AR¥S'J;'RONG Ii. TRAUTMAN.
entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state." If an artificial person like a corporation may be an "inhabitant" of a
state or district, it can with most propriety be said to be an inhabitant of the state that created it, or of the state where it keeps its records aud principal office, and where its chief officers reside, or may most usually be found. These, in my judgment, are the tests which should determine the domicile of a corporation; and, tried by such tests, the defendant is clearly an inhabitant of the district of Mississippi. No other rule, indeed, seems to be applicable to the determination of the question of domicile, unless it be held that a corporation is an inhabitant of any and every state where it has an office and transacts business. But if the latter position be assumed, no reason is perceived why it might not with as good rea,son be held that a corporation is likewise a citizen of each state where it maintains an office aud transacts business. That, however, is a doctrine at variance with all of the decisions respecting the citizenship of corporations. On the assumption that the defendant has an office and agent in this state, it goe.s without saying that it might have been sued in this district under the act of March 3, 1875, to determine the jurisdiction of the United States courts,' as that act permitted suits to be brought against a defendant, not only in the district of his residence, but wherever he might" be found at the time of sen'ing * * * process." These latter words, permitting service where a defendant may be found,bave been dropped in the amendatory act of March 3, 1887, for the manifest purpose of requiring all suits to be brought in the district of the defendant's residence, excepting those suits in which jurisdiction is dependent solely on the fact of diverse citizenship. The authorities cited by plaintiffs' counsel in opposition to the motion (being all decisions under the act of March 3, 1875) are therefore not in point. The motion to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (it being an inhabitant of the district of Mississippi) is therefore sustained, and the suit is dismissed.
ARMSTRONG t1. TRAUTMAN
(Oircuit Oourt, B. D. Ohio, lV, D. May 81,1888.)
CoURTS-FEDERAL JURISDICTION.....,AcTIONS BY RECEIVERS OF NATIONAL BANKS -Ae:tr MARCil 3,1887.
Act Congo Murch 3. 1887, § 4. declares that national banking associations are. for the purpose of all actions by or against them, at law or in equity, to be deemed citizens of the states in which they are respectively located. but "the provisions of this section shall not be held to affect the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in cases commenced by the United or by direction of any officer thereof; or cases for winding up the affairs of any such bank." Held, that a receiver of a national bank may still maintain a suit in the United States circuit court, without reference to the citizenship of \he pal'ties or to the amount involved, to recover a claim due th ll bank. "
276 At Law.
FEDERAL REPORTER. On motion to dismiss.
JA()KSON, J. This case is before the court on the motion of defendants Frank Haffner and Christian Haffner to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction in this court to entertain the suit. The motion is based on two gronnds, viz.: First, that the petitioner is a citizen of tne same state with the defendants; and, secondly. that the amount claimed (being only $1,333.58) is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court under the act of March 3, 1887. The petition shows that David Armstrong, a citizen of the Southern district orOhio, is the duly appointed and qualified receiver of the Fidelity National Bank, of Cincinnati, Ohio, which was lately a corporation organized under the banking laws of the United States, and became the holder and owner of a certain check for $1,333.58, having date June 20, 1887, drawn by Trautman & Fischer on the German National Bank of Cincinnati to the order of the defendants Frank and Christian Haffner, under the firm name of F. & (' Haffner, and by them indorsed; that said check, which was the property of said Fidelity National Bank and a part of its aBl3ets which came into the possession of said receiver by virtue of his appointment, was duly presented at said 'German National Bank for payment; that the same was not paid; and that said drawers and indorsers had due notice thereof. The question presented by the motion of the defendants Frank and Christian Haffner to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction is whether, under the act of March 3, 1887, a receiver of a natiomtl bank may maintain a suit in this court, without reference to the citizenship of the parties and of the amount involved, to recover a claim or demand due the national bank, whose assets have been transferred or assigned to him by operation of law under his appointment. Prior to the act of March 3, 1887, this was not an open question. It was well settled by several decisions on the circuit, uncler the act of March 3, 1875, and prior acts, that receivers of national banks, being officers of the United States, could maintain such actions without regard to the citizenship of the parties or the amount involved in the suit. Fl'elinghuysen v. Baldwin,12 Fed. Rep. 395; Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. Rep. 506. In this last case the subject was fully reviewed by Mr. Justice GRAY, and the jurisdiction of the circuit court was maintained. In the case of Armstrong v. Ettlesohn, ante, 209, (very recently decided,) Judge BLODGETT has sustained the jurisdiction of the court, without regard to the amount involved, under the act of March 3, 1887; citing Price v. ,A.bbott, 17 Fed. Rep. 506, as applicable to the latteract. While by the fourth section of the act of March 3,1887, national banking associations are, for the purpose of all actions by or against them, real, personal, or mixed, and in all suits in equity, to be deemed citizens of the states in which they are respectively located j and while the jurisdiction of· the federal courts in. suits by or against those associations is only such as they would have in cases between iQdividual citizens, it is, however; expressly provided that" the provisions of this section shall not be held to affect the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in cases com-
menced by the United States or by direction of any officer thereof, or Cllses for winding up the affairs of any such bank." It seems clear that under this provision· the jurisdiction of this court is preserved in cases like the present, where the receiver is engaged in winding up the affairs of the nationlll banking association, and invokes the aid of this court in collecting the assets of the bank. The court is of the opinion that defendants' motion is not well taken, and should be disallowed. It is accordingly so ordered, with costs, and the defendants are allowed 30 days to answer the petition.
GILMOUR et al.
(OiA"cuit Court, 8. D. Ohio. August 17,1888.)
COURTS-FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION-NATIONAL BANKs-INSOLVENCY -AGENTS. ,
The federal courts have the same jurisdiction of suits by and all:aiust the "agents" of national banks appointed under the national banking acts of conwhen the "receivers" of an insolvent bank have been dis]Jlaced by such agents, " as they have of suits by and against the" receivers" of such banks, each being in the same sense officers of the United States, and each representing in precisely the same relation the bank in its corporate capacity; and this jurisdiction attaches without regard to any diversity of citizenship of the parties or the amounts involved. When the receiver of aninsolvent national bank has been displaced by an "agent" appointed under the acts of congress in that behalf. it is proper practice to substitute, upon motion,the "agent" as the plaintiff on the record in place of the "receiver," in a suit already commenced by the latter.
At Law. Motion by James McConville, who commenced this suit as the "receiver" of the Metropolitan National Bank of Cincinnati, to substitute him['ielf aEl the "agent" of the said bank, appointed under the provisions of the. third section of the act of June 30, 1876, c. 156, as the party plaintiff entitled to continue the suit in the latter capacity against the defendants. Willial1/l B. Burnet and J. E. Bruce, for plaintiff. Champian & Williarn8 and Logan & Slattery, for defendants. HAMMOND, J. It having been established, especially by the judgment of this court in the case of Armstrong v. Trautman, ante, 275, that we have jurisdiction of cases brought by the receiver of a national bank, without regard to diversity of citizenship or the amount involved, I do not see why we have not the same jurisdiction of suits brought by the "agent," appointed under the provisions of the national banking act to take the .plaoenf the receiver under certain circumstances named in the act. Act June 30, 1876, c. 156, (l Supp. Rev. St. 216; 19 St. (l3;) ATrn8trong v. Trantman, supra; ATrn8trong v. Ettle80hn, ante, 209; Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. Rep. 506; Prelinghuysfm, v. Baldwin, 12 395.