'688 up for'intintnsr possibly lose hiedhyestrnent 'inCalifo'rnia, and forego the chances'ofa'sale to som'e 'other party, whCl might not be so particular -about the legllltitie.Certairily the injury to thedefendant by insisting upon the contract was vastly morethau the loss to the plaintiff by its abandonment., And again, defendant haanot yet received his patent; nevertheless,.pl:airitiff is asking a decree for a specific performance. In -other words, 'he 'is ,ltsking this court to compel a conveyance of the very titlewhich,"wheil' offered, he declined to receive. True, he asks that thiscQutt't'El'tain: jutisdietioliof the case' and of the defendant until such time as tlie pateht shall' be issued, and that in the mean time, he himself be relieved from the obligatibnto paYi in fact, the bill has a twofold aspect,---"ooo petforrnance by defendant, and the other to delay paiytilet1t,"by the plaintiff. ' 'Again,as a general rule it may be observed,in eases,iof this kind, a leading inquiry is as to who is seeking to avoid the eontiMt. It may happen that a vendor under such a contract, 'seeihg a chance to realize more on another sale, or believing in the rapid Increase of' value, seeks some technical excuse to avoid complying with his contract. When that is apparent. and the purchaser has acted in good faith, the colitt will readily' enforce specific performance. It will punish the wrdng:.d.oeorby compelling 'him to do that which he agreed to db· .on theotber hllnd, when the; vendor is acting in good faith, is ready to perform that which he understood he had agreed to perform, to transfer 'all the title that he has, aind the purchaser is the one who is making ex'cuses; and 'seeks without present payment to hold hill claim upon the property, then the courts will be very apt to say to him to pursue his 'remedy by an action at law, and let go his hold upon the property. Fil1:a11y, itmny be observed that in matters of this kind courts not merely observ;e the words of the contract, but also have respect to the obligations of the' golden rule, and that, unless a plaintiff has done as he would be done by, it is useless for him to come into that forum where equity and good conscience reign supreme over the letter of the law. A decree will be entered dismissing the bill.
SWANSON 'D. CltICAGO, ST.
P. & K.
(Circuit Oourt, D. Minnesota. June 28. 1888.)
ATrORNEY AND CLIENT - COMPENSATION RIGHT TO PROSECUTE SUIT.
COMPROMISE WITHOUT PADlBNT-
Where plaintiff in an action for personal injuries voluntarily proposes a compromise. which is accepted, and there is to show that it was collusive as to plaintiff's attorneys, who had no knowledge of it, a motion by the attorneys for leave to prosecutenotwithstanding the settlement will be denied.
On Motion. Arctander & Arctander, for plaintiff. Lusk& Bunn, for defendant.
'LEWIS 11. CHICAGO,
P. I< K. C. RY. CO.
BREWER, J. A motion .was made by plaintiff's Counsel for leave to prosecute this suit, notwithstanding an alleged settlement made by the plaintiff with the defendant, on the ground that the same was made without the knowledge of plaintiff's counsel, and with a: view to defraud them out of their fees.. I have simply this to say: It is unquestioned that parties to a lawsuit may settle and compromise their litigation without consulting their counsel; and that, in the absence of a statute giving an attorne)T8 lien for his fees, courts will not intervene, unless there has been collusion between the parties, and an attempt to defraud an attorney out of his fees.. So say alIthe authorities presented by counsel for the plaintiff. In this case. there. is no reason to believe that there was any collusion, or any intent to defraud. It is one of those actions for personal injuries in which, while the amount claimed is large, yet we all know that there is often a great uncertainty as to the fact, as well as to the amount, oithe verdict. It appears that the plaintiff, on one of the first days of :this term, of his own volition, went to the claim agent of the defendant,and.proposed to compromise fora given sum, amounting to about a thousand dollars. The same was accepted, the money paid, and a stipulation for the settlement. of the .case signed. This was done without consultation with, .and without the knowledge of, the attorneys; and there is nothing in the transaction to show that it was not executed in the utmost good faith, without any thought of any interest the attorneys might have in the case. It is true that,.the day before, the respective counsel met here in the court room, and spoke of a compromise. CounseL for defendant said he had no authority to do anything in the matter, but would suggest the terms mentioned to his client; and the pWntiff's attorney said he would do the same to his; but neither of them saw their clients, or had any consultation with them, and before they IDet again .tJ:teir clients had settled this suit. Under those circumstances, I must stand, although it may operate to prevent counsel for plaintiff from receiving any compensation for their services. The motion will be overruled, and the case dismissed as per stipulation.
ST. P. & K.
(Ovrcuit Coure. D. Minnuota. June 19, 1888.)
AleAtlLT AND BATTERY-CIVIL AOTION-PLEADING. , ,Acomplaint·whichalleges, ali iothe old common
colint. that defendant, by one of its employes, committed an assault and battery upon the plaintift, another employe, is not demurrable.
·At Law. On demurrer to 'complaint. Action by Douglas Lewis against Chicago, St; 'Paul & :Kansas City Railway Company.