negligent handling of the tug, and the faulty position of the Lord Warden, collided with the latter. The commissioner appointed to ascertain the damage suffered by the Sllica allowed demurrage at the rate of $92 a day, the amount stipulated. in the Silica's charter-party, for time lost while undergoing repairs. To this. counsel for the Protector excepted, on the groqnd that the Silica was not entitled to more than the actual damage suffered; that the voyage must be considered as begun when the bark left London; and that the earnings of the bark must be apportioned over all the time that intervened between her departure from London and her arrival at Fiume, in order to ascertain the Pf!//" diem. loss. Oharles Gibbons, Jr., for the Silica. H. R. Edmunda. for the Lord Warden. Drivf!//" &- Ooulston, for the Protector.
BUTLER, J. The exceptions must be dismissed. The rule adopted by the commissioner for ascertaining damages from delay is, under the oircumstances, the proper one. Under ordinary circumstances, it is always so. In exceptional cases, such as The Potomac, 105 U. S. 630, the rule invoked by the exceptor is applicable. Here the otheris safer; and it gives the libelant less than he' would take under rule invoked 'againsthini;unless, indeed, we adopt the exceptor's method of ascertaining profits; that is, by including the profitless passage from London, in the voyage, though the vessel was not chartered until she came to Philadelphia. This we could' not do.
THE WISCONSIN. t
:(1)i8trict Oowrt, B. D.Ne1/) York. May 6, 1887.)
BALVAGE-SJIlRVIOEs-l'ILOT AS SALVOR-AWARD.
Libelant, 8 pilot, was on board t,he steamship W., but had not taken charge, when the v.essel ran ashore. Thereafter he rendered assistance by suggestions as to getting h,er off, and b, taking charge of her when she was floated in a rudderless'conditlon.He mcurred no risk; and was not called upon for any extraordinary exertion. Held,that he should recover $1.000·salvage.
A pilot may be a salvor, although aboard the vessel,ftbe has not yet assumed the relation of pilot to her.
PILOT MAY BE SALVOR.
'. The'statute of New Jersey (section 16 of the issue of 1846) relates to extraordinary pilotage services, A case of pilotage services. necessarily presupaid to an poses the vessel capable of being navigated. So a pilot, unnavigable vessel, is not bound by the above statute, and his services may be not those of a pilot, but of a salvor.
Reported by Edward G. ;Benedict, Esq., oltha New York bar.
In Admiralty. Whitehead, Parker & Dexter, for libelant. Nash & Kingsford, for claimant. BENEDICT, J. The principal objection made to the recovery of salvage by the libelant is that the libelant, being a pilot, was under a pre-existing covenant to do what he did towards getting the vessel off the shore, where she had grounded when not in h1Er charge. But, although the libelant was a pilot, and was on board the steamer, he had not assumed the relation of pilot to the vessel. According to an understanding to that effect, he had gone below to bed, to be called when his services as pilot were required, and while so below the ship grounded hard upon the shore of the SE;l8. He was under ilo agreement to assist the vessel after she had grounded. . Another objection to a recovery of salvage by the libelant is based upon the provision of the statute of New Jersey, (section 16 of the issue 'Of 1846,) as follows: . or deputy-pilot who shall have exerted himself for the of'any vessel appearing to bein distress,and in want of a pilot, llhaU' be entitled, for any extraordinary services, to such sum as. the pilot and. master, owner, or consignee can agree on, or, i:Q. case of not agreeing, as ,too. sbllJI determine to baa reward." This provision, it is said, made it the duty of the libela.ntto do what he could to aid the vessel after she grounded, and he cannot recover salvage, because services required by law as a duty are never compensated .as salvage services. But I am of the opinion that the provision of the statute above referred to created no legal obligation on the part of the libelant to exert himself for the preservation of this vessel, situated as she was. If this vessel, grounded as she was on the shore of the open sea, can be said to be "a vessel in want of a pilot," within the meaning of the statute referred to, still I am of the opinion that under the de·cision of the supreme court in Hobart v. Dragan, 10 Pet. 108, it cannot be held that the libelant was under legal obligations to render any services to her. The statute referred to relates to extraordinary pilotage services. A case of services, and the present is not a case of pilotage services, as pointed out by the supreme court of the United. States in Hobart v. Dragan, 10 Pet. 123, necessarily presupposes a vessel in a situation capable of being navigated. The steamer in question at the time of the commencement of the libelant's services was unnavigable, for she was hard ashore. The claim of the libelant appears to be clearly within the principle of the decision in Hobart v. Dragan. In this case, as in that, the services in question were rendered to a vessel wholly unnavigable, by one not connected with the vessel by any pre-existing covenant, and under circumstances when no legal obligation to aid in her preservation attached to the one rendering the services. I am bound, therefore, to conclude that the libelant's services were not those of a pilot, by consequence were those of a salvor. There remains to consider the amount proper to be awarded the pilot
for these services. The large sum suggested by him as a proper reward is based upon the idea that he saved the steamer. But such was not the fact. According to the testimony of the master and officers of the steamer, the pilot did nothing orany value. I am of the opinion, however, tbathe aided iIi the rescue ofthe steamer. The suggestions made by the pilot were of value, and his presence on board the vessel after she floated, and before she was taken in tow, tended to relieve the master to aeettain degree, and were calculated to give a confidence to those on board which otherwise might llothlj.ve existed. Indeed, for a time after the vessel floated, and before she was taken in tow, the pilot was in charge:, and under his direction the steamer, although rUdderless, instead of dodging off and on as the intended to do, waiting for tugs nearer the bar, which had been sent for, approached several ing astern, and using her sails in connection with her screw to direct her course.· But the pilot incurred no risk, and was pot called on to put forth any extraordinary exertions. The .which he claims to have made are such as would have occurred to any. (lompetent master, audit is impossible to say that the l3alvation of the steamer was dUe to the :exertions of the pilot. But he did render services of value to tl,le steamar as she was situated, and he is entitled to be. compensated liberally for what he did. In my opinion, he will be, so compensated by awarding him the sum of $1,000. For that sum, With costs, let him have a decree.
BOWMAN V. BOWMAN.
«(Jircuit (Jourt, N. lJ. lllinoi8.
:May 16, 1887.)
A suit for divorce was removed under the act of March 3, 1887. defendant denying in his petition the allegation of marriage set out in the bill, and claiming that the controversy arose between citizens of different states. Held, upon motion to remand, that the case could. not be removed upon the issue made, as the determination of such issue would not necessarily dispose of the case. 2. SAME-ACT:MAROH 3, 1887-AMoUNT IN CONTROVERSy-ALIMONY. , In a suit. for divorce, defendant alleged in his petition for removal that the amount in controversy exceeded $2,000, upon the ground that the complainant charged in her biil that he was the owner of valuable real estate, and received aD income of not less than $10,000 per annum; and prayed an award of alimony according to the equities of the case. Held, in view of the fact tbat the allowance of alimony was discretionary and the amount uncertain, that it could not be said to be a suit wherein the matter in controversy ex;ceeded the sum of $2,000. ' !In Equity. Bill for divorce.
Hogan, Case &- Hogan, for complainant. Frank J. Bowman, pro Be, and L. M. Shreve, for defendant.
Bt.oDGETT, J. This is a bill for divorce, originally filed by the complainant in the circuit court of Cook County, and by the defendant removed to this court. .A. motion is now made to remand on the that itis not a removable case. The application to remand was made in the state court before an answer was filed by the defendant; but in his petition for removal the defendant alleges that the complainant, Ida M. Bowman, was never married to the defendant, and is not his wife, but is a feme sale, and wholly denies the allegation of marriage set out in the bill; and alleges further that the defendant is a citizen of the state of Missouri, and the complainant is a citizen of the state of Illinois, and has been for many years, past, and that she was never a citizen of the state of Missouri. The right of removal is claimed upon the ground that the controversy in the case is between a citizen of Missouri and a citizen of Illinois, and that it involves more than the sum of $2,000; the defendant insisting that he has the right as a citizen of .Missouri to have the issue he makes in the case, that he was never married to the complainant, tried in this court. n is a rule so well fixed as not to require the citation of authorities in its support that the citizenship of the wife follows the citizenship of the husband; and hence, for this reason, perhaps more than any other, this class of litigation has never obtained admission in the federal courts. In Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, it is said: "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce,.or for the allowance of alimony, either as an 01'iginalproceeding in chancery, or a8 an incident to a divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board." v.30F.no.12-54