UNITED STA.TES '11. LEVA.LLY.
States holds so. If a citizen of. the E\tate of Minnesota should into the state of Wisconsin, and commit a crime in the state of Wisconsin intentionally, and afterwards, when prosecution was initiated against him, was found in the state of Minnesota, I take it that the state of Wisconsin would be justified in demanding him, and that the governor of Minnesota would send the prisoner back as a fugitive from justice, having committed a crime in another state. That appears to be this case. The petitioner admits in his testimony that on the 16th day of September he ,vas in the state of Wisconsin, and in the city of Milwaukee 14 days before the exact date specified in this affidavit. The affidavit charges him with the commission of this crime of embezzlement on or about the 1st day of October. It might have been committed six months before that, 'or a year before that. The laws of the state of Wisconsin provide that, in regard to crimes of this character; proof can be offered showing that the offense had been committed six months afterwards. within the time alleged in this indictment or affidavit. That is the law of this state. I cannot tU,rn now to the section, but thatisthe law. And certainly the crime does not outlaw within two years; but, if the prisoner is not taken by surprise, and knows what the charge is, and it is substantially charg'ed 'in the affidavit, he cannot complain that the person who made thE:l affi,davit was not specific in the very day in fixing the time. I think there can be no question-in my own mind there is none, at least-that these papers are conformable to the act of congress, that the obligation im. posed upon the governor of the state by these papers and the requisition ofthE:lgovernor of Wisconsin under the act of congress required him to arrest th,e partyfor the purpose of delivering him up for rell10val to the state of Wisconsin. Having come to thaJ, determination, the pro,ceedings'of habeaa cOrpus are discharged, and'the petitioner remanded.
An appealhaa been taIr.en. to the circuit court of the United States , : .i. '
UNITED STATES '11. LEVALLY
November 17, 1888.)
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-FINDING'AND F:rnmQ-i-CRwINAL LAW-ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
Where the foreman of the grand jury wrote his name in blank across the back of a bill of indictment, under the proper date, without more, and no findby the grand jury was either reduced to writing or publicly announced in .court, after plea of not guilty, trial, and conviction, held, that judgment must be arrested for want of a finding. '
Indictment for Passing Counterfeit Coin. ment. William A. Stone, for the motion.
On motion in arrest of judg-
The United States Attorney, for the United States.
ACHESON, J. This case differs essentially from State v. iBN. H. 488; Com. v. Smyth, 11 Cush. 473; Price's Case, 21 Grat. 846, and
other cases cHedand relied on by the district attorney. In this court the practiCe. is, and always has been, for the district attorney to prepare in advance the bills of .indictment, and submit the same, with the evidence to support them, to the grand jury, whose action in each case, finding or ignoring the bill, is indorsed thereon, such indorsement being attested by. the signature of the foreman thereunder. The foreman never signs his name at the foot of the Dill, and the only written evidence of the action of the grand jury is the indorsement. The grand jury having brought the bill into court, in ansWer to the usual question hand the iIifinding is not publicly announced, either dictmen.t tp the clerk. by the jury or the clerk, nor is any record thereof then made; but · subsequently the clerk makes the proper entry on the minute-book and docket, from the indorsement on the bill. In the present case the forei man tif'the grand jury merely wrote his name in blank across the back "of the bill, under the date, /lOct. 16, 1888." It is quite impossible, thEm, to determine from anything that appears what the action of the jury'reallY"was. From this incomplete and insensible indorse; · ment it cannot be assumed that the intention was to find the bill to be true. Nor are we at liberty, assuggested, to carry downthe word /lin· dictment,"printed on the back of the bill, and treat it as part of the finding of the grand jury, even, conceding (which we are by no means prepared to 'do) that. the ,use of that word alone, under the ruling in Sparks v. Com. ,9 Pa:. St. 354, 'would suffice. Nowhere upon the record is there any entryitnpoi'ting the finding of the bill astrue. ' The words "indictment filed" have no such significance, and the entry, "a true bill," upon the calendar or trial-list, prepared for the use of the judge, is a matter of no moment. Indeed, the clerk could riot properly make any record of the finding of the bill as true, for no such finding was reduced to writing by the grand jury, or publicly announced by them in court. The sum of the matter, then, is that by an oversight the trial here erroneously proceeded, without it appearing in anywise that the bill of indiptment had been fOUlltiby the grand jury. Therefore the motion in arrest of juq,gment must prevail. ',' And now, Noveinber 17, 1888, it is ordered that judgment be arrested for the reason assigned in ,tPE! I,lJ.otion.
HUNTINGTON tI. HARTFORD HEEL-PLATE CO.
HARTFORD HEEL-PLATE CO.
(CircuieCourt, D. Connecticut. November 12, 1888.)
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-INFRTNGEMENT-HEEL-PLATES FOR RUBBERS.
Letters patent No. 296,623, issued April 8,1884, to Frederick Richardson, for a die to attach heel-plates to rubber shoes, describe a die having radially placed planes, inclining in opposite directions, their use being to clinch the prongs of the plate through the heel, also in opposite directions. These planes are depressions in and entirely below the upper surface of the die; their object being to bend and clinch the ends only of the prongs, without bending their heavy bases or plugs, which pass through the heel, as that would tear the material, and admit water. The opposite direction of the prongs, when clinched, was claimed to balance the .clinching strain, and imbed the plate firmly and evenly. .Letters patent No. 369,554, September 6, 1887, issued to Francis H. Richards. .for a machine for l;tttachingheel'plates, descril!e a die with eleva· tions, only two being radially placed, and without any system of regularly arranged planes. The whole prong. which is slepder. without any heavy base, is intentionally bent. Held that, as the latter invention would not, and was not'jntended to; perform the important feature of the former. viz., of bending only. the end of the prong. it was no infringement, although two of the planes'were radially placed. ' Letters pat.ent No. 296,624, of April 8, 1884, to Frederick Richardson. for a machine for attaching heel:plates to rubber shoes. are not infringed by letters patent No. 369,554, of September 6,1887, to l!'rancis H. Richards, for a machine for the same purpose; the peculiar parts of the former being the bolder or guide"andthe mechanism therewith, and neither the plates. clamp. nor spring in the Richards machine, nor the three in combination, beillg equivalent thereto.
SAME-lHcHTNE FOR ATTACHING HEET,-PLATES.
In Equity. On final hearing of bill. Bill by William H. Huntington to restrain the Hartford Heel-Plate COlnpany from the· infringement of two patents, granted to Frederick RIchardson, for a machine and die for attaching heel-plates to rubJ:ler 'A preliminary injunction was granted as to the patent for the die, 'but' refused as to the machine. 33 Fed. Rep. 281. Afterwards the injunction was dissolved on the ground that the die patent had been anticipated by a prior English patent. Id. 838. Wm. Edgar Simonds, for plaintiff. Oharles E. Mitchell, for
SHIPMAN, J. This is a 'bill in equity, based upon the alleged infringement oftwo letters patent, Nos. 296,623 and 296,624, which were granted April 8, 1884, to Frederick Richardson; one of said patents being for a die for securing heel-plates to rubber shoes, and the other being for a machine for the same purpose. A motion under this bill for a preliminary injunction was refused as to the machine patent, and was granted as to the die patent, but that injunction was afterwards dissolved. The opinion upon the motion stated theimportant faets, which had then been disclosed, in regard to each patent, each invention, and the alleged infringing devices. 33 Fed. Rep. 281, 838. Nothing is required to be added in regard to the questions which are at issue upon the machine patent. v.36F.no.11-44