mtendent;of.the Ashley Phosphate Company, (the respondent,) and proceeded to discharge the remaining 300 tons. Eight of the ten laydays had been consumed. The master was bound for two more days, and, by the custom oBhe port, he should discharge at least 70 tons per day. She got up the river on 21st, in a rain. The 22d is a public holiday by statute in South Carolina. This is not a lay-day. The case quoted by libelant (The Tangier, 23 How. 44) decides that Thanksgiving day was a lay-day. But that was a day of voluntary observance, not a holiday by statute. Besides this, the master and the consignees both agreed not to work on the twenty-second of February. On 23d and 24th the ship discharged 138 tons. On 25th, 26th, 28th, the rest of the cargo was discharged. The 27th was Sunday. For these three days the respondents must pay demurrage. Let decree be entered accordingly.
THE CHEROKEE. l
(lX8trict Court, D. South ()"airou,na. March
8ALVAGE-:SUIT TO RECOVER-PLEADING-AvERMENT OF OWNERBHIP.
In a suit for salvage, the libelant mUst allege specifically, and in a distinct article, who are the owners of the vessel alleged to have rendered the service in question. Ownership is, in a suit of this character, a material fact, and may become of essential importance to the respondent.
In Admiralty. Hearing on exceptions to libel. Mitchell, &: Smith, for BryOln &: Bryan, for respondent. SIMONTON, J. This is a motion, in the nature of a demurrer, as to the sufficiency of the libel. The libel begins in these words: "The libel of Thomas Young, owner of the steam-tug Monarch, of Charleston, for himself and all others, entitled against the S. S. Cherokee, in a cause of salvage, civil and maritime, alleges as follows: First;" etc. Nowhere in the allegations following this heading is it stated that Young is the owner of the tug Monarch; nor is his name mentioned or his ownership alluded to again. Upon this point respondent excepts to the libel. The ownership of the tug is a material fact, and it may pecome of essential importance in the protection of the respondent in obeying the decree of the court in this case. It should therefore be alleged in a distinct article, (Rule 23d, Adm.,) so that respondent may traverse it, if he be so advised, or at least may require proof of it. Even if this has not been adopted as the universal it is better pleading, Rnd this will be observed hereafter within this jurisdiction. It conforms to the opinion of the supreme court in McKinlay v. Morrish, 21 How. 343. The libelant will amend his libel to meet this objection.
Reported by Theodore M. Etting, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.
(Oircuit Oourt. B. D. Ge<>r!1ia, E. D. 'February 22,1887.)
RJlMOVAL OF CAUSEs-REMAND BY CONSENT.
Where a removable suit has been properly removed under the act of March 3, 1875. from a state court into this court, the consent of parties cannot authorize this court to remand the.. cause to the state court. Motion to remand.
(ByllabUs by tM Court.)
Action on Note. Removed from state court. Denmark & Adams, for plaintiff. Garrard & Meldrim, for defendant.
SPEER J. This-is a motion to remand a cause to the state court by consent parties.. From the record it appears that the commenced his action against the defendant in the state superIOr court, on, a promissory note for $1,110.07, payable to F .. Stubbs or bearer. It is alleged in the declaration that, after Its matunty, "indorsed, duly assigned, transferred, and delivered" the note to the' plaintiff, a non-resident. The 4efendant filed, with other pleas, a plea in the state court, alleging that the plaintiff is not, and never was, the true owner of thE) note suedon, and that it is necessary, for the protection of the defendant, that the title of the holder of note be inquired into. The plaintiff then had the'cause removed to this court, under the act of March 3,1875, alleging in his petition that,atthe time the action was commenced, he was,and still is, a citizen of the state of South Carolina, and the defendant a citizen of the state of Georgia. The transcript of the record from the state court was filed in the clerk's office of this court, June 25, 1888. An order in the following terms, and signed by counsel for both parties, is now presented to the court for its signature: "Upon motion and consent plaintiff and defendant, it is ordered by the court that said cause be. and the sarne is hereby remanded, to the state court." I do not think this the authority to make the order. When a cause is properly .removed to this jurisdiction, under the act of March 3, 1875, the jurisdiction of the, state court is finally determined.' It ceases to exist. Further proceedings by it would be coram non judice. New York Silk Manufg Co. v. Second Nat. Bank, 10 Fed. Rep. 204; Shaft v. Phamix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 544. The authorization to remove a cause from the federal to the state court is expressed as follows: "Where it shall be made to appear, to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been removed thereto, that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the. jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined. either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act, the said court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss or remand it to the court from which it was removed. as justice may require." Act March 3, 1875, § 5, (18 St. U. S. 470.) v .30F.no.9-41