flettled and just rule of law that. the conduct of one party to a contract which prevents the other party from performing his part is an excuse for I will not further discuss this question, as the rights of thEi' plaintiffs involved in the issues presented by the pleadings have been :determhlledby a· fair and impartial trial. I· think. that a :deoided preponderance of the evidence showed that the failure'ofthe saw-mill to do good work was caused by the defendants not being willing to pay sufficient compensation to secure the services of experienced and ,oompetent engineers and workmen to operate machinery that required skillful. management. "For the consequences of mismanagement, inattention; and the want of the required skill in the working 'the plaintiffs are not, p.or does their contract in any manner make them, 'responsible"in this action., Tysonv. Ty8on, 92 N. C. 291. Motion for· new trial disallowed.
(OtreUft Oourt, .
Oo.v. McKENNA '8.nd others.
, The' procurement of workmen·who are erilrloyed upon terms as to . whioh are aust :and satisfaetory to quit work In·a body for the purpose of Indamage upon thf1employerby who are not in his employ, uil!il the accede to ohuch outsid.e persons, whIch he 'IS under no obhgation to grant, constItutes in law a malIcIOUS " andiIlee:al interference with the business, which is actionable. ,2. SAME-BOYQOTT-DA)1:AGES-MISPEMEANOR-PEN. CODE. N. Y. § 168. . . . Peclaring and attempting to enforce a boycott for the purpose of compelling an employer to pay such a rate of wages to his employes as the boycotters who are not in his employ might demand, are acts rendering- the boycotters liable in damages, and are also misdemeanors at common law as well as by . Pen. Code N.' Y. § 168.
8: ! SUrE-Ll\BORItRS'
associations designed to coerce workmen to become members of such.combinations .or associations, orto int,erfere with, obstruct, vex, or annoy them in or in obt'aining wqrk, because they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members; or designed to prevent employers from making a just discrimination in the rate of wages paid to the sl,tiHful and to the unskmfu\;tp' the diJigent and to tpe lazy; to the efficient and to'the inefficient; and all deslgned to interfere with the perfect freedom of employers in' 'the <proper management and control of their lawful business, or to jlictate in, iany particular upon which their businesssha,ll be conducted, by mes,l1S of threats of injur,vpr loss, by interference with. their property or traffic, 'or with their lawful 'employment of other .persons, or designed to abtidgeanjr I>f these rights;-'-atepro tanto illegal com. bina,ti.ona or furtheran,cEj;atsl1ch intentions ,by, !?Y 4,arnage, are actionable. .'
",,' . An' action to recover clarnagesfrorn rnose who have combined to do Suchan
injury..toa plaintiff'sbusinese, and the use of his property, is "an action an injury to property," withiii the meaning of section 549" subd. 2, Code ". 'P·roe. N, Y'iand order fo.r the arl'est ·of defen,dants.may be grmli'ed therelll.
'" ,SAME.,-ACTION-"INJURY TO PROC. N. Y. § 549, Su'lm.
OLD DOMI!iOION STEAM-SHIP CO.
Motion to Discharge from Arrest. OlareiWe: A. Seward, f9r plaintiffs. LnvisF'. Post and Samuel Ashton, for defendants. BROWN, J. This action was brought to recover $20,000 damages alleged to'have been sustained by the plaintiff through the unlawful action onhe defendants in the recent strike of the longshore-men, and in their attempt to boycott the plaintiff in its business as a common carrier. The defendants are alleged to constitute, or to style themselves, an "Executive Board of the Ocean Association of the Longshore-men's Union." Atthe time of the commencement of the action they were arrested and held to of arrest issued in conformity with the state practice. bail under Thedeferidants now move, upon the plaintiff's papers only, to vacate the order of'l:l.rrest,on the ground t4at the material facts charged are alleged on. information and belief only; without a suffici.l:JI'J,tstatement of the sources of-information; that the facts stated do not make out a prima jaciecaf!Je;that it appears that the defendants were acting within their legal rigbts; and that the plaintiff's loss, if any, is damnum absque injuria; and that, at best, the plaintiff's case is so doubtful that the order of arrest should: not be sustained. I. have carefully considered the elaborate arguments of counsel, and examined the'numerous authorities referred'to. For lack of time, I can only: state my conclusions: 1. .'All the material averments are either stated positively, or the source ' of information is sufficiently indicated. 2. The facts stated in the complaint and affidavit constitute a legal · cause ofaction against aU the defendants, for the actual damages Buffered, for the following reasons: (a) The plaintiff waS engaged in the legal calling of a common carrier, owning vessels, lighters, and other craft used in its business, in the employrnentof which numerous workmen were necessary, who, as the complaint avers, were employed "upon terms as to wages which were just and satisfactory." (b) The defendants, not being in plaintiff's employ, and without any legal justification, so far as appears,-a mere dispute about wages, the merits of which are not stated, not being any legal justification,-procured plaintift's workmen in this city and in southern ports to quit work ill a body ,for the purpose of inflicting injury and damage upon the plaintiff until it should accede to the defendants' .demands, and pay southern negroes the same wages as New York longshore-men, which the' plaintiff was under no obligation to grant; and such .procurement of workmen :toquit work being designed to inflict injury on the plaintiff, and not being justified, constituted in law a malicious and illegal interference with the plaintiff's business. which is actionable. (c) After the plaintiff's workmen, through the defendants' procurement, had quit work, the defendants. for the further unlawful purpose of compelling the plaintiff to pay such a rate of wages as they might demand, declared a boycott of the plaintiff's business, and attempted to v.30F.no.1-4
prevent the plaintiff from carrying on any business as common carrier, or from using or employing its vessels, lighters, etc., in that business. and endeavored to stop all dealings of other persons with the plaintiff, by sending threatening notices or messages to its various customers and patrons,and to the agents of various steam-ship lines, and to wharfingers and warehousemen usually dealing with the plaintiff, designed to intimidate them from having any dealings with it, through threats of loss and expense in case they dealt with the plaintiff by receiving, storing, or transmitting its goods, or otherwise; and various persons were deterred from dealing with the plaintiff in consequence of such intimidations, and refused to perform existing contracts, and withheld their former customary business, greatly to the plaintiff's damage. (d) The acts last mentioned were not only illegal, rendering the defendants liable in damages, but also misdemeanors at com:Qlon law, as well as by se0tion 168 ofthe Penal Code of this state. (e) Associations ,have no more right to inflict injury upon others than individuals· have. All combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become members, or to interfere with, obstruct, vex, or.annoy them in working, or in obtaining work, because they are not meInbers, or in order to induce them to become members,; or designed W prevent employers from making a just'discrimination in the rate of wages paid to the skillful and to the to the diligent and to the lazy; to the efficient and to the inefficient; and all associations designed tointerfere with the perfect freedom of employers in· the proper ment and control oftheir lawful business, or to inanypait'ticular . the terms upon which theil:, business shall be conducted, by means of threats of injury or loss, by interference with their. property or traffic, or with their lawful employment of other persons, or designed to abridge any of these rights,-are pro tanto illegal combinations or associations; and all acts done in furtherance of such intentions by such means, and accompanied by damage, are actionable. See Greenh. Pub. Pol. 648,653; Peoplev. Fisher, 14 Wend. 1; Tarleton v. McGawleyj Peake. *205; Raja,elv. VerelBt, 2 W. Bl. 1055; lJumley v. Gye, 2 E1. & £1. 216; Bowenv. HaU, 6 Q. B. Div.333, 337; Gregory DtJ,ke oj Brunswick, 6 Man. & G. 205; Gunter v. Amor, 4 J. B. More, 12; Reg. v. Rowlands, 17 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 671, 685; Mogul St. 00. v. McGregor, 15 Q. B. Div. 476; Walker v. Oronin, 107 Mass. 555; Carew v.Rmherjord, 106 Mass. 1; State v. Donaldson,32 N. J. Law, 151; .Mallter Stevedores' A88'n v. Walsh, 2 Daly, 1, 13i Johnaton Co. v. Meinhardt, 60 How. Pro 168; Slaughter-house Oases, '16 Wall. 36, 116. 3. There is no such doubt concerning the plaintiff's legal rights- as should debar it from the usulll remedy. The motion to discharge from arrest is therefore denied.
IN RE HOOVER.
(District Oourt, 8. D. Georgia, E. D
HABEAS CORPUS-CIRCUIT COURT-SHERIFF.
March 1, 1887.>
Where the writ of habeas COrpU8 from the United States court is sought against the sheriff of a state court by one imprisoned for the violation of a state law, the petitioner must clearly show an irreconcilable antagonism be· tween the federa1law and the state law under which he is in custody. and distinguished.
2. SAME-CASE DISTINGUISHED. The case of rick Wo v. Hopkina, 118 U. S. 856, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064, cited,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLIOE POWER-REGULATING OOOUPATIONS.
Where the political power of a state for the safety of its people takes the responsibility of saying that certain occupations are hurtful, and will not be permitted in its boundaries, unless that declaration is so unreasonable as to be outside the domain of law, the occupation so stigmatized is no longer a right, privilege, or immunity, within the meaning of the constitution. 1
·· INTOXIOATING LIQUORS-RIGHT TO SELL NOT PRIVILEGE OF CITIZEN OF UNITED STATm8·.
The right to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of the privileges and im· munitiesof citizens of the United t::ltates ·which by the fourteenth amendment . the states were forbidden to abridge. 1 6. S.um-STATE PROHmITING OR REGULATING SliE. The state may authorize, or refuse to authorize, the sale of liquor on such terms as it thinkl!. proper, and the courts of the United States have nothing to do with the exer<lise of this police power.1 6. SllIlll-GEORGIA LAW VALlD. The law of the state complained of in this application is reasonable, necessary, and beneficia!.1 (811llabm by the Oourt.)
On "Application for Habeas Corpus. Oharles N. West, for petitioner. Fleming G. Du Bigrwn, for sheriff.
SPEER, J. On the twelfth day of February, 1887, Lemuel L. Hoover, resident of Chatham county, and a citizen of the state of Georgia, was beforEl the superior court of said county, the honorable A. P. ADAMS, J .. presiding, charged by indictment with spirituous liquors out a license from the state. On arraignment, Hoover pleaded guilty, and he was sentenced; and the court imposed a fine on him of $250, and the costs, and ordered, in default of payment, the alternative penalty of six months' imprisonment in the common jail. Hoover refused to pay the fine and costs, and was taken into custody by John T. Ronan, sheriff; and that official, with much kindness and liberality of conduct,having been apprised by Hoover that he purposed to test in this court the validity of his conviction, did not confine his prisoner, but detained him constructively. A petition for habea8 corpus was immediately presented to me. Ordinarily, in cases of this character, to gran< the writ is a ma-tter of course, and the legality of the detention is determined on the return of the arresting officer. On this application,
See Expai'te Kennedy,('rex.) 3 S. W. Rep. 114. and note.