring. These decisions were approved, and followed by Mr. Circuit Judge WALI,ACE, In re Davi8M, 21 Fed. Rep. 618, reversing the district court on point. The jurisdictioll toAry offenses committed in the or ;military service, unobstructed by the civil courts, ",as, recogni,zed in Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13, an<:lBogart's Case approvingly cited. rd. 22. That the civil courts cannot,interfere with courts-martial in of their legitiltUl,te jurisdiction, was held supreme court in Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 570, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1050. And in Smith v. Whitney, ,116 U. S,. 177, 6 Sup. Ct. 570, thesuprem.e court says, "this court has repeatedly recognized the general'rule, that the of ,a, court-lllartial within the scope of its jurisdiction, q,n¢ d'Jlty, cannot, be cOlltrolled reviewed in the by writ.of otheruJi8e/'and with numerous other cases cites. both In, re Bogart, 2 Sawy; ,396,and Inre White, 9 $awy.49, ,17, thereby recognizing thOse casesas, properly, laying dowtl; an,d applying, the law. " ·. ..',' But it is ,earnestly insisted, the petitioner, that the niilitary courts, in-pursuance of an, order orMr. Cameron, made in 1877" secreta;ry, of war"decline, tg to the lill).itation fopnd. t4e 10M of war; and courts protect the Pllt1tiqn¢r, ,and'such as are, similarly, situated,they' have no protection;' and' are, arbitrarily, and' wrongfully; deprived :of personal rights granted auq.assured by of thetJnited States.. Numerous instances cited, which, it is alleged show this state of factll. . We do not know the precise facts orviews upon which thecourts-inartiaIacted in ihenticases, But we ;have nQhesitationiri Saying that inour judp;ment the to3d' article of war applies to the offense of desertioJ:l as we11;as to offenses... Desertionis an ofJ'ense,under the,statute, p,unishableby aeverest ,llenaltiell, the express of the that; II no per8on, shall be liable tq,be tried and pUJ;1ished * * * -for any offense, :wniohappears tohavebeen committed more' than two the issuing of the, order Jor such . This is of the largest, alld most comprehensiv:e' There is.no exception, _ or that. c.an.,reasonably, ,'be' impHe<i ,'of the Offeris.e.,' o.f d.. esert.i.o.n." .. .. There seems to be no roqm for'construction; To interP9Iate intO the provisiolJ. im exception of offense of is, ,all it appears to us, clearly, to legislate, riot to construe, or interpret. If this qffense ca.n be tak;ell out of the so may any, and all others, and AAQ nugatory, by to be a manifestly unjustifiable, ltlling, of the secretary of war, an,d'o)" . courts-martial, -if followed by them, acting; iii deference or $ubortliriatiou, " ,, , thereto.
IN BE ZIMMERMAN.
A question has arisen, desertion is a continuing offense, in such sense, that the statllte does not begin to run till tWe expiration ofthe term of enlistment. A continuing civil, Or military', obligation, to serve till the expiration of the term of enlistment, is one thing; and a continuing criminal offense, if such there can be, which is perfected, and ripe for charges and trial, at the moment it is "ccrmmitted," for the purpose of barring a trial and punishment under the statute of limitations, is quite another. Some, however,maintain the affirmative of the proposition, notwithstanding the language of the statute is after the offense "appears to have been ccrmmitted." AlthOugh by no means satisfied with that view, yet, for the requirements of this case, conceding, that desertion is a continuing offense, for the purpose of the statutory bar, during the entire term of enlistment; therein differing from a breach in other contracts for a specific term of service, and that the statute does not begin to rUn although the offense is complete and ripe for trial and punishmAnt at the moment the desertion is complete, or offense committed, till the expiration ofl!luch term, still the petitioner was not attested, and the order for trial was-not issued, till more than eight years after the expiration of his term of enlistment. The statute had, therefore; run in his favor several times over, even upon that hypothesis. We do not ourselves, entertain the slightest doubt that this petitioner, upon .the facts now appearing, is entitled to the full benefit of this provision of the statute. If we are right on this proposition, then an erroneous ruling of the milita-ryauthorities which upon the facts as theyappear in this case, or in any case, where the deserter has been within the jUrisdiqtlon of the military authorities, with'no obstacle in the way of arrest" anq at all times amenable to arrest and trial for two years, after tb,e offense appears to have' been committed, fails to give full effect to ilie statutotybar no matter how well intentioned, and a in pursuance of such ruling, inflicts a great wrong upon the citizen so sit.uated, ,tnedand punished. "It may well be, that, inter armal!ilent leges. The exigencies of active war, sometimes require eVe1l the suspension of the great writ of habeas coryus-thebulwark of pefsonalliberty., But in times of profound peace, the military, no more than the civil authorities, can willfully place them· selves above the laws, without an unwarrantable usurpation of authority. Military, as well as civil courts, may, unintentionally, err in judgJnlimt, upon questions open to doubt; We do not, and we cannot, im, pute to these military courts, or the secretary of war, a purpose to deliberately,l1nd willfully disobey the law, or refuse to give it full effect. If wrong in their construction, they undoubtedly actin strict accordance :with their view of the law, and of their duty. But, 8.S3uming, for the purposes of this case, only, that suoh wrongs are inflicted, as' alleged,delibe'rately, or other,,:ise, there is, still, under the decision ot the supreme court, and authorities cited, no rijviewing, . contrOlling,_ in the <llvil courts. Congress,itlsuch cases, triui:!tlift'ord a remedy, or the wrongs must be' endured. We must
therefore, adpere to the rulings upon this point heretofore made. But under our views, had we the Jurisdiction to do so, wesbould not hesitate to give full effect to ,the bar of the statute by discharging the prisoner, on this ground. The attention of congress appears to have been attracted to this supposed failure of the military authorities to give effect to the statute of limitations, with respect to the ,offense of desertion; for, since the other portions of this opinion were written. our attention has been called to the passage of a,bill by the senate, amending the 103d article of war, and specifically mentioning by name, the offense of desertion, as included within its purview, thus; giving emphasis to the only construction, as it appears to us, that the, article, as it now stands, will, reasonably, bear. . '. , ".j , But, whether petitioner wasin the military within the melining of t4e law, at the time .of the alleged desertion, is, a Jurisdictional fact, anci open to inquiry in, the civil courts. If he was not in contempll1tion of law, in the military sel;'vice, at the tim;e, then, there could ,be no offense of desertion; anq ;the ,military court had no jurisdiction to try him at all. , The l;llilitary courts are cQUrt$'o(special, limited--I).ot generaljuri.sdiction. While the civil courts cannot interfere with the military courts, when actlng within their judsdiction, it is the province of the former, to confinathe latter, strictly, to of their special jurisdiction. Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. 8.167,.6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570. In Bogart's 2 Sawy. 396, and in Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 21, the court inquired into the fact, whether ,the petitioners were in the nayal service, at the time when the alleged offense was COIDIl1itted, and, on finding that they were, held, that the courts were proceedil,)g within their appropriate jurisdiction, and refused on that ground to, interfere. case, the jurisdiction depends upon the fact, whether petitioner, at the time of his enlistment,and alleged desertion, was under 21 years old, and enlisteq without the consent of his father under whose control he was; and if so, whether such enlistment, was void. ab initio under tpe statute, in such not a soldier, in the service of the United States. For sense, that he the purposes of this decision, we shall assume, that the petitioner was :under 21 years of age, both at the date of his enlistment,. and of his desertion; and that he ewisted without the consent of his father. Upon this assumption,what was his legal status? ' Section 1 of the act of 1872, un,clerwhich the enlistment was made, provides: that "no person under the age of 21 years. shaU be enlisted ormU$into the military service of the United States,Ujithout the written consent, of his parents, or guardian; provided, that, such minor has such parents, or guardians, entitled to his custody andcontroI." 17 St. 117. (secpon 1117, Rev. St.) And the next,section, makes it an offense for anyofficar to knowingly violate the pr(lceding ,section, punishable by dis Il1 issal from se.t:vice, or such other punishment as the co.urt-martial shall direct. Article 47 of the articles of war, provides, that "any solJierwho, having received pay, or having duly enlisted in the service of the United States,
deserts the same, shall * * * suffer * * * in time of peace, any punishment excepting death, which a court-martial shall direct." Rev. St. § 1342. The petitioner enlisted, taking an oath that he was 21 years old, in all respects indue form except that he did not obtain the consent of his father. He actually served, and "received pay," over a year, and then' clandestinely abandoneu the service, carrying with him his gun, and accoutrements, and he is now,held for trial upon charges for such desertion. He was a soldier de facto, and "received pay," as such, whether" duly enlisted" or not, and thus he falls within the.first alternative provided, which does not seem to require any due enHStment, as an element in the offense. ' A number of authorities are cited from the state courts,and one from a United States district court, in which.it is, stated, generally, by the judges, in the course of the decisions,that an enlistment by a minor under the statute, the consent of his parent, or guardian, is, void,andi not merely voidable. The strongest instance of the use of such language is, perhaps, that of United States Distriot Judge MCCANDLESS in Tu,rner'aGure,wherein he says: "It is objected, that he is a deserter, and subject to military law. The return to thtia writ dOe8not make him a deserter." ,But, he observes, outside menta ()f the case, that, "there can be no criminal desertion, if the enlistment WlllS illegal. It was a declaration, merely, of an intention not to be bound...o..a disclaimer of the contract, which, under the ,act of congress, he had a right to make, in the absence of the consent oLhis parent, or guardian." He quotes from a prior case the following: "In the presence of the enemy, or in the enemy's country, even camp-followers would,'probably, be amenable to marliallaw, for, if they w.ere not, the flafety of ,tM, army might be somewhat jeopardized by theirdeserti!>nto the enemy. It ,could only be in tha;t light that a person, unlawfully, enlisted, anll hllld, without authority of law, could be amenable to military punishment." Turner's Oa&e, 2 Pittsb. 373, 374. ' , ' . But the statute, in defining the offense of desertion, says nothing about being in the presence of the enemy. The presence of theen,emy is not made by the statute an element in the offense· of desertion. Desertion is a statutory offense. and it is difficult to perceive, why, a party under the terms of the statute, should be amenable to trial by military for the offense of desertion, when he deserts inane place, when he would not, by desertion in another. The liability to martial law in the presence of the enemy must arise from other considerations than, and ·outside of the provisions ()f this statute. Is a party unlawfully enlisted, .amenable to trial by courts-martial for any statutory military offense? If amenable for any other statutory offense, why not for de facto desertion? The following additional cases are cited by petitioner to sustain the same view: ann. v. Locke, 8 Phila. 225; In reCarlton, 7 Cow. 471; 8luxYm..er'8 Gure, Car. Law Repos. 55 j ann. v. Ha'l"f'i.8on, 11 Mass. 63 j Ex parte Maaon, 1 Murph. 336; Com. v. Fox, 7 Pa. St. 336.· But in all these cases, including Turner'8, the application for the writ of habeas .C07})'U8, was by parents to have their minor sons discharged from military .service, only, not from custody of courts-martial, holding them specially
court woullJ,pe1'haps. not look beyond or behind the proceedings which were to bring him bifore a milita1"lJ court," , 7 Pa. St. 340. Why not,' if the court were proceeding to try the party for what could
for trial upon charges for desertion, or other military offenses committed while de facto in the military service. And the observations of the judges have reference to the facts of the particular cases before them. In Fox's (h8e, one of the strongest, cited, to maintain the position of the petitioner, COuLTER, J., takes care to say: " It doea not appear, from the return of the officers. that the minor is tmder arrest for the crime ofdeae1'tirJn, and is'to be tried by a court-martial. That might p08sibly, make some difference. If he was in proceas of t1'ial. this
not, possibly,be an offense for which he was amenable, to the military authorities? Were this like those cited by petitioner, the case of a parent applying to the court for the discharge from further service of his minor son, in active service at the time, who had been enlisted in violation of the provisions of section 1117 of the Revised Statutes; and nothing more, we should not hesitate to make the order for discharge. But this is not the position of the petitioner. He is not in the service, his term of enlistment having long since expired, but he is held in custody for trial upon a charge for a gross military offense, alleged to have been committed when he was de facto in actual .service. This presents a very different question for'solution. While no case deciding the exact, point now presented in favor of the, petitioner, is cited, or has come under our, notice, there are several cases to the contrary. The exact question arose In reDa'lJimn,. on appeal to the circujtcourt in the southemdistrict of New York, and was, carefully, and,ably, considered by Citcuit Judge He held that a minor, enlisted in the army; 'without the consent of his parents, or guardian, was amenable to trial by the military courts for the offense of desertion; and the petitioner was, accordingly, remanded. In Re Da'lYi8on, 21 Fed. Rep. 622, 623. The propriety of the distinction, ing an enlistment in violation of the provisions of section 1118 to be absolutely' void, 'while one in contravention of section'1117, is only voidable-the prohibitory language, llno person under the age of years, shall be enlisted or mustered- into the military service"-being identi<lal, is not entirely clear to our minds. ;But the decision is<an authority, in point, at least, as to section 1117,and entitled to the highest respect. So, in theQlu of McOonologue, taken from the military authorities on habeas cO'Jpus, while under arrest for desertion, Mr. Justice GRAY, now of the United States supreme court in deciding the case said, "A minor's contract of enlistment is indeed voidable, only, and not void, and, if, before a writ of habei:tscorpus is suedO'ut to avoid it, he is arrested 'on charges for desettion,he sl'1tf>uldnot bere1easoo:by the court,while proceedings for. his trial by themilitax:y authorities'are proceeding.".Citing as authoritiils onthepbint Dews' Case, 25: 'Law Rep. 538; Tyler v. Pome:rrY!h S. AI.. len, 480, 501; Com: v. Gamble, 11 Serg.& R. 93, which see. Mceono.-. logue)s Otse, i1i07 Mass. 154. So in Ex paTte Anderson, 16 Iowa, 595,
Mr. Juslice DILWN while on the bench of the supreme court of Iowa, held, that, "wqen the return to a writ of habeas corpus shows that a prisoner -is held to answer a charge of the military crime of desertion, of which the military courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, the court wiU not inquire into the validity of his enlistment, but wiU remand him for trial by the colfrtwhich has jurisdiction of the offe1lse." This is. also, directly, in point. See, also, In re WaU, to the same effect. 8 Fed. Rep. 85. Whatever doubts we might entertain, were the point presented for de'<lision for the first time, upon these authorities, all of which present the precise point for decision, being one way, we hold,. that the court-martial has jurisdiction to try thecasej that the demurrerm the return must -overruled, the writ discharged, and the prisoner remanded. As f3uggested by Mr. Circuit Judge LoWELL in Wall's Case, supra. should it that a minor unlawfully enlisted without the consent of his father, after such enlistment, notified his commander, that he:repudi. ated'hie contract of enlistment, as illegal, be,furtherbound by it, returned his gun and equipments, and then openly left, avowing his leavi1'>gto be in consequence of the repudiation of his contract, as illegal, we are not prepared' to say, that he would not be' entitled till his if, afterwards, arrested, and held for trial on a charge of based upon these acts. But it will be time enoughto decide thatpoipt when the question arises. . Up9n the view we take, the fact, that the petitioner, ,Vvhen -and:when he deserted, was a minor; that he was living with, and the -oontrolof his father, and enlisted without his consent, are immaterial, to the decision, and, we, therefore, for that reason, decline to 'retain the case fOl. ptoofs of those facts. If on appeal, the supreme' court should be of opinion, that we are wfong, on this proposition, it will,. course, .judgment, and remand the case with. instrlictioq to permit the, taking of proofs upon those points. As there,is now anappeaI to the 'Supreme court from judgments in haMascorpus Gases,. where a pll.rty is allegedto be in violation of the laws of the United States, it is hoped, that this case' Will be appealed, and, that an authoritati'\l"e demay be had upon all the \Texed questions noticed in this decision. . l.etth.e.demurrer to the return be overruled, the application to present the proofs indicated, denied, the writ discharged, and remanded to the custody of respondent.
KALr.sTRoM and others.
(Di8trit'.t. (Jourl, W:D. Michigan, No D. 1887.)
INTERNAL REVENUE-WHOLESALE LIQUOR DEALERS LICENSE.
Where retail liquor dealers organize themselves under the style of a "Protection Union," and sign "artfcles" pledging themselves to purchase beer through the "Union " of brewers in another state, by which means they save two dollarsabarrel,and, no wholesale licenses having been taken out as providedby Rev. St. 0:. S.J 3242, such purchases are made through the secretary and treasurer or the" union," who is paid nothing for his services, the memo bers being changed only with freight, atorage, and the like. the retail dealers bec<?me wholesale dealers, and are liable to the penalty set out in that section. . .
Indidtment under Rev. St. U.S.§3242, for carrying on the business of wholesale liquor dealers without licenses. The following letter from the district to the circuit judge states the
GR..uID RAPIDS, MIOH.,: October 13, 1886. Htm. HowellE..Tackson-MY DBAB.JUDGE:.At my last term, at Mara case was tried before meinvohring a question upon which I was in ,great doubt. The case was this,: Pertain retail liquor dealers, who were saloon keepers at Garden City, in the upper peninsula, and who had obtained licenses, as such, had. been. su,rp)ied, with. beer by a wholesale dealer whose 'place of business was also there·. Fipding that they could supply themselves .at two dollars less per barrel than the 'local dealer was' selli ng at, these retail dealers organized themselves into ahiassociation which they. called the "ProtectionUnion;" composed of themselves and some dealers of their class from towns, the several signing what they termed "articles," but wbich, in faet, were nothing more. than a pledge that they would severpurchase their beer, through the troion, of a certain house of brewers in Milwaukee. They appointed a seCretary and treasurer. They had a place of deposit, where. when an invoice of beer arrived by rail from Milwaukee, the beer was stored in barrels.. Whetl any of the members wanted beer. he would send a drayman, with an order to the s6C1:etaryand treasurer, who was the same person. It would be the draymao for him. and a memoranquAl of it made, and, on the demand, it was paiq for by the mem.1>,(;,r' .theactual cost) by As fast as the stock began to get low, each member would make hIS estImate of about what he would want of the t1ext order, and the secretary and treasurer would make out an order in the name of the Unioo for the amount (.abolIt) of the aggregate of the orders, and send it into the Milwaukee concern, which would thereupon ship the beer, by car·load, to the "Protective Union," against which the bills were made out. These bills were paid by the secretary and treasurer, who collected from each the payment for so much as he actually had, and no more. Thus there would be some time between the shipment of the beer and the payment therefor to the Milwaukee people. As between themselves, each member of the Union was liable only for what he had, though probably, as between them and the Milwaukee house, each would be liable, in sulido, for the whole of the stuff sent. The Union made no The secretary and treasurer, who was one of their number, charged nothing for bis services; and charges for which the members paid, freight. storage, and the like, were to cover actual casb only. Tbe wholesale dealer on tbe ground was. of course, crowded out. Tbe Union paid no liquor tax.