of a contract· the· same; . In such a proceeding a court· of equityoperates by its decree in personam, on the defendants, and not in rem, on the and therefore it matters not whether the land which is the subject of the contract is within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or nok If the court gets jurisdiction of the parties it has jurisdiction to determine what, if any, contract exists between them, and enforce it against the party in default, and may compel obedience to its decree by proceedings in the nature of punishment for contempt. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1317; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 743. ,But, assuming, as I do, that "the claim" of the plaintiff is within the purview of the act of 1887, this court has jurisdiction in this case without reference to the locality of the land, simply because congress by that act has conferred it.' The petitioner is.required to bring his suit,notinthe .districtwhere the land is situated,but in that in which he resides. The United States is potentially existent or resident throughout the states and te.rritories, and agrees by the terms of the act to submit to the jurisdiction of the courtio which the suit is brought, on due notice thereof being givel1.to its attorney and representative. And thus the court gets jurisdiction of the partieE' and the cause, and it is immaterial. either under the statute or the general principles Qfequity jUrisdiction, where the land fOfwhich the patent is sought may lie· . The demurrer is overruled.
SEDDON 'IJ. VIRGINIA, T. & C. S. & I. Co. et al. SEDDON, Trustee, 'l7. SAME. W. C. SEDDON V. SAME. PACE V. SAME. DOOLEY V. SAME. MABEN V. SAME. LEAKE V. SAME.
Virginia. :August 7, 1888.)
1·. REMOVAL Oll'CAUSES-CITIZENSHlP OF PARTIES. Ina suit against a corporation and its directors jointly. to cancel subscriptions to the corporate stock,. and to compel the defendants to refund the amounts already paid on the same, the directors· are not merely nominal parties; and where one of. them is a citizen of the District of Columbia, or a citizen of the same state as plaintiff, the suit is not removable under act Congo March 8. 1887, § 2, providing that any snit in which the controversy is wholfy between citizens of different states shall be removable to the United States circuit court. 1 S. SAME-RECORD AND PETITION. A record and petition for removal of a cause from the state to the federal courts, which fails to show the citizenship of the petitioners at the time the suit was commenced, does not entitle them to a removal.
On Motion to Remand. Seven suits, in which Thomas Seddon, Thomas Seddon, trustee, James B. Pace, James H. Dooley, W. O. Seddon,J. G. Maben, and T·
..1Goncerning the removal of causes under the act of March 8, 1887, on tbeground of diverse citizenship, see Cooley v. McArthur, 35 Fed. Rep. 372, and note; Whelaa v. . . Railroad Co.; Id. 8 4 , 9 . ·
SEDDON fl. VIRGINIA,.T. & C. S.&
C. Leake, Jr., were the respective plaintiffs, and the Virginia, Tennessee & Carolina Steel & Iron Company, a corporation, and its directors, were defendants, the object of which was to cancel subscriptions to the' stock of the corporation defendant, and compel it and -its directors to refund the amounts already paid in the subscriptions. Act Congo March 3, 1887, § 2, provides that any suit in which the controversy is wholly between citizens of different states, and which can be fully determined as between them. shall be removable to the United States circuit court for the proper district. ' White &- I1uchanan. Ohristian &- Ohristian, and W. W. Gordon, for plaintiff. R. A. Ayer8, Atty. Gen., PAUL, J. These seven, suits were instituted in the circuit court of, Washington county, Va. The defendants, the. Virginia, Tennessee'& Carolina Steel & Iron Company, Frederick W. Huidekoper, John H;tnman, William'p. Clyde, George S. Scott, A. H. Bronson, Extine Norton, and Nathaniel Thayer', petitioned the state court to remove these' cases into this court, which petition was denied, and the said defendants, under the provisions of section 2. act March 3" 1887, amending act March 3, 1875, (24 St. at Large, 552,) presented their petitions,; with a copy of the record, to this court, and the causes were docketed here at the May term, 1888. They are now submitted on a motion to' remand to the state court, on the ground that this court has nojurisdic-' tion of said causes. The object of all these suits is the same. brought by subscribers to the' capital stock of .the Virginia, Tennessee & Carolina Steel & Iron Company, for the purpose ofannulling their scriptions, and to recover the amounts already paid on such SUbscriptions, on the ground that the subscriptions were induced by fraudulerit representations made by the directors of said company, and contained in a prospectus issued by said directors. The claims are made against the Virginia, Tennessee & Carolina Steel & Iron Company, a corporation under the laws of the state of New Jersey, and the directors of said company. The directors are the defendants Frederick W. Huidekoper; a citizen of the District of Columbia; John M. Bailey, a citizen of Virginia; George S. Scott, William P. Clyde, John H. Inman, A. H. Bronson, and Extine Norton, citizens of New York; and Nathaniel Thayer, a citizen of Massachusetts. The other defendants are citizens of the state of Virginia. It is conceded that they are merely nominal parties to the· suits. and it is not necessary to consider their citizenship in discussing the question .of the jurisdiction of this court. The citizenship of the plaintiffs in the several suits is as follows: Thomas Seddon. Thomas Seddon, trustee, James B. Pace, James H. Dooley, and '1'. C. Leake. Jr., Virginia; William C. Seddon, Maryland; and J. C. Maben. New' York. The plaintiffs move that these causes be remanded to the state court-First. Because the petition for removal is insufficient, in that. it fails to allege that the citizenship of the parties, as stateq in the petition, existed at the commenceUlent of the suits. The records, as brought into
thisconrt, did not contain the bills filed in the several causes in the state 'Court, the records being copied and brought here before the bills were filed. But by an agreement in writing, signed by counsel for the plaintiffs, and for the defendants, and filed at the hearing of this motion, the bill i!'l made part of the record in each cause. The record, as thus made up, including the petition for removal, fails to show the citizenship of the petitioners at the time the suits were commenced. It is well settled that the citizenship of tp.e parties, which gives jurisdiction to this court, must be shown to have existed at the time of commencing the suit, and at the time of filing the petition for removal. Railroad Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379-381,4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 510; Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U. S. 561, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873;\ Akers v. Akers, 117U. S. 197, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 669. If no other ground existed than the failure of the record and petitionto show the citizenship of the parties at the time the suits were instituted, and when the application for removal was made, the court is of <1pinion that for this reason the causes should be remanoed. Second. Another ground for the motion to remand is that the defendant Frederick W. Huidekoper, who is one of the directors 'of the Virginia, Tennessee & Carolina Steel & Iron Company, and who is jointly sued with said company aod the other directors of said company, is not a citizen of any but is a citizen of the District of Columbia, and that the suits are therefore not between citizens of different states, and are therefore not l!'emovable. "States of the Union are the political bodies referred to in the extension of the judicial power of the United States to controversies 'between the citizens of different states.' The territories»f the United States are not such states, and the Distriet of Columbia is not a state, and hence citizenship in neither will suffice to give jurisdiction." Spear, Fed. Jud. 144, 140; Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; Corporation oj New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91; Barney.v. Baltimore City, 6 Wall. 280. Counsel for defendants contend that said Huidekoper, though one of the directors of the Virginia, Tennessee & Carolina Steel & Iron Company, is not a real, but only a nominal, party to these suits; that the only real defelldant in the controvers:r is the Virginia, Tennessee & CaroUna Steel & Iron Company; that all ofthe directors of said company are n.ominal parties; and, if not nominal, their liability is several and separable, and is not joined with that of the said company of which they are directors. The court cannot adopt this view. The bill in each suit seeks relief against the said Virginia, Tennessee & Carolina Steel & Iron Company, and all of the directors. The bill in each suit states: "Your orator is advised that he has the right to have the said contract of subscription annulled and rescinded; to recover from the said company and the said directors the said sums paid by him on account ,of said stock, .with interest on each payment from the time of its payment, and to have the estate of and debts due the said company in this state subjected to their payment." The prayer of each bill is: "That llpona hearing of the cause your honor will adjudge, order, and decree said. cuntract of subscription to be null· and void; that said company and
KANSAS CITY &T. BY. CO. tI. INTERSTATE LUMBEB CO.
said directors pay to your orator the said sums paid by him on account of said stock, with interest on each payment from its date; that the said estate and debts of said company which have been attached in this cause be subjected to the payment of what is due your orator." The charges in the bill and the prayer for relief make a single controversy. It is not a separable one, so as to enable some of the defendants to remove cause into this court. The plaintiffs have sued the defendants jointly, as they had a right to do, and they must be treated as joint defendants, and real parties to the controversy. Railroad CO. V · .Mills, 113 U. S. 256, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. 41-43,5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1034, 1161; Sloane v.Ander8on, 117 U. S. 278, 279, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; Little v. Gile8, 118 U. S. 602,7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32; Wire Hedge Co. v. Pullet, 122 U. S. 535, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1265. This ground for remanding, to-wit, that the defendant Frederick W. Huidekoper is a citizen of the District of Columbia, and not of any state, and that the controversy is single I;lndnot separable, applies alike to all of the suits, and is sufficient cause for remanding them all. It further appears from the record that the defendant JohnM. Bailey is a citizen of the state of Virginia, and that the plaintiffs in five oBhe suits, viz., Thomas Seddon, Thomas Seddon, trustee, James B. Paoo, James H. Dooley, and T. C. Leake, Jr., are citizens of the same state. J. C. Maben, the plaintiff in another suit, is a citizen of the state of New York, the same state of which the defendants George S. Scott, William P. Clyde, John H. Inman, A. H. Bronson, and Extine Norton are citizens. In all of these suits, then, it is clear that the requisite citizenship .to give this court jurisdiction does not exist. The opposing parties in the suits have not each a different state citizenship. Othei' reasons are assigned by counsel for remanding these causes, but it is unnecessary to consider them. The foregoing are sufficient. Orders will be entered in all the causes, remanding them to the stat& court.
& T. Ry. CO.
V. INTERSTATE LUMBER
(Circuit Court, 1.
w: D. Missouri, w: D. August 27.1888.)
REMOVAL OF CAUSES-MoTION TO REMAND-TIME OF HEARING.
Under the removal acts of 1875 and 1887, § 3, requiring the party remoTl..'g the cause to give bond for entering in the United States circuit court, on thefirst day ofitsnext session, a copy of the record, and for appearing and entering bail, etc., and providing that, such copy entered, the cause shal1 proceed as if. it had been commenced there, the United States circuit court has no power to remand a cause so removed, for want of jurisdiction prior tOo the return-day, thltt being the next regular term after the removal.
EMINENT DOMAIN -
SAME-PROCEDURE AFTER REMOVAL COMMISSIONERS.
Under the Missouri statute for the condemnation of land by railway companies, providing that a summons shall be issued to the owner, giving him Ie)
ApPOINTMENT 011'" .