GRIFFIN '0. MACON COUNTY.
notary certifies that ;'1, Alex. W. Jones, a notary public in and for said county and state, do hereby certify that in pursuance to the annexed commission I caused the said witness to come before me at Augusta, b said county, * * * and he subscribed and swore to the same before me," etc. Can there be any doubt that the witness named in the certificate is the one who signed the deposition? The fair meaning of the certificate is that the notary caused the witness named in the commission to appear before him, to give his testimony, and to sign and swear to the deposition when reduced to writing, and the name appended to the deposition is that of the witness named in the commission, so that it fully appears who it was that testified. Defendants also ask the suppression of the deposition of William Manning, .because the officer taking the same has attached to the deposition a copy of a deed referred to and, produced by the witness on the examination; it beine claimed that it was not offered in evidence. The in. troduction of papers in evis-lence cannot be had before a mere commissioner for the/taking of depositions. Section 3736 of the Code of Iowa requires that"all exhibits produced before the person taking the deposi.. tion, or proved or referred to by any witness, or correct copies thereof, must be appended to the depositions and returned with them, unless sufficient reason be shown for not so doing." The deposition shows that the witness referred to the deed in question, and therefore it was entirely proper for the notary to return a copy thereof attached to the deposition. Whether it is admissible in evidence on the trial is another question, the . decision of which did not belong to the .notary· The plaintiff may not offer the deed in evidence. but that does not require the suppression of the deposition. Finding, therefore, no substantial merit in any of the objections taken on the several deposition,s herein· filed, the motion to suppress the same. is overruled.
(Circuit (Jourl, E. D. "lfis8ouri, N. D
December 5, 1888.)
'LnUTA.TION OF AOTIONS-"-RuNNING OF THE STATU'fE-'COUNTY BONDS-"-INTEREeT COUPONS.. . . . . . .
.When an installment of interest due on 8 municipal bond cannot be recovered by 8 suit on the coupon by reason of lapse of time since the coupon mao tured, the same installment of interest cannot be recovered along with the principal debt in 8 suit on the bond.
At Law. On submission. Action by BradleyA. Griffin against Macon county, Missouri, on·o;>Unty "bonds. .eX EUiot, for 9. Mitchell, f.or
. FEDERAL REPORTER.
THAYER, J Plaintiff brings suit on six bonds, executed by Macon county. They bear date January 1,1870, and matured January 1,1882. In the body oUhe bond it is recited that the county will pay interest "at ten per cent. per annum, which interest shall be payable semi-annually, on the presentation of the coupons hereto annexed." All of the coupons originally attached to the bonds have been detached, except those which matured on and after July 1, 1878. In the first count of thepetitian plaintiff demands judgment for the principal sum due on the six bonds, and also interest thereon at 10 per cent. per annum, from January 1, 1870, to January 1, 1878, and from January 1, 1882, to the of rendition of judgment. The coupons that matured after January 1, 1878, and up to the maturity of the bonds, are sued on in the second count of the petition. This suit was filed on April 20, 1888.· It will be observed, therefore, that all the coupons on the bonds in question which matured on and prior to January 1,1878, were more than 10 years overdue when the said suit was filed, and· for that reason an action on the coupons is barred by limita,tion. By suing'on the bonds, and demanding judgment for the principal sum, together with all interest that accrued thereon up to January 1, 1878, the plaintiff seeks to avoid a plea of the statute of limitations, which could have been successfully interposed if he had declared on the coupons. Huey v. Macon Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 481, and cases cited. The point to be determined is whether such overdue interest can recovered by declaring for it in a suit on the bonds, notwithstanding the fact that it could not be recovered by a suit on the coupons? The point is novel, and, so far as I am advised, has never been expressly determined. In several well-considered cases it has been held that, when money due on II. note or bond ,is made payable by installments, the ute of limitations begins to run against each installment from the time it matures. Bush v StoweU,71 Pa. St. 208; Burnham v. Brown, 23 Me. 400; Estabrook v. Moulton, 9 Mass. 258; Heywood v. Perrin, 10 Pick. 228. But Mr. Wood in his work on "Limitation of Actions" says that, "with singular inconsistency" it has been held in some cases that interest made payable annually is not subject to the same rule; that the statute does not run against interest installments payable annually, until the principal debt matures. Wood, Lim. § 126, p. 296. In my opinion, there is no distinction in principle between a debt payable by installments and interest payable annually or semi-annually in installments. If the statute begins to run in the former.case as soon as an installment of the debt matures, for equally gOOd reasons it ought to run against interest installments as Soon as they become payable. It is worthy of note that the few cases cited by Mr. Wood as holding that the statute of limitations will not run against interest installments until the principal matures, were suits upon notes or bonds to which no interest coupons were attached. Separate contracts to pay installments of interest at stated intervals were not annexed to the obligation to pay the debt. Vide Bank v. Doe, 19 Vt. 463; Hendersonv. Hamilton, 1 Hall, 314; Ferryv. Ferry, 2 Cush. 92. The rulings made in the cases last mentioned appear to ha\'e
t1. MACON COUNTY.
been based on the ground that interest is a mere incident of a debt, and is so inseparably connected therewith that it may be recovered in connection with the debt when it matures; no matter for how long a period it has been overdue. By this was meant, I suppose, that the stipulation with reference to interest in the cases then under consideration formed. an inseparable part of the promise or obligation to pay the principal debt. But if, as in the present case, the parties to a note or bond make independent stipulations as to interest, and put such stipulations in the form of negotiable coupons, which may be detached from the bond, and are intended to be detached and negotiated, no reason is perceived why the statute of limitations should not run, as soon as they mature, against all such installments of interest as are represented by such interest coupons. It appears to me that it would be extremely technical, as well as illogical, to say that the statute of limitations runs against the promise contained in a coupon from the date of its maturity, but does not run against the same promise contained in the bond until. the bond matures. In view of the fact that it has been held that the same period oflimitation applies to a coupon that.avplies to a bond,-tbat they are contracts of equal dignity,-the true doctrine is no doubt that, when an, action to recover a given installment -of interest cannot be maintained on a coupon by reason of lapse oftime, such instaUment cannotue recovered by a suit on tbe bond. Oily v. Lamson ·.. 9 Wall. 482; City v. Butler, .14 Wall. 296. The views bere expressed are confirmed by the decision in Clark v. Iowa Oity, 20 Wall. 586, although it is true that the precise question now before the court was not involved tbat case. It was there held that coupons, when severed from illuqicipal bonds, are negotiable, and pass by delivery, and tbat, when so they cease to be mere incidents of the bonds, and become independent claims. It was furtber beld tbat, thougb bonds are C3:llceled, or paid .before maturity, such coupons as are at the time outstanding hands of tbird do not lose their validity, but fillY be collected by tbe holder for If outstanding unpaid coupqns are not extinguished by the cancellation, payment, or surrender of the bonds to whipb they pertain, it is manifest that tbe interest which accrues from time to time on bonds with interest coupons annexed is not a mere incident of the debt, and is not so' inseparably connected therewith that it may be recovered along with the principal debt ina suit on the hond, as distinguished from a suit on the coupon, regardless of the length of such interest ll)ay have been overdue. The question submitted to the court years as to whether the interest installments which fell due more before the auit was filerl may be recovered in an action on tbe bonds, is accordingly decided in the negative. Such interest installments are barred, unless the statute can be avoided by a plea of some. of the exceptions which suspend its operation.
UNITED STATES 11. GABRmL
(Oircuit OQ1/rt, B. D. LouUiiana. May 26, 1888.)
CuSTOMS DUTIES-DUTIES OF ApPRAISERS-EsTIMATE OF VALUE.
R!lv. St. U S. § 2902, directing appraisers of imports to ascerta,in market value and wholesale price of the goods in the principal markets of country whence they are imported,regardless of the invoice. is unaffected by act U; S. March 3, 1883, § 7, which repeals Rev. St. §§ 2907, 2908. and act June 22. 1874. providing that certain costs of transportation, etc.. shall be added to the price of goods, or by section 7. of the act of March 3d. which modifies the oath to be taken upon the entry of goods. with respect to said costs of transportation. but leaves the oath otherwise unchanged, and the dutiable value of goods is to be estimated from their market value in the principal markets of the country whence they are imported.
At Law. On motion -for new 'trial. Action by the United States against Gabriel & Schall upon a bond given for duties upon cement entered at the port of New Orleans. Verdict for plaintiff, which defendant moved to set aside. J. W. Gurley, Asst. U. S. Atty., for the United States. Howe & Prentiss, for defendant.Before PARDEE and BILLINGS, JJ.
PARDEE, J. The defendants imported, through the port of New Orleans, a lot of cement from Holzminden, Germany. Their agent made the proper entry at the custOl'n-house; filed the necessary oath and sworn and certified invoice from the manufacturers at Holzminden; paid duty on the valuation given by the irivoice, gave the requisite bond, and took order for delivery of the goods. The local appraiser valued the goods for duty higher than the invoice value, and the importers were notified. Dissatisfied with such higher valuation, the importers called for a reappraisement by merchant appraisers under section 2930, Rev. St. The merchant appraisers were appointed, and made an appraisement of the dutiable value of the said goods,' substantially the same as the local appraiser had previously done. The defendants, still dissatisfied, appealed to the collector and secretary of the treasury, but obtaineu no relief. Suit being brought on the bond, on the trial, the defendants offered to prove that the merchant appraisers, in their appraisement, through error or mistake, ignored the valuation of the goods at Holzminden, and based their finding on the value of such goods at Bremen, a place also in Germany, and that the actual dutiable value was the value at Holzminden, and that the same was correctly shown by the invoice filed with entry of the goods. This evidence was excluded by the trial judge, and .such exclusion is the real base of the motion for a new trial. It is claimed that the act of March 3, 1883, (22 St. at Large, 488'et seq.,) has modified and repealed section 2902, Rev. St., so far as therein the dutiable value of imported goods is to be determined by the true and
IPllollication delayed by inability to obtaih copy of opinion at
of its rendition.