rlhder'whatineffect amounted to a Calae statement as to the scope of the patent\, and the conductof the compJaillimt since the license was obtained, .in not protecting its licensees, is SUChllS to exclude the complainant from the protection of a court of equity by,the specific enforcement of this contract. Complainant has put defendants in such relations to it under this license that every ,dictate of fair dealing required that they should not only establish and maintain the.validity of the patent as against those who used the entire ,combination,but also that they sustain by judicial proceedings the position on which they exacted this license from defendants, viz." that all who made and sold springs adapted and fitted for use in the combination were and thus have protected the defendantain.the manufacture of the springs; and this complainant has wholly failed to do. The law is well settled and elementary that where a con,tract is harsh and oppressive, or where it has been obtained by fraud, or where.even one party haa executed it under a mistaken impression of its scope and provisions, a court of equity will not interfere to specifically enforce it; but will leave the complainant to his remedy at law. 2 Story, Eq. Jur.§§ 693, 769,770; Bigelow; Fraud, 390,391; Adams, Eq. 83; Race v. Weston, 86 Dl.-94. I am, therefore, of opinion that upon this second, ground, if not upon the first,. :the complainant is entitled to no relief in this court. , The third and fourth points made by the defendants, which challenge the validity of the patent for want of novelty, and by reason of the reissue with expanded claims, while not necessary for consideration in the view I take of the case upon the other points made, may, I think, be so far considered as to say that the defendants have put into the record a large amount of proof bearing upon these questions; and in my estimation this proof could never have been considered by the court, because, i( this contract was binding upon the defendant, and could be enforced in this court, I have no doubt the defendantS were estopped from denying the validity of the patent from any cause; and hence, while dismissing this bill for want of equity, it will be with the provision that the defendants pay their own costs, as the bulk of the costs on the part of defendants has been made by taking proof upon these two latter points.
ST. LflUIS &.0. R. 00.
(Oireuit 0011.'1'1, 8. D. lllinoiB. February 9, 1888.,
EKmENT DOMAIN-TRANllll'ER-BOAT LANDING.
Act Ill. July 1,1887, known as the "Water-Craft provides that all railroad companies hlloving a terminus upon any navigable river on that state shall have power to own for their own use any water-craft necessary in carrying acros88uch river any cars, etc., "provided that no right shall exist under this act ,tR any rell-l .estate for a landing for such watercraft, or for any other purpose. And tWs act shall only apply to such railroad companies as own the landing for such water-craft. It Held, that a rail-
ST. I.OU1S &I C. R. CO. V. THOMAS.
road company whose road terminated on the Ohio river at Cai·ro could not condemn landfor an incline track and transfer ferry-boat landing, in order to connect with another railroad company.
John M. Lainsden, A. Leek, and Greene & Humphrey, for petitioner, and Brown, Wheeler & Brown, and John M. Butler, for defendants, and also for the motion. Before GRESHAM and ALI,EJ'i, JJ.
GRESHAM, J., (oraUy.) This proceeding was commenced by the Louis & CairoRailroad Company and the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company, in the old Wabash case against Thomas and TrllCY, trustees of the Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railroad Company and the Cairo Transfer Company, to condemn a piece of land on the bank of the Ohio river, at Cairo, for an incline track and transfer ferry-boat landing. We have given such consideration to the questions arising on the petition for a rehearing as the limited timejustified, and are prepared to announce our conclusion. One of the objections urged against the proceeding is based upon what is known as the "Water-Craft Act," passed by the legislature of Dlinois on July 1, 1877. So much of that act as it is material to notice reads thus: .. Be it enacted by the people of the state of Illinois represented in the general assembly, that all railroad companies incorporated under the laws of this state having a terminus upon any navigable river bordering On the state shaH have power to own for their own use any water-craft necessary ill carrying across such river any cars, property, or passengers transported over their line, or transported over any railroad terminating on the opposite side of such river, to be transported- over their line: provided, that no right shall exist under this act to condemn any real estate for a landing for such water-craft, or for any other purpose. And this act shall only apply to such l"dilroad companies as own the landing for such This act confers upon lllinois railroad corporations terminating upon navigable rivers along the border of the state the right to own and operate transfer boats between the opposite sides of such rivers. The St.Louis & Cairo Railroad Company owns a line of road terminating on the Ohio river at Cairo, and the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company owns a line of road terminating on the same river immediately opposite; and the former company needs, or supposes it needs, land at Cairo'upon which to construct its track down to the river, and for a landing,.froAl which it may run its cars upon boats to be transferred to the MobHe & Ohio road on the opposite side of the river, aud to enable it to receive the cars of that company. The question is whether land can be acquired by the petitioner for this purpose by condemnation. If this act governs this case, --and it seenis to me that it does,-the petitioner cannot own a transfer ferry-boat, unless it also owns a landing; and it is l10tpermitted to own the land fora landing unless it acquires it by purchase. Why the legislature denied to corporations thus situated the right to acquire land by
On motion for rehearing.
<JoRdemnationfor a necessary purpose we do not know, nor is it material to inquire. . It' issufficientfu say that the legislature was authorized to pass such an act, and the courts 'must enforce it. The facts stated in the petition seem to bring the case squarely within the statute; indeed, the act seems to have been passed with referenc'e to the conditions which now exist at Cairo. I doubt if similar conditions exist elsewhere on the border of Illinois. As already stated! the road of the petitioner terminates at Cairo. It aoes not need the land in controversy except for the purpose of construeting an incline, and a landing for transfer boats. It is not contendea that additional terminal facilities are needed for any other purpose, .I find no difficulty in agreeing with the counsel for the petitioner on all othe)' points discussed in the argument. Under the Illinois statutes, the petitioner and the Mobile & Ohio Company ,are authorized to consolidate; and, but for the act of 1877, I should feel inclined to hold that the petitioner might condemn the land in controversy, and own transfer ferry.boats, solely for the ptirpose of transferring cars from one side of the river to the other. In Railroad Co. v. Railroad CO' l 13 N. E. Rep. the supreme court of Illinois held that the right of way of a railroad company in Illinois could be condemned and appropriated by another railroad company, under the stat-. utes of that Rtate, only to tl;1eextellt of crossing or intersecting. The laud in controversy is not part of the right of way of the Cairo, Vincennes & Chi(',ugo Railway Company. Judge AI,LEN is not yet pr,epare4, to hold that the act of 1877 is an obstacle to the prosecution of .thisproceeding, but he has such doubts upon the questioD that he has united with me in allowing a rehearing. ALLEN, J. I am not satisfied that the water-craft act of 1877 presents an insuperable objection to the conderimation of the strip of land sought to be condemned under the .einin4:mt domain rule. The St. Louis & Cairo Railroad, having established a business connection with the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, seems entitled to facilities to transfer cars over the Ohio river. I have sufficient doubt on this question, however, to induce me, in view of its great importance, to concur in sustaining the motion for a rehearing, in order that the question may receive further and more mature consideration.
BROWN". CARBONATE BANK OF LEADVILLE.
(Circuit Court, D. ,Colorado. May S,1888.)
BANES-AND BANKING-NATIONAL BANKS-!NSOLVE1Wy-FRAUDULENT TRANSJ'ERS-PLlllADING-MrsJOINDER OJ' CAUSES.
The complaint in an action to recover the value of certain notes alleged to have been the property of a bank of which plaintiff was receiver, and to been wrongfully converted by defendant, contained two counts. The first charged that an officer of plaintiff's bank surreptitiously took these notes from its vaults, and delivered them to defendant, which took with