menced by the United States or by direction of any officer thereof, or Cllses for winding up the affairs of any such bank." It seems clear that under this provision· the jurisdiction of this court is preserved in cases like the present, where the receiver is engaged in winding up the affairs of the nationlll banking association, and invokes the aid of this court in collecting the assets of the bank. The court is of the opinion that defendants' motion is not well taken, and should be disallowed. It is accordingly so ordered, with costs, and the defendants are allowed 30 days to answer the petition.
GILMOUR et al.
(OiA"cuit Court, 8. D. Ohio. August 17,1888.)
COURTS-FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION-NATIONAL BANKs-INSOLVENCY -AGENTS. ,
The federal courts have the same jurisdiction of suits by and all:aiust the "agents" of national banks appointed under the national banking acts of conwhen the "receivers" of an insolvent bank have been dis]Jlaced by such agents, " as they have of suits by and against the" receivers" of such banks, each being in the same sense officers of the United States, and each representing in precisely the same relation the bank in its corporate capacity; and this jurisdiction attaches without regard to any diversity of citizenship of the parties or the amounts involved. When the receiver of aninsolvent national bank has been displaced by an "agent" appointed under the acts of congress in that behalf. it is proper practice to substitute, upon motion,the "agent" as the plaintiff on the record in place of the "receiver," in a suit already commenced by the latter.
At Law. Motion by James McConville, who commenced this suit as the "receiver" of the Metropolitan National Bank of Cincinnati, to substitute him['ielf aEl the "agent" of the said bank, appointed under the provisions of the. third section of the act of June 30, 1876, c. 156, as the party plaintiff entitled to continue the suit in the latter capacity against the defendants. Willial1/l B. Burnet and J. E. Bruce, for plaintiff. Champian & Williarn8 and Logan & Slattery, for defendants. HAMMOND, J. It having been established, especially by the judgment of this court in the case of Armstrong v. Trautman, ante, 275, that we have jurisdiction of cases brought by the receiver of a national bank, without regard to diversity of citizenship or the amount involved, I do not see why we have not the same jurisdiction of suits brought by the "agent," appointed under the provisions of the national banking act to take the .plaoenf the receiver under certain circumstances named in the act. Act June 30, 1876, c. 156, (l Supp. Rev. St. 216; 19 St. (l3;) ATrn8trong v. Trantman, supra; ATrn8trong v. Ettle80hn, ante, 209; Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. Rep. 506; Prelinghuysfm, v. Baldwin, 12 395.
·FEDERAL . REPORTER.
This "agerlt" is an officer of the United States in every sense that the "receiver" is, albeit he is somewhat differently appointed, and his dllties are precisely the same, aridnlthough he takes up the business at a somewhat later stage of the winding-up proceedings; and, so far as I can see, every argument used in the reasoning of these cases to support the jurisdiction applies with equal force to the "agent" as to the "receiver." Indeed, the "agent" is only the "receiver" under another name. By the very terms of the act itself,defining the powers of the "agent," he may apply to this court for authority to sell, compromise, or compound the debts, and may sue and be sued in his own name or that of the association, and the general scope of his duties and powers as there defined are those of the receiver and of all receivers winding up an insolvent corporation. The against the jurisdiction proceeds on the notion that after the depositors and creditors are paid, the United States has no further interest in the matter, and that the whole administration, being turned over to the shareholders through this" agent," the concern relapses into the condition before insolvency, and that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is thereby ousted. But this would separation and division of the be an unnecessary and possibly jurisdiction over an insolvency proceeding, that should not he permitted upon any mere implication or inferenoe, and only submitted to upon an express command of the statute, Itwould be a reversal of the general rule, which concentrates the jurisdiction over insolvency proceedings rather than disperses it. Moreover, the United States has no more interest in the matter before than after the appointment ofthis "agent." The legislation contemplates a more independent and exclusive control by the United States of the assets before than after this "agent" is appointed, in the interest of creditors and depositors,no doubt, and for obvious reasons. It also contemplates a somewhat exclusive control by the shareholders ofthe remnants of the insolvent assetS, also for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the interest of the United States in the matter is precisely the same, and, in both situations ofthe assets, is based solely on grounds of public policy equally applicable to eithet,. Having established national banking system upon the faith of federal superv1sion and Mntrol in certain cases, among which are these useful and necessary provisions for wind.. ing up a concern, in the event of insolvency, it induees depositors to place their money in them, creditors to deal with and trust them, the people at large to accept their circulating notes as money I and shareholdersto invest in the shares of stock. Now, the latter are as much entitled to the protection arising out ofthe public policy manifested by the acts of congress for the federal scrutiny and control in their dealings inter sese, in case of insolvency, as creditors are entitled to that protection, and for the same reason precisely. The method of dealing with the assets in the one case or the other tnay be widely different, but this cannot affect the question of jurisdiction and the reason for it. 'the· conclusion of the argument is iIi itself anon sequitur, and it does not follow because the: act of congress grants the 'shareholders the 'privilege of controlling the further proceedings in insolvency after the debts are paid, that