-statements of: facts surrounding arid' accompanying the transaction, which may be unnecessary,-but no Qbjection of that kind can be reached by demurrer. The objection. is to the second connt, and it is claimed that that states merely conclusions onaw. It charges briefly that the First National Bank of Lead,vUle, having refused to pay its circulating notes, and suspended payment to its creditQrs; and being in default, and in contemplation of insolveney, assigned' and transferred to the defendant, with a view to prevent the application of its assets among its sev,eral creditors in the mannerin such cases made and provided by law, certain notes then' deHcribed. . That is enough. It states a cause of action clearly under the statute. It is nO,t necessary to state the evidence, -describe what circumstances created the condition ofinsolvency or the manner in which the transfer was made. It is enough allege that the bank acted in contemplation of insolvency, and with a view to prevent by law.' ,, . the application of these assets as' The demurrer will be overruled. Leave to answer in 15 days.
H.A.AG ". BO.ARI,> 0," COUNTY COM'RS.
(Oircuit Oourt, D." Oolo-r:ado. April 18, 1888.,'
AID-BONOS-MISNOMER 011' COMPANY':'"
Under act. Colo. Jan.10,1868,§§52,58, (Rev. St. c.18;)requiringthe approval , , of the voters to the iSl\uMce bonds to aid in thecoustruction of . wagon roads, where .the voter" :approve the issuance of such bonds in the na)lle of the Del Norte ,& SU)ll)llitWagon Road Company, and the county tber.eupon issues and regis.te rs bon as, but in the name of the Del Norte & Sum!?lt-Wagon b.eing one, and the bonds recituig that the voters have a . roved Issue In the latter name, and where the county pays the inte st regularly, and 'assum'es the of the completed ro",4, the valid in the hands of a bonaJiae pur,chaser notwithstandin,g , .
, "At, Law. Action on county p6p.ds. " , The plaintiff, brings this action on bonds issued by the l board of county commissioni;lrs Of Rio Grande county, Colo., to aid in the construction of a wagon road. Roger8 & (J'ldhbert, for plaintiff.. . ' . R. D. Thoinp80'f1 andE. " ·· Richardson, for deferidants. . ' ."
J. . This is an the bona fide, holder.' They this recital:' "
county bonds, ,of which the plaintiff issued July 1,,1876, and contain ,
'''ThIs debt is authQrized l>Y aJ;l actofthe legislative assell.t:/ t: ..,\ territory of Colorado, approved day of January, 1868, and under the pro,visions ofsections 52 and 53 of chapter 18, Revised Statutes of Colorado. In pursuance whereof, upon the 'l3th day of August, '1875, the commissioners of ,Rio Grande county, of said terdtory· .submitted, upon' written applica-
v. -gOA-nb- OI!'
tion of one hundred voters of said county, to the electors thereof, in manner prescribed :by law, tbe followl ng proposition: ·Shall the county of Rio Gmnde, territory of Colorado, issue six ;thollsand dollars of its coupon bonds, to be dated July 1.1876, and bear interest at the rate of eiglIt per cent. per annum; the interest payable annually at the office of the treasurer of the territory of Colorado, the principal payable in ten years after the 1st day of July. one thousand eight hondred and seventy-six; said bonds to be used by the county of Rio Grande 'luaid of the Del Norte & Summit-Wagon Toll-Road CompanyP'-which said proposition. upon the 14th day of September, 1875. at a special eJection held in said county, was decided in the affirmative by a majority of the electors of said county." They were duly registered on August 8. 1876, and the certificate of of the territorial auditor affixed. The statutes of Colorado make such certificate evidence of the legal issue. If by that were meant conclusive evidence, nothing more need be said, for there is nothing on the face of the bonds to show a wantofauthority on the part of the county to issue, or a failure to comply with prescribed conditions. It may mean, however, only prima facie evidence; and yet, would not that be sufficient to uphold the bonds in the hands ofa bona fide holder, as against ahy mere Jefect not apparent on their face? I do not care, however, to rest thIS case on either of these suggestions, for there has been a full showing of the facts attenuinK their issue,and I am satisfied therefrom that they are both legl:J.lly and equitably the valid obligations of the defendant.The statute authorized a subscription to the capital stock of an organized road company, and the of that subscription in bonds·. The recital does not affirmatively show whether a subsctiption or a donation was made, or whether the recipient was an incorporated company or hot; but the testimony puts the matter at rest. The company was rated, stock wass'ubscribed, was issued to and received by the county;' it took part in the corporate proceedings as a stockholder, fixed the rates of toll, offered some shares for sale, and, finally, took possession of the road. I The defense presented-at least the only one which requires noticeis that the bonds were issued to the wrong party, and thus the intention of the voters thwarted. In 1874 a was formed. but not incorporated, known as the "Del Norte & SUII1mitWagon Road. Company." The petition for an election. the election notice, and all proceedings. connected with the election, spoke of a subscription to the capital stock of the Del Norte & Summit Wagon Road Company. This petition was· filed with the county commissioners on July 23,1875. 'l'hree 4ays before, articles of incorporati6n of the Del Norte & Summit Road Company were signed. On the 23d, the day the petition was filed, they were acknowledged by the incorporators, and on July 27th they were filed in the office of the secretary of state, and the incorporation perfected: This was the onlyincorporll.t;edcompany in existence until some tima after the issue of the bonds. On June 30,1876, this company changed its name to the "Del Norte & Summit Wagon Toll-Road Company,ll-'the name found in the bonds. This declaration of change of name was filed in the office of the county clerk of the county, and also in the office of the sec-
retary oEstate.On July 6, 1876, the county commissioners passed a resolution authorizing its president to subscribe to the capital stock, of the Del Norte & Summit Wagon Toll-Road Company, "which said comptmy," as the resolution reads, "was formerly known Rnd designated as the 'Del Norte & $ummit Road Company,' it being the same company for which bonds to the amount of six thousand dollars were voted in aid of, at the election held in said county on the 14th of September, 1875." The resolution also provides for a certain disposition of all the stock of the company, both that belonging to the county and that retained by the incorporators, which was to be placed in the hands of a trustee as guaranty for the completion of the road. Thereafter, at the solicitation of the county officers and other citizens, a banker in the county purchased the bonds, and the proceeds were in the construetion of the road. The county, as heretofore stated, voted on this stock, participated in the proceedings of this company, fixed the rates of toll, offered the shares for B!J.le, and, !inaUy took possession of the Further, it paid the interest oothe bonds until they Imatured,-a period of 10 years. Now, although the name used in the election proceedings was not technically correct, yet the whole conduct of affairs from the commencement to the close shows what company was intended, and that the right company received the bonds. The identificati,on is complete, and a mere misnomer in no manner affects the validity of the subscription or the bond,S. Moultrie v. Fairfield, 105 U.S. 370j Anderson Co. v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 433. Legally, therefore, the county is bound to pay this debtj equitably, also, it is bound, fOT it secured that which a subscription was intended to secure,-the completed road; it received the stock promised for its subscriptionjand, finally, took possession of the 'toad itself. It recognized for 10 years the validity of the bonds by the payment of the annual interest, and only challenged their validity when the maturing of the debt made the necessary payment a burden. Under those circumstances, the language of DRUMMOND, C. J., in Bank v. Springfield, 4 Fed. Rep. 276. is pertinent: , "But the equity of the holders of these, bonds does seem so strong that no court, unless under a sort of moral or legal compulsion, would feel inclined to say, under all the circumstances of this case, that these bonds were invalid. Having been issued for so long a time, the interest on them having been paid, their validity having been recognized again and again in after years by the cityautborities, it does seem as though it; i" too late now, under all the circumstances of this case, for the city to question their validity. I therefore hQld that they are valid, and the city is liable. It has issued the bonds. obtained the money, and the benefits it has conferred; and law and equity dethe debt shall be paid." ' Pertinent, also; is the language qf the apostle: brethren, ... ... whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever whatsoever things are of good report, if there be things are just. '" ... and if there be any praIse, think on these things." 'The plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
BLISS V. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court, E. D. Mi88ouri, E. D. April 14,1888.)
CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED STATES-JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS- PUEVIOUS REJECTION. '
Act of March 3, 1887, giving to United States circuit courts jurisdiction of claims against the United States, contains a proviso "that nothing in this section shall be construed as giving either of the courts herein mentioned jurisdiction to hear and determine * * * claims which have been heretofore rejected or reported on adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same." Held that, the comptroller of the treasury having charge of the adjustment of accounts against the government, a rejection of an account by him is a rejection by a department au. thorized to hear and determine the same. within the meaning of said proviso. Where an account against the United States for legal services has been approved by the attorney general, adjusted by the first auditor. certified to the first comptroller, and by him approved, but not paid. the United States circuit court ,has jurisdiction of an action to recover the amount thereof, under act of March 3, 1887.
At Law. Plea to the jurisdiction of the United States circuit court. William H. Bliss, pro se. Tlurtnas P. Bashaw, Dist. Atty., and Thomas M. Knapp, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the United States. BREWER, J., (orally.) In the case of William H. Bliss v. United States, there is a plea to the jurisdiction of this court. The action is one against the United States, to recover for services as United States district attorney, and under special employment. It is brought under the act of March 3, 1887, which gives to the circuit courts jurisdiction of claims against the United States, with this proviso: "Provided, however. that nothing in this section shall be construed as giving either of the courts herein mentioned jurisdiction to hear and determine claims growing out of the late civil war, commonly known as · war claims,' or to heat and determine other claims which have heretofore been rejected or reported on adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same." The plea is one running to the entire petition, there being several counts; and it rests upon this last proposition, that this court has no jurisdiction in cases where the claims nave been heretofore rejected or reported on adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same. It appears from the amended petition that the treasury department refuses to pay any of these claims. That the comptroller is an officer having such charge of the adjustment and settlement of accounts against the government that his action amounts to that of the treasury department in rejecting a claim, is, we think, clear. Section 2169 gives to him the power and makes it his duty to superintend the adjustment and preservation of the public accounts, subject to his revision. Section 191, after providing for the presentation of claims, declares: "But the decision thereon shall be final and conclu-