slide; the' combination being such that vertical motion of the slide sball cause a simultaneous ,horizontal motion of the bolt. (2) In a mortice lock, the mechanism of which to be operated upon by the key is contained within one or two separate tumbler-cases or escutcheons, adapted to be secured to the lock-case after the latter bas beenmorticed into the door, a set or slide conwithin said lock-case, and controllable only when the dooris open,which set or slide is adapted to suitably engage with either one or both of said escutcheons, inserted through either or both sides of the door"and to prevent the withdrawal of said escutcheons from the lock-case. (3) The combination, sllbstantially as set forth, of the slide H, adapted to engage with one or more escutcheons or tumbler-cases, and to prevent the withdrawal of the hitter from the lock-case, and the operating-screw, J, inaccessible when the door on which the lock is used is closed. (4) The slide, or set H, provided with two Wings or projections, h, h, and adapted to engage, as desired, with either one or two escutcheons or tum bIer-cases inserted from one or both sides of the case of a mortice lock." It is admitted that the first claim is not infringed, and that the other claims are not infringed by the slides which the defendant now uses, and that it did make a few locks which infringed those claims. The defendant denies that the improvement which they describe was a patentable invention. In view of the Yale and Winn patents, which are relied upon by the defendant as disclosing the prior state of the art, I think that there was invention on the part of the patentee, as distinguished from mechanical skill. Let there be a decree for an injunction, and for an accounting the infringement, bY' the use of the "Complainant's Exhibit, Defendant Lock," of the second, third, and fourth claims of the Towne patent. 'The bill is dismissed as to the Dickerman and Taylor patents. The questions in regard to costs will be reserved until the final ' decree.
THE BONNIE DOON. 1 BAmD, Sheriff,
THE BONNIE DOON.
, (Di8trict Oourt, D. DelawQlfe. November 24, 1888.
AD1llRALTY-COURTS-JURISDICTION-RECOVERY OF POSSESSION.
Where a sheriff has attached a vessel, which is afterwards taken out of his custody and removed into another state, he can sue in admiralty to recover possession in the district court of the district into which the vessel has been removed.
SAME-ATTAcmlENT-RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
A vessel was attached on a libel against the master individually. The master, without the knowledge or authority of the owner, removed tbe vessel to another state. Held that, the attachment having been illegal, and the vessel never in c'ltBtlJdia legis, the sheriff was not entitled to the possession as against the owner. , The owner was not chargeable with the guaai criminal act of the the vessel. , master in
Libel in rem.
bY hiih-ks Wilks Collet, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.
,THE BONNIE DOON.
Libel by Da.vid Baird,sheriff, to recover possession of the steam-yacht ". Bonnie Doon. ' w. C. Spruance and C. M. Curtis, for libelant. Bradford &:Vandegrift, for claimant.
WALES, J. This is a libel torecover possession. On the7th of June, 1888, the libelant, as sheriff of Camden county, N. J., by virtue of a writ of attachment, issued out of the circuit court for said county, against John Craig, at the suit of Joseph Campbell, in an action of contract, levied onand took possession of the small steam-yacht Bonnie Doon, then lying in the Delaware river, near Beach-Street wharf, in the city of Camden, as the property of the said Craig, who was then in command and acting as master thereof. A few days after the sheriff had acquired possession of the yacht in the manner just described, and while the property was still in his custody, Craig, as is alleged, with the assistance of uther persons, unknown to the libelant, unlawfully took the yacht out of the possession of the sheriff, and brought it within this district, where itwas found by the sheriff, who now seeks to recover possession by virtue of his speci8.1 property obtained under the levy. The answer of Craig, the master and claimant, in beh8.1f of James Graham, of New York city, sets forth that Graham is the true and sole owner of the yacht; that he (Craig) is only the master, and as such master, in behalf of and as bailee for Graham, is entitled to have possession of the property, subject to the claim of the marshal. It is admitted that Craig quietly carried off the yacht on the ground that it was not hIS property, but belonged to Graham. The substance of the exceptions is that the answer affords no j ustification of the conduct of Craig. Possessory actions may be brought in this court to recover ships, or other property, to which a party is entitled by virtue of a maritime right, being analogous to the common-law actions of replevin and detinue, in which the specific property is recovered, instead of damages. These actions may be brought by owners. to try the right to the possession of a ship as among themselves, and by a master or owner to recover possession. Petitory. as well as possessory suits, are also within the admiralty jurisdiction, and may be brought in all cases to reinstate the ownel'S of ships who have been wrongfully deprived of their property. Ben. Adm. §§ 276, 311. This case, then, is properly in court, and, as there is no controversy about the facts, the question for decision is one of law only, and that is, whether the libelant, whose possession of the vessel was obtained and lost under the circumstances stated in the record, should have a decree for restitution. The action in the Camden county court was against Craig, individually, for a cause of action in which he alone was liable, and had no relation to the yacht or its owner. The sheriff was commanded by his writ to attach the goods and chattels, etc., of Craig, and had no authority under that writ to seize the goods or property of any other person. In taking the property of Graham, therefore, he acted illegally, and was a trespasser. He may have been misled by seeing Craig in command, but that is no
excllse forI mllcD less a jllstification of, the wrongful seizure. Possession alone is never reliable evidence of ownership. He should have informed himself of the fact of ownership, and, if in doubt, called on the plaintiff in the attachment to protect him by an indemnifying bond, which is a very common practice in such cases. Failing to do this, he took the risk, and must abide the consequences, whatever they may be, of having made an illegal levy. Drake, Attachm. § 196; ]'reem. Ex'ns, § 254. There is no intimation that Graham ordered the removal ofthe yacht from Camden, or that he has ratified Craig's conduct in causing the removal. As master, Craig had no right to take the yacht froln the sheriff, and in doing so acted outside of the line of his duty. His act was of a quasi criminal nature,and an owner cannot be held responsible for the criminal offenses of his servant, when committed without his knowledge or consent. But the contest here not between the sheriff and Oraig; it is between the sheriff and Graham. It is conceded that Graham is entitled to have the property restored to him, but that he should go to Camden, and assert his right in the place where the seizure was made. Why so? If this court has jurisdiction of the cause, there is no reason why it should not be decided here and now, instead of puting Graham to the expense and delay of going to Camden, and renewing the contest there. It must be remembered that this whole difficulty has grown out of the sheriff's mistake in levying on property that did not belong to the defendant named in the writ. Propert.y cannot be placed in custodia legis by an unauthorized levy. The custody of the sheriffin such a case is an unlawful, and not a legal, custody. The defendant (Craig) or a stranger could not interfere, but the true owner of the property may bring an action of trespass or replevin against the sheriff, or he may even take it away peaceable, if he can. Freem. Ex'ns, §,268. Craig's conduct in running off with the yacht cannot be approved. His doing so was ill-advised, but not more so than was the improvident and hasty seizure by the sheriff. It is one of the incidents of his office that a sheriff will sometimes be called on to exercise his judgment promptly in executing a writ, and he may be placed in the dilemma of making himself liable to the plaintiff in the writ by refusing to seize property represented to belong to the defendant, or, by taking it, of making himself responsible to the owner for an unwarranted levy. The owner, if he be without fault, as it appears he was in this case, must always have his property restored to him. The sheriff may have' a remedy against Craig, but has no right to retain or demand .possession of the vessel after the title of the owner has been established. The exceptions are overruled.
!rHE EGYPTIAN MONARCH.
THE EGYPTIAN MONARCH. ROBERTS
THE EGYPTIAN MONARCH.
(District Oourt, D. New Jersey. November 17, 1888.
ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION-CONFLICT OF LAWS.
A _proceeding in 1'em by It seaman for personal injuries received on board an English vessel. while within English territorial waters, is governed by the law of England, though libelant is a naturalized American citizen. The jurisdiction of the high court of admiralty of England does not extend to a claim for damages by a seaman for personal injuries received on board an English ship while within the body of a county of England.
SAME-ENGLISH HIGH COURT-SHIPPING-PERSONAL INJURIES.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FELLOW-SERVANTS.
A second mate, who superintends the reeling in of servant with a seaman engaged in turning the reel.
is a fellow-
In Admiraltv. Libel by John Roberts against the British steam-ship Egyptian Monarch, Royal Exchange Shipping Company, claimant, for damages for personal injury. A. B. Caldwell and Cha8. Blandy, for libelant. E. B. Conver8, for claimant. .
WALES, J. This is a proceeding in rem to recover damages for injuries sustained by the libelant, a seaman on board the. Egyptian Monarch, on her voyage from England to the United States, in the month of July, 1886. The libelant, a naturalized citizen of the United States, had shipped as an able-bodied seaman. The vessel left the Milward docks, in the port of London, on July 14th, being towed out into the river Thames by a attached to a two-and-a-halfinch wire hawser, which was a part of the tackle of the steam-ship, and fastened at the other end to the aftdeck of the Monarch. At the time of the accident the vessel was going down the river, but was still within the limits of the port of London. The libelant, with another member of the crew, was reeling in the hawser, which had been cast off by the tug, and triced up along-side of the Monarch. One end of the hawser was fast to the reel, a horizontal drum between two uprights, passing thence out through the after-quarter chock j and along the ship's side forward to her waist, where the other end was made fast by a hempen line to the mi.dship davit, so that the bight of the hawser just touched the water. The second mate superintended the work of reeling. Under his direction the boatswain's mate paid out the hawser from the davit by means of the line, and the men at the reel wound it up. During this operation the hawser was paid out more rapidly than it was taken up on the drum, in consequence of which the bight sank into the water at the vessel's stern and was caught by the propeller, which reversed the motion of the drum, causing the handle at which the libelant was working to fly back, and inflict on him serious bodily injuries. of The libelant alleges that the accident occurred through the the second mate, and seeks to hold the owners of the ship liable. There