WASHINGTON FIRE & MARINE INS.
right or estate was conceded to her, it could not aid the petitioner in this case, as it is alleged in the petition that the government did before the passage of that act recognize the assignment by Peter Duncan to Cooper, and declared his assignee to be entitled to the rights l:lecured by the law. In our judgment the demurrer must be sustained, arid t4& petition dismissed.
MARINE INS. Co. tl. CHESEBRO.
(Circuit Court, D. Connecticut. September Term, 1887.)
PRINCIPAL .AND AGENT-LIABILITY OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL.
Defendant, the agent of plaintiff, an insurance company, effected an insurance,and informed plaintiff thereof. upon which plaintiff, being dissatisfied, directed defendant to return the policy at once, saying- that the risk was a prohibited one. Defendant, believing plaintiff misinformed as to the risk, so wrote, and held the policy. Plaintiff again directed the policy returned, which defendant did, but before notifying the insured thereof a loss by fire occurred which plilintiff was compelled to pay. Held, that defendant's disobedience of rendered him liable for the amount plaintiff had been compelled to pay.
At Law. Action by the Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Company against Charles E. Chesebro, its agent, for negligence and disobedience of orders, whereby the plaintiff had been compelled to pay a loss. It appeared that plaintiff had ordered the insurance canceled, the policy still being in defendant's hands, as soon as they were informed of its having been effected, saying: "Please at once relieve us of the risk. The property in itself, and the exposure to the same, would make it prohibited with us. Let us have the policy, please, by return mail." The defendant, thinking the company misinformed as the riJk, so wrote, and stated that he would hold. the policy, which he had not yet written, until further orders from them. Immediately on receipt plaintiff again instructed defendant to return the policy, which he did. Before defendant notified the insured of the cancellation, the property was burned, and plaintiff paid the loss. Defendant claimed that he did not receive the last letter until the day the building burned, and, owing to the absence of the owners, could not noti1y them, and offered evidence tending to prove this fad. Plaintiff offered evidence to prove that the letter should in due course of mail .have been received two or three days before the fire, and that in fact the letter from defendant containing the policy was received by them before the fire. Defendant's reason for believing plaintiff misinformed as to the risk was that the map of the village showed an exposure to an iron foundry, which no longer existed. After the jury were instructed as stated in the opinion, they found for plaintiff the sum of $1,5:48.43'1 the full amount of the loss paid, with interest and costs. A. P. Hyde; for plaintiff.
. a. E:Perkins
Ohar'ldE., Searls, 'for
(chargingjti,ry.); 1. ltheing adhIilted thfl;t the defend-:ant was for. tqe plaintiff, i t the duty. of the defendant, upon receipt of the notice, dated July 31, 1885, peremptorily ordering him to cancel the risk, to proceed to do so with all reasonable 2. It being admitted thatJhe office of the agent was within five minutes' walk of the office and place of business of E. T. Whitmore & Co., the insured, the agent's neglect to cancel said policy for a period of more than six days after the receipt ofsnid peremptory order was such a neglect of duty as would render the defsndant liable to the plaintiff for the loss incurred by the plaintiff in consequence thereof. 3. That the delay after the receipt of the notice dated July 31st, is not excused by the fact-if it should be found-that the agent believed that the company were mi,stakeri as to the safetyor danger of the risk, or as to the wisdom of retaining the risk. 4. Thatif the agent delayed complying with the peremptory orders of company to cancel therisk,and did so delay from a mistaken view of, the safety of the risk and the wisdom of canceling it, or in the hope of persuading the plaintiff to continue the risk, the delay in the mean time was at his own peril and at his own risk if a fire should occur. 5. If the second order to cancel, dated the 7th day of August, 1885, was receivedpy the agent in such season that he had one or two days the day of the fire in which to cancel the risk, and he made 110 89 to do, such neglect on the part of the defendant was a breach oJ his duty, and would render him liable for the damages which the pany suffered in consequence there9f. The court further charged ,adopting the language in the case of Courcier v. Ritter, 4 Wash. C. C. 551, as to instructions to an agent: "If theorderleaves him a discretion. the law requires of him Dothingfurther than the exercise of a sound. honest jUdgment. But if the order be free from ambiguity. is positive and unqualified, it must be rigidly obeyed. if it be practicable; and DO motive connected with the interest of the principal, however honestly entei'tained, or however Wisely adopted. can excuse a breach of it."
OLARKE 11. AMERICAN
IMPROVEMENT CO. et aZ.
(Circuit Court, So E. New York. Jult 8, 1888.)
DAMAGES-FOR P!:RSONAL TORT-ExCESSIVE-FALSE IilPIusONMlIlNT-MALICIOU8 PROSECUTION.
Where plaintiff, a respectable woman, was arrested at the instigation of de· fendants; uponfalse charges of a forcible entry into a house of one of defendants. where she and her family had been liVIng, ana of an assault upon the other defendant; and was committed to jail with disorderly women, and required to give sureties of the peace without trial, and the arrest was procured without reasonable or probable cause, for the purpose of keeping plaintiff