species of preference would be created, which, as it appears to me, would be at variance with the policy of the assignment act. In'some cases such rule, if adopted, would practically defeat the assignment; creditors instead of participating ratably in the distribution of the'assignedeffects, would take that portion of the trust-estate in specie, which they could identify as having been originullypurchased from themselves, and had not been paid for. In this manner a new method of distribution would be inaugurated, which is at variance with the provisions of the assignment law; and in many cases such practice would lead to great confusion in the administration of assigned estates. I am or the opinion that section ,2353 was not intended to have such effect. It should be construed, according to my view, in conformity with, and in subordination to, the policy of the assignment law, so as not to defeat its provisions; that is to say, it should be held that,when personal property has passed to an assignee under an assignment that is valid so far as the assignee is concerned,such property cannot be seized under an execution or attachment against the assignor merely by virtue of the pro.visions of sections 2353. I shall so hold, and accordingly overrule the claim of the attaching creditors to' a portion ofthe property based upon that section. Judgment will therefore be entered ·on the verdict of the jury to the effect that the assignee is entitled to all and singular the property levied nponby the United States marshal that was, covered by the assignment, and was found in his hands; and an order will be made on the marshal directing him to turn the property over to tbeassignee. An order will, also be made requiring the receiver appointed in the Case to file a final report of the collections he bas made on choses in action in his hands, and, after he has filed such report, he will be ordered to tum over what property is in his hands to theassighee.
(Oi"rcuit Oourt, D. Minneaota.
DAMAGRS-BREAOH OF CONTRACT OF AFFREIGHTMENT.
Where plaintiff had a contract to transport a of coal by water tor defendant at an agreed price. the. coal to be delivered to him by defendant at a designated point. and defendant failed to deliver it,plaintiff's messl'mi of damages was the difference between the cost of transportation and the cOn, tract price.
2. SAME-EVIDENC:&-RECOUPMENT. An offer of evidence by defendant. not for the purpose of showing freight earned by plaintiff in order to recoup, but to show what plaintiff's boat'"wal! wa.s properly rejected. [, said to
PRINCIPAL AND.. AGENT-UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL-PARQL EvwJll1'f()E.
The right to show by parol evidence that a defendant was anundiscio.ed principal in a cuntract made by; a third person is not doubtful ' ,
Motion for new trial.
.. FEDERAL BEPOBTD·
for plaintift. O. D. O'Brien, for. defendant.
NELSON, J. The evidence shows that the steamer Minnie Hermatn, Thomas Boland, owner, entered into a contract with H. Y. Smith to receive from the railroad companies at Running Water, Pierre. or Bismark, on the Missouri river. and transport and deliver to the agent of Smith on the steam-boat landing of the several posts, coal to be delivered to the government under Smith's contracts, -125 tons, more or less, Fort Randall; 300 tons, more or less, Fort Bennett; 800 tons, more or less, Fort Yates. Smith agreed to pay $4.20 per ton of 2,000 pounds for transporting coal to Forts Yates and Bennett, and $4.30 per ton of 2,000 pounds for transporting coal to Fort Randall, and that the plaintiff with his boat went to Running Water. On his arrival at Sioux City, he notified Smith about the day that he would be at Running Water, and wanted the coal ready. Smith answered that the coal had been forwarded: On plaintiff's arrival at Running Water he made a demand for coal of the agent of the railroad company, and was told that he had strict orders not to deliver any coal to him. He also again telegraphed Smith from Running Water, and received answer that the" coal has been delivered. You were notified dAlton that it would be." He also procoodedto St. Paul, and demanded coal from Smith, who refused, saying that it was delivered to other parties. There was evidence on the part of plaintiff tending to show that the de-fendant was an undisclosed principal to the contract with the plaintiff. All the direct evidence of the witnesses who testified in reference to the matter, with the exception of the president of the defendant company, tended to prove that the defendant was a party to the contract, whose name was not disclosed; and so did the circumstantial evidence. Coal was shipped by the defendant under the Smith contmct, so-called, from Duluth to Bismarck, or river landing, for Fort Yates; and coal was also shipped from Milwaukee to Running Water for Fort Randall. The defendant offered no evidence. The jury was int;>tructed in substance that if the plaintiff had proved that the defendant was an undisclosed principal, and that it was interested as a!). undisclosed principal in the contractsigned by Smith, he could recover if a breach of the contract was also proved. Also that the measure of damages was the loss under the contract for its non.fulfiUment '()n of the defendant, to-wit, the difference between, the cost of transportation and the price under the contract. Also, the jury was instructed that the plaintiff could only recover for loss of the trimsportation of coal which he proved had been delivered at either one or the QtheI: placet;>ntentioned in thecotltract for shipment to the forts! There was evidence tending to show the, cost of transportation, and the number of pounds or tons of. coal delivered at Bismarck, or river landing, and, for Forts Yates and Raildall. The jury gave the plain-' tift' a verdict. ;The instruction in reference to the measure of damages is correct. If the coal at Bismarck, or river landing, and Running Water, had been turned over to plaintiff, and transported by himta FortsYates
IN RE MA.HON.
arid Randall, his gain would have been :the difference between the contract price of carriage and the cost of transportation. What the plaintiff would have made if the contract had been kept by the defendant is the measure of damages if the contract is broken. This was the rule given to govern the jury. The ofter of evidence by defendant which was rejected was not for the purpose of showing freight earned by plaintiff in order to recoup, but what the boat was "said to have earned;" and it was properly excluded. This is not a charter-party, but a contract of affreightment, and the measure of damages for a breach is to be determined by the rules applicable to such contracts. The right to show by parol evidence that the defendant was an undisclosed principal is not doubtful. F01;d v. Williams, 21 How. 287. Motion for a new trial is denied.
(DiI/n'et (Jourl. D. Kentucky. March $, 1888.)
EXTRADITION-INTERSTATE-ARREST AND . PnIVATE PARTIES. .
BRINGING INTO JURISDICTION
On a petition for lwbea/l CorPU8, where it appears that the petitioner,.being charged with crimein one state. had tied to another, where he was arrested by a private party without authority. and that the authorities of the latter state had not acted upon a requisition of the executive of the former. the district court will not revise the arrest as being an effort tORct under Const. U. S. art. 4.. 2, providing for interstate extradition of persons charged. with crime. and laws passed thereunder. A lawful arrest, under aJlthorityof a state 90urt, of one unlawfully brought into the state by private parties, is not a violation of the fourteenth amendment to Const. U. S.· providing- that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." . 8. SAME-DUE PROOESS OF LAw. . .. In the fourteenth amendment toConst. S., providing that no state shall "deprive anl; person of life, liberty, or property. without due process of law," the phrase' due process of law" refers to the state's own process, and a lawful arrest under. authority of a state court of one unlawfully brouglit into the state by private parties, is not a violation of the provision. .
SAME-PRIVILEGES OF CITIZENS-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Petition for writ of Habeas (Joryus, by Plyant Mahon. Abner Justice, jailer of Pike county, having made his return to the writ of habeas coryus herein. on the day of February, II and Plj'ant Mahonhavmg filed hIS 'response thereto, and produced eVIdence, the colirt certifies the following to be the facts as admitted by the parties or proven to the court's satisfaction, viz.: The petitioner, Mahon, together with 19 other pereons, was, at the September term, 1882, of the circuit court· of Pike county, Ky., indicted by· the grand jury ,impaneled in and by said cburt,forwillful murder, alleged to have been bommittcdby them in said county. Mahon was at the time, and had