it for the first time was seen. and examined. It was not delivered or accepted until July 29th, but when accepted it took effect in accordance with its express terms, and if, by itS terms, it commenced on June 15th, and was to continue for 12 months thereafter, the bond, if delivered and if accepted during the 12 months, related back to June 15th. Dawea v. Edes, 13 Mass. 177; Hatch v. AtUeborough, 97 Mass; 533. The employer was required to fill a blank in his certificate, stating when the bond was to be dated. This has some significance when taken in conpection with the terms of the bond, which declares that it was made on the 15th of June, 1884, and was in consideration of $35 paid as a premium for the term of 12 months ending on June 15, 1885, at 12 o'clock noon. It also provides that the bond maybe canceled upon one month's notice, and refunding the premium paid, less a pro rata part thereof for the term it has been in force, remaining liable for any default which may have been 'committed by the employe up to the date of such .determination. tha't the obligation was to comThese various provisions show menceon the prescribed day, and was to continue for one year, subject to <;ancellation, and that the day of delivery and acceptance was not the day from which the defendant's liability was to date·. The only remaining question is as to the amount of the defendant's liability. He received, after June 15th, $2,823.30, which he either used himself, or wrongfully accounted for. That sum of money which he received after the date of the bond, instead of being honestly applied, was by fraud and dishonesty applied in payment of previous defalcations, and the new collections were, by like fraud, not accounted for. The amount due upon the defendant's obligation was on January 1, 1885, $2,823.30, for which, with intl'lrest to the date of the payment, let judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff.
(Oircuit Oourt. No D. Nqw York.
B.. as assignee in bankruptcy of D., obtained a judgment D. and one for property fraudulently converted. S. was subsequently adjudged a bankrupt. and obtllined a discharge from his debts. D. bought the judgment of the assignee in bankruptcY'. Held: (1) That D. acquired the assignee's title to the judgment, and S. could not object that D. was a party to the fraud. (2) The judgment being for a debt created by fraud, the discharge of S. in bank· roptcy did not affect it. (8) There being no contribution between wrong-doers, D. was entitled to collect the whole amount of S. (Sgllal)'lllJ bg the Oourt.)
B4;NKRUPToy-FRAUDULENT TRANSACTION-PURCHASE BY WRONG·DOER FROM ASSIGNEE-EFFECT OF DISCHARGE.
Appeal from district court.
tReversing Balliett v. Dearborn, 27 Fed. Rep. 507.
13AJ.LIETT V. SEELEY.
In Bankruptcy. On motion for cancellation of judgment, or for perpetual stay of execution thereon. Reversing 27 Fed. Rep. 507, where the facts more fully appear. He:nry M. Davis, for appellant. Daniel McInto8h, for respondent.
WALLACE, J. The· order of the district court granting a perpetual stay of execution upon the judgment obtained against the defendants is, in effect, a final detennination of the action, and is equivalent to a cancellation of the judgmen"t. An appeal, therefore, properly lies in this c)urt. The judgment was for the value of property fraudulently transferred by Seeley and Davis with the purpose of defeating the title of the plaintiff as assignee in bankrtlptcy of Davis. .Subsequently to the rendition of the judgment Seeley was adjudged a bankrupt, and in the course of the proceedings in b.ankruptcy obtained a. discharge from his debts. Davis, the joint tort-feasor with Seeley, and his co-defendant in the action, purchased the judgment of Balliett, and the execution. iss'..1ed thereon against Seeley, which was stayed by the district court at the application of Seeley. . It is entirely clear that, asthe j udgn1ent debt was created by fraud in fact on the part of Seeley, as well as on the part of Davis, Seeley's discharge in bankruptcy did not .affect the judgment. The decision of the learned district judge was placed upon the ground that Davis should not be permitted to collect a demand of Seeley which originated in the fraud of both, because he would thereby be enabled to profit by his own wrong. See BaUiett v. Dearborn, 27 Fed. Rep. 507 . This conclusion ignores the effect of the purchase byDavis of Balliett's title to the judgment. Balliett was entitled to enforce the judgment against Seeley and Davis, or both; or, at his option, to sell it and realize upon it in that way. The vendee of personal property, including choses in action, acquires the title of the vendor, and any inquiry into his antecedent relations with the subject of the sale is wholly irrelevant in a case like the present. The judgment here being merely a chose in action, the purchaser took it subject to all equities existing at the time of the assignment in favor of the debtors or either of them against the assignor, but he acquired all the rights of the assignor. There are no exceptions to the rule that the purchaser acquires the title of the seller; on the other hand, he sometimes acquires a better title, as in the famili.ar instance of the purchase of commercial paper, or of chattels bona fide which the seller has acquired by deceit, and in the exceptional instal1ces where as a bona fide purchaser he is not prejudiced by, the notice of his assignor. Bush v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535, 549; Fortv. Burch, 5 187. In equity, as at law, the purchaser canstatidupon the titleofhis vendor, and enforce his vendor's title agaillst the equities of notwithstanding hil:; knowledge of these equitiel.l at the time ofhis:"purchase; for. otherwise the vendor might be deprived of selling his property v. Brigg8, 6 raige, 323, 329; Jackson Y, McChesney,7 Cow. 360; Griffith v. Griffith, 9 Paige,315j Boone v. 10
'177'jll·Story;Eq. J :409. ,If could ipsist that Pavis is liable the:courtwduldbe justified in refusing to the latter to use its process for compelling Seeley to pay the whole judgment debt without offering to do equity·.. As there is no contribution. between wrong-doers there is no foundation, for such a claim. It must bl:} held that Davis acquired what he bought, and succeeds to all the rights :ofBalliett-to use the judgment against Seeley, including that of collect. ing' it by an execution., The order of the district 9Qurt is therefore' reversed.
UNITED STATES 'l1. KING. ,
(Oircuit Oourt, E. D. New York. February 24,1888.)
Rev. St. U B. 5389, provides that "e:very person who commits murder within fort . * . under the ex()lusive jurisdiction of the United States. * * it· shall suffer death." Held, the statute not defining the offense of mur· der; thai the common law, as it was in England before the Revolution, and as. it has since been interpreted in our courtS, must be looked to for a definition, and as ther" defined, murderiswhere a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfullYand feloniously kills any. human being in the peace of the sov· erei/l;n; with malice prepense or aforethought, express or implied.
B.' BAME--+-BoUNDARmll OF REllERVATION. ." ' · .' On the of an.indictment for murder alleged to have been committed at Fort, JI/tmilton, in New York harbor. it Was in evidence that the fatal shot was. fired 100 feet inside a certa.in fence on theUne of Hamilton avenue. Theprose· cQtionintroduced a deed:to the United States of a certain plot of ground, and also, the /l<ct the New York covEJring the same plot. rhis was. followed b1 testimony that the military aqthorities of the United States had for' years past, exercised, acts of ownetlJhip and jurisdiction over the same ground; which was in the village of FOl:t Hamilton, adjacent to and inside of the.sllid.fenc,e. Certain maps of the premises. sworn to by those who made them, were then put in evidence. Hefd; that if the jury believed the testi· mony·of those who made the maps, and also believed that the natural and artiticial monuments that they found on the soil when the maps were made co,' incide(Un location with the monuments, artificial and natural, that were placed there when the deed was given and th'e act of cession was passed, they were warranted in,finding that the fence. on the line of Hamilton avenue was sub· stantially coincident with the.proper.ty·line and the line of jurisdiction of the United States. ' , .
3. SAME-ARTlctlilsOF WAR.
. Where the man kllled is a civilian,;aud the killing is done in a government whenolf,dlltr, requests bearing subject of fort, by a.pnv!'te the ground bemg a military post, and of the rules governmg the servee, the articles of war, etc., have no bearirlg upon the case, and are properly refu3ed.
4..BAME.L.BREACil: OF MILITAUY Rl<lGULATION.
.., It:appellred,upon the trial ofa priVate soldier charged with a murder com· upon ,a that the soldiers stationed there were frequently allowed togo out'an'd.come in without a pass. It willi also in evidence :that there, were many'saloonsJn the neighborhood; Held. thai; ;thisj fact, though "to the prejudice of, good order and.military disciplinEJ," wit,hiJ;l tp,e meaning, of 1\rticles ,of war, (article 62:J should not work to the preludiCe'bftl;1e accused, .who 'had 'avaUed himself of the privilege· on. the " ,'night oJlthemurder. '. ", :, , ..',' , ;