·FEDERAL . REPORTER.
This "agerlt" is an officer of the United States in every sense that the "receiver" is, albeit he is somewhat differently appointed, and his dllties are precisely the same, aridnlthough he takes up the business at a somewhat later stage of the winding-up proceedings; and, so far as I can see, every argument used in the reasoning of these cases to support the jurisdiction applies with equal force to the "agent" as to the "receiver." Indeed, the "agent" is only the "receiver" under another name. By the very terms of the act itself,defining the powers of the "agent," he may apply to this court for authority to sell, compromise, or compound the debts, and may sue and be sued in his own name or that of the association, and the general scope of his duties and powers as there defined are those of the receiver and of all receivers winding up an insolvent corporation. The against the jurisdiction proceeds on the notion that after the depositors and creditors are paid, the United States has no further interest in the matter, and that the whole administration, being turned over to the shareholders through this" agent," the concern relapses into the condition before insolvency, and that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is thereby ousted. But this would separation and division of the be an unnecessary and possibly jurisdiction over an insolvency proceeding, that should not he permitted upon any mere implication or inferenoe, and only submitted to upon an express command of the statute, Itwould be a reversal of the general rule, which concentrates the jurisdiction over insolvency proceedings rather than disperses it. Moreover, the United States has no more interest in the matter before than after the appointment ofthis "agent." The legislation contemplates a more independent and exclusive control by the United States of the assets before than after this "agent" is appointed, in the interest of creditors and depositors,no doubt, and for obvious reasons. It also contemplates a somewhat exclusive control by the shareholders ofthe remnants of the insolvent assetS, also for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the interest of the United States in the matter is precisely the same, and, in both situations ofthe assets, is based solely on grounds of public policy equally applicable to eithet,. Having established national banking system upon the faith of federal superv1sion and Mntrol in certain cases, among which are these useful and necessary provisions for wind.. ing up a concern, in the event of insolvency, it induees depositors to place their money in them, creditors to deal with and trust them, the people at large to accept their circulating notes as money I and shareholdersto invest in the shares of stock. Now, the latter are as much entitled to the protection arising out ofthe public policy manifested by the acts of congress for the federal scrutiny and control in their dealings inter sese, in case of insolvency, as creditors are entitled to that protection, and for the same reason precisely. The method of dealing with the assets in the one case or the other tnay be widely different, but this cannot affect the question of jurisdiction and the reason for it. 'the· conclusion of the argument is iIi itself anon sequitur, and it does not follow because the: act of congress grants the 'shareholders the 'privilege of controlling the further proceedings in insolvency after the debts are paid, that
WEDEK'IND V. SOUTHERN PAC. CO.
eral jurisdiction does or should cease, but on the 'contrary the reason for continuing it is the same. . The jurisdiction being thus established for the "agent," who is the suCcessor of the "receiver," there can be no doubt about the right to substitute him as a new party to a suit commenced by the "receiver," during his existence as such. It is the common right and practice of substituting as a. new party to the record any successor in interest anel tion whenever a. change occurs by death or otherwlse. E!lch of these administrative officials-the "receiver" and the "agent"-represent the bank in its corporate capacity, and neither of them is more or less than the other such a representative. The "agent" is in no sense a purchaser from the "receiver," and occupies no relation analogous to that of one who takes from another by purchase, but is only asuccessor in interest and office to the same right or title as that. held by the "receiver," and so falls within the general rule of substitution of :one such representative foran:other whenever there shall be a change. Indeed, here there is searoelyany ne<lessity fora SUbstitution; except for the bare purpose of technical conformity, sinca the "receiver" and the "agent "are one and the same petson, and either ma:y, under the privileges of the statute, sue in his own name as "reoeiver" or "agent." ' Motion granted.
WEDEKIND"'. SOUTHERN PAC.
(CirCUit Oourt, D. NeDada.
RmrOVAL OJ', CAUSES-TIME OF ApPLICATION.
In an. action begun in a state court defendant was,by state'statute required to answer the complaint on May 1,1888. ,On May 1st defendant ap· pearedspecially in the case, and moved to set aside tl;1e service of summons, but neitiier sought nor obtained any rule or order of court extending Its time to plead to the complaint. The motion to quash the service of summ,oDs was heard, and taken under advisement by the court, May 28th. While the same 'Was so under advisement. on May 31st, defendant filed its general answer to the complaint, and at the same time filed its petition and;bond on removal to this court. On motion to remand. held, that the case must be remanded; the peti· tion and bond not having been filed jnthe state court at the time defendant was' by law required to answer or plead to the complaint; no extension of time having been granted by any rule or order of said state court. 1 .(Syllabu, by theOQurt.)
On Motion to Remand. John F. Alexander and R. H. Lindsay, for motion. J. B. MarMaU and Baker &; Winea, contra.
SABIN, J. The plaintiff ill this action is a. citizen and resident of the state .of Nevad,a. The defendant. is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Keotllcky, the lessee of the ,Central Pacinc Rail-
, . lAs to what is the pl,'Oper time forflUttg an: apjl1eation for removal
state to a federal eourt, see Whelan'v. Raill"oad'CO;,85 Fed. Rep. 849,and:uote.