takes a building as he finds it, and if he preserves it in the same condition in which he received it, he is not liable for any injury which results alone from such condition. He must be guilty of some wrong, either of negligence, causing the insecurity and instability I or of disregard of some contract obligation to put it in repair and good condition. Clearly I so far as is disclosed, he was under rio responsibility for the injury. He was therefore improperly joined. The only real party is the owner of the building, and as he is a citizen of another state, he is entitled to a .removal to this court. Motion to remand overruled.
SHORT t1. CHICAGO,
(Olf'ttUit (Jour,- D. Minnuota.· December 15, 1887.)
CAUSES-AOT OF 8, 1887-Locll Act of congress of March 8, 1887, 2, provides that, in. suits in the state conrts, Where the defendant is a. ciilzen of- another state, he may have the cause removed to the circuit court of the United States if it shall be made to appear to the circuit court that fromprejlldiceor local influence he cannot obtain justice in the state court. Hetd that, under this section, a mere formal affidavit by the defendant that he believes that he calinot obtain justice because of prejudice or local influence is not sufficient; but the fact that such prejudice or local influence exists must be shown to the circuit by oral testimany or by affidavit. .
The W'o"yisions of the act of congress 1867, relating to the removal of causes from the state to the federal courts on the ground of prejudice and local influence; were repealed by the provisions of the act or congress of March 8, 1887, eVt;ln though express words of repeal were not used: .. 4. COURTS-ACT OF MARCH 8. 1881-SUIT AGAINST CITIZEN OF ANOTHER STATE. Under the provisions of act of congres!l of March 8, 1887, an action may be maintained in the circuit court of the United States against a citizen of another state. ·
The affidavit showing local prejudice and influence ,as a ground for theremoval, of from the state to the ·federal courts, under the provisions of act of congress of March 8,1887, maybe 'tiled in the state court, and a cer, titled copy thereof sent up to the cirGuit court.
On :Motion to Remand, Allen M. Short, brought action against the defendant The milroad company I in the state court. The defenda,nt served an order of removal to the circuit court of the United States, whereupon the plaintiff moves to remand to the state courts, upon the ground that the affidavit upon which the order of removal was based was insufficient. Wil8O'/lr &: Bowers, for plaintiff. . W. H. Norris and Flandrau, Sqwirea &: Outcheoo, for defendant. BREW:Jm, J. This is a motion to remand. The action was brought . by a·citizen of Minnesota against this railroad corporation. which is a
SHORT 'V. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY.
citizen of the state of Wisconsin. It is an attempt at removal under the act of 1887, on the ground of local prejudice, it being too late for a removal on the ground of difference of citizenship. One ground of the motion to remand is that this court cannot take original jurisdiction of an action by a citizen of this state against a citizen of another state, and thereforA,if it cannot take original jurisdiction of such an action, it cannot by removal acquire jurisdiction. I had occasion to examine that question in the state of Nebraska, and I there came to the conclusion that that proposition cannot be sustained. I think an action can be maintained in this court against a citizen of another state. I am aware that there is a decision in the circuit court of California to the contrary. FIELD, SAWYER, and SABIN, JJ., County of Yuba v. Mining Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 183. I shall not discuss that question at length, from the fact that my Brother SHlRAS, in the Northern district ofIowa, has written an opinion upon thiS point, and I will say that his opinion my conclusionswith respect to that matter. Fale8 v.Railway Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 673. The other question is this: An affidavit is filed for removal, in which the affiant states that he has reason to believe,anddoes believe, that by reason ·of prejudice and local influence he will not be able to obtain justice in that forum. In other words, an affidavit is made by the officers of the corporation in the form prescribed by the act of 1867. 'fhat act teads thus: "When a suit is between a citizen of the state in which it is brought and a citizen of another state, it may be so removed on the petition ofthe latter, whether he be plaintiff or defendant, filed at any time before the trial or final hearing of the suit, if, before or at the time of the filing said petition, he makes and files in said court an affidavit stating that he has reason to believe and does believe that, from prejudice or local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in said. state court." By that act the removal was granted upon the filing of that affidavit, if in the form prescribed. The removal was absolute, and the actual existence of prejudice or local influence was not a matter for inquiry. In other words, congress cast the burden upon the conscience of the party, and said if he was willing to make an affidavit that he believed and had reason to believe that, from prej udice or local influence, he could not obtain justice in the state court, then he should have a removal to the federal court. Nowhere was it left to be determined as to whether or not such prejudice or influence did exist. But whenever any party litigant in the state court, with the proper citizenship existing, felt that he could not obtain justice in the state court, and was willing to express that fact in an affidavit, the right of removal went beyond the power of challenge. The act of 1887 isa complete reversal of that theory. I am aware that Judge DJ<;ADY, of Oregon, in the case of Fisk v. Henarie, 32 Fed. Rep. 417, has held that this portion of the act with respect to the filing of the affidavit is still in force; but I think he is mistaken. The thought which underlies the matter of prejudice and "local influence to-day, and that underlying the act of 1867, are entirely different. While this act 00867 is not in terms repealed, yet it is famil-
iar law that when a later act covers the same ground, and is obviously intended by the legislature to be its expressed will upon the whole subjectmatter. involved therein, then, although there be no terms of repeal, and although there may be some provisions in the earlier not absolutely inconsistent with those of the later act, yet the whole of the earlier act is repealed. To my mind, it is obvious that the legislation of 1887 with respect to prejudice and local influence was intended to supersede entirely the act of 1867, and to plant the matter upon a new basis, and planting it llpon a new basis, to let the act of 1887 take the place of that of 1867. Let uS,see what the act of 1887 says upon that subject: "Where a suit is now pending, ·or may be hereafter brought, in any state court, in which there is a controversy between a citizen of another state, any <iefendant, being such citizen of another state, may remove such suit into the circuit court of the United States for the proper district, at any time before the trialthereof, when it, shall be made to appear to said circuit court that, from prejudice or local influence; he will not be able to obtain justice in said state court. " In other words, before a removal can be had on the ground of prejudice or local influence, there must be shown to the circuit court of the United States the existence of such prejudice or local influence. It is not given to the pa'rty upon his conscience to say he believes, or has reason to believe, that such prejudice exists, and thereby become entitled to a removal; but there is a question of fact which the circuit court must determine, and it cannot order the removal until it appears that such prejudice or local influence exists. Now, how can that fact be made to appear? How can any fact be made to appear? Either by oral testimony or affidavits. The affidavits in this case do not allege the fact. Counsel for plaintiff insists that an affidavit, in form, simply saying that there does exist prejudice or local influence so as to prevent a fair trial, is not sufficient; that that is a fact which cannot be testified to in a general way; that the affidavits must show a series of isolated and separate facts, from which, taken together, the court can see that such local prejudice does exist. In that proposition I am inclined to hold against him, so far as the first showing is made. It is not, however, necessary positively to decide that question now. If the question were presented, I should be inclined to hold that an affidavit, alleging in plain and unequivocal terms that such local prejudice does exist. and that a fair trial cannot be had, would entitle the party to a removal. I think, however, that that fact, like any other fact, may be challenged. After the affida.vithas been presented, and a rp,moval ordered, the party opposing it may come in and traverse that allegation of prejudice, the same as any other averment of fact. And this need not be done by plea of abatement. No particular form of procedure is prescribed. "The rule ..1.as obtained, as is proper. that where a petition for removal is filed on the ground of citizenship, the truth of its allegations should be challenged by a plea of abatement. But, under the local prejudice clause, no petition need be filed. All that is required is that it shall be made to appear to the circuit court that, from prejudice or local influence, the
UXITED STATES V. RONAN.
party will not be able to obtain justice in said court. This showing may be made by affidavit; and if this constitutes a specific averment, while it may not be conclusive, it is prima facie evidence of the fact, and throws the case into this court, leaving the other party to challenge its truth. 'rhere being no form, no procedure prescribed, I think the court in any particular case may prescribe a mode of procedure, or might lay down a general rule applicable to all cases. Such being tne conclusion to which I have come, both from the argument had here, and from those had elsewhere, it must be held that this affidavit is insufficient; it is no affidavit at all. It is a form of affidavit that might be used for the verification of a pleading, or other purposes, when authorized by statute; but as evidence it is nothing. I shall have to sustain the motion to remand, on the ground that there is no evidence before me from which to find the existence of any prejudice or local influence. As a question of practice,and out of respect to the state court, I think that the affidavit of local influence may be filed in that court, and then a certified copy in this.
RONAN, Sheriff. 1
(Oircuit Oourt, S. D. Georgia, E. D. November 7,1887.)
A saloon keeper, who had made no attempt to comply with the state liquor law, pleaded guilty when arraigned under an indictment charging him with having sold liquor without the license required by the statute. He was sen· tenced to he imprisoned until the fine imposed was paid. Application was made to the United States district judge for a writ of habea8 corpU8, on the ground that the act under which the petitioner was prosecuted was unconstitutional, because it denied him the equal protection of the laws guarantied by Const. U. S. Amend. 14. The particular act in question had never been sustained by the supreme court of the state. The district judge refused the writ. Held, on appeal, that the granting of the writ rested in the discretion of the district judge, and, the facts showing no abuse of that discretion, his refusal of the writ should be affirmed. Code Ga. § 1419, as amended by the act of October 16,1885, provides that no license to retail spirituous liquors shall be granted, except in incorporated cities 0'1' towns, unless with the "written consent of ten of the nearest bonafld6 residents, five of whom shall be freeholders, "etc. Held, that the exception in favor·of such towns and cities was not unconstitutional as denying to saloon keepers in the counties the equal protection of the laws secured to citizens by Const. U. S. Amend. 14. 2 . Nor is that section of the Code in contravention of the fourteenth amendment because the decision of the court of county commissioners, and of the ordinary in counties where no such court exists, is made final and conclusive;
JUDGE-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIQUOR LAW.
lNTOXICATIKG LIQUORS-:;CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSENT OF FREEHOLDERS.
SAME-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LICENSE-CONCLUSIVENESS OF DECISION.
.,1Aftlrming 80 Fed. Rep. 51. · I See note on next page. Reported by Joseph P. Hornor, Esq" of the New Orleans bar.