thing as Ii decree in the federal :courts to the effect that a judgment by confession, regularly entered in a state court, is an assignment. A judg ment of that kind has the same force and effect as if it had been regularly entered after a trial and contest, and it is equally binding on the parties. It cahnot be interfered with by this court A person who has levied on property under a judgment of that kind, anclsold the property, is entiUedtohold the proceeds until the judgment is set aside for fraud, or on some other ground, or by motion in the state court, because of some defect in the proceeding. kIr. Binswanger. Does your honor hold that Justice MILLER went beyond the rulings of your honor in, Weil v. Polaclcf The Churt. I think he clearly overruled the case of Clappv. Nordmeyer, 25 Fed. Rep. 72, and all the cases in the federal courteof this state that have undertaken to construe or decree a judgment of a state court to be an assignment. The state laws authorize confessions of a judgment as .'\fell B.lbvplunta,ry assignm,ents. A confessed judgment is something en';' tirely different from an ,asSignment, ,and, in my opinion, such judgments can only be attacked for the same reasons that you can attack an ordinary judgment; that is, for fraud, or on account of some irregularity in the proceeding. I have several times, since Justice MILLER overruled the motion for a rehearing in Weil v. Polack, (thereby overruling Clapp v. Nordmeyer,) that 4il1s Qould no be entertained in the federal coqrt to declare that a confession of judgment was a voluntary assignment.: 'Judge BREwER,Iam very certain"understands the effect of that decision the same as I do. Mr. Biru>Wdlngef. I understood Justice MILLER'S decision to mean that a confession o.f.judgment will not be regarded as a deed of assigmrient, unless it is an evasion of the state law, and is followed by a deed of assignment'on the same day. The Court. No; he didn't state any such exception to the rule. He held broadly that a 'confession of judgment could not be construed as an assignment, and enforced as such. You may have such a judgment annulled for fraud in a proper proceeding, or set aside for irregularity; but you cannot obiaIn a decree declaring it to be something entirely different from a'judgment and enforcing it as such. I will sustain the demurrer to your bill.
REINEMAN et, ,at
BALL et 01.
«(Jz"rcuit Oourt. S. D. New York. February-l4, 1888.)'
REMOVAL OF CAUSES-SE;PARABLE CONTROVERSY.
PARKER V. KEW ORLEANS, B. R. &, V. R.
such separable controversy is presented as to authorize a removal of the action on· the. ground of, the diverility of citizenship, some of the plaintiffs being residents lilf the same state as the defendant.
On Petition to Remand. Action by Samuel Reineman and others against Michael Ball and others to set aside a general assignment. Pranklin Bien, for plaintiffs. , Baker & Schwartz, for defendants. LACOMBE, J. This action,:was begun in the state court on April 27, 1886, by four of the plaintiffs against the defendants, all parties being citizens and residents of New York. Subsequently, the summons and by bringing in two additional plaintiffs, citizens and residentsofMasSllchusetts.These latter thereupon removed the caUse into here the copy of the record required by the removal act. Defendants have, therefore, themselves entered the record, and now move to remand, in accordance with the rules and practice of this circuit. Ander80n v. Appleton, 32 Fed. Rep. 855. The actioncisbroughtto set aside, as fraudulent, a general assignment maa.e by tiM' defendants,Ball & Levy, to Julius Altman. Each of the plaintiffs is a separate judgment creditor of the defendants, Ball 1& Levy. Executions have been issued on their several judgments, and returned unsatisfied.' No issue is raised as 'to these judgments, the defendants. only controverting such facts as. tend to show tliat the assignment. was fraudulent or invalid, or that the preferences it contains are fictitious; and the only controversy involved in the case is the questiouwhether that assignment was fraudulent. This is not a separable controversy, within the later decisions. See Ander80n v. Appleton, 32 Fed. Rep. 855, and cases there cited. Inasmuch, therefore, as citizens of this state are found ouhoth sides of that controversy, the cause must be remanded.
PARKER- V. NEW ORLEANS,
B. R. & V. R.Co. et. al., Intervenor.)
((Jircuit Oourt, W:.D. Louiaiana.
January Term. 1888.)
In equity, future property may be mortgaged. A railway company, under the laws of Louisiana, when authorized to borrow money forcoDstruction. pur.. poses, may mortgage such property as it may acquire in the future, and aa Boon as the property is acquired the mortgage operates on it.
;ObViO.UillY,. i.t. W'o.uldbe di.mcult if n.ot impracticable., for· a railway company to specitic;slly .des()ribe future property that it might acquire. When Buch property IsmortgaKed. the, mortgage attaches to property Bubseq uently acquired as if' it' had been described specifically in the act; it is entitled to th" same effect in law as if it lu1.d beeD a judicial mortgage.