dence, as distinguished from an occasional lodger or visitor." Imperial Diet. "Inhabitant: 2. (Law.) One who has a legal settlement in a town, city, or padsh; a resident." Webster. "Inhabitant: A dweller or householder in any place." Toml. Law Diet. I am not aware that the term "inhabitant," as applicable to a corporation in a case like this, has ever been judicially defined, but it seems to mea corporation must be held to be an inhabitant of the place where it has its principal place of business, where its corporate offices and records are kept, and its corporate meetings are lawfully held. A corporation, like an individual, may have agents representing it ina district of which it is not an inhabitant; and no reason is perceived why it can be sued outside of the district where its principal ,corporate business is done by service on its agent, which would not allow an individual to be so sued. And if a natural person, charged with the infringement of a patent, can only be sued in the district of which he is an inhabitant, lean see no good reason why a corporation is not entitled to the same protection under this law. This defendant is a corporation created by the laws of the state of Connecticut. The bill also. avers that it isa citizen of the state of Massachusetts, and has its principal office in the city of Boston, in that state, and hence, by the showing of the bill, it may be an inhabitant of Boston; although I do not intend to passon that question here. Waiving the question whether a corporation can be a citizen or inhabitant of any state except that from which it has obtained its corporate rights and existence, it is quite clear to me that it cannot be a citizen or inhabitant of more than one place; and although the bill states that this defendant does business in this district, that cannot make the as its principal offices corporation an inhabitant of the district so are elsewhere. It scoms to me that, according to this bill, this corporation is either an inhabitant of Connecticut or Massachusetts, and fore it can only be sued in those states. Certain states have enacted statutes which require that corporations, like insurance companies, incorporated in other states, sllall, as a condition upon which they will be permitted to do business in the state enacting such statutes, appoint agents upon whom process may be served; but there is no such statute in this state which applies to this defendant. I am therefore of opinion that this cause should he dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
'M. & S. CO.
M. &: S. CO. et. al.
May 4, 1888.)
(mrcuit COU'l't, D. Oolorn(lo.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES-SEPARABLE CONTROVERSY.
Where plaintiffs' title to the product of a mine has been established bya decree in a state court. a proceeding by plaintiffs against the same and other defendants, to obtain possession of their rights under the decree, although independent in form and involving a defendant who a superior title by, purchase, is in effect merely a supplementary proceeding, inseparably connected with the original decree, and therefore not removable to the
On Motion to Remand. J. T. Vaile, for cumplainants. Goo.J. Boal, tor deftmdants.
BREWER,' O.J. In Wolcott and others v. The Aspen Mining &: Smelting Company ,and ot'Jl,ers there is, a motion to remand. Three grounds are presented. The first and third are passed with the single observation that very properly an interrogation mark might' be put at the end of each of the questions The second I consider more fully, be';' cause I think it the more important, and it is decisive. The proposition in that is that this suit or proceeding in the state court was merely ancillaryto a case already determined in the district court, and transferred by appeal and now pending in the supreme court of the state. The facts are these: In a suit in the state court, in which these plaintiffs were intervenors, their title was adjudicated to a fraction of interest in the Emma mine. Some of these defendants were detimdants in that suit. One J. B. Wheeler was the owner of a large portion of the adverse interests. After that decree an appeal Wl!-S taken to the supreme court, and it is there, pending. That decree, as I said, established the title of the present plaintiffs to a fractional interest in the Emma mine. This complaint, which' is in the nature of a bill in equity in this court, was filed as an independent complaint; and yet the form in which these things are pursued is immaterial; we always go back to the substance of the transaction. It is a proceeding to enforce possession of the same fractional share of the product of that mine as was given by the decree. It sj)ts forth the decree. It shows there has been a certain amount of prod- , net frOm that mine; and is a proceeding to enforce plaintiffs' right to that proportionate share of the product of the mine. The Aspen Mining & Smeltipg Company, principal and removing defendant, purchased, as .alleged,-,after that decree, from Wheeler. In its answer, nol denying, that decree or those proceedings or its purchase, it sets up ownership in this ore by reason of a purchase of the apex of the vein, and, of course, that inteIjects into this litigation that controversy between other parties which Was compromised a week ago. Now, it is settled that a proceed-. mg whipp i,8 merely ancillary, and for the purpose of carrying into effect .an existing judgment or decree, is not removable; the case in which the: