(Oifooui$ CO'Uf'1, B.D,'4labamtJ. January 80,1889.)
A vesseI.engaged In the carrying trade on a naylgable river fs "engaged In \he coastwise trade" within the meaning of the act of June 19, 1886, and the shipping commissioner is entitled to fees for shipping seamen on such vessel.
On Writ of Error to District Court. 85 Fed. Rep. 917. At law. Action by Paul Ravesies against the United States forfee$ as shipping commissioner for the port of Mobile. .A demurrer to the titionwas'sustained,and the case is brought up as on writ of error by plaintiff. . J. L; & T. H. Smith, for plaintiff in error. John D. Bu1"1lItt, U. S. Atty. PARDEE,J. All fOl'Illalities in the bringing up of this case from the court having been waived, the case is treated 88 though regularly brought up on writ of error to the district court. ' The facts of the case are well stated in the opinion .of the district judge, ·on file in the record, and reported 85 Fed. Rep. 917. The error assigned in the case,_ and the only matter presented to this court for decision, is whether the wordl:l, "any vessel engaged in the coastwise trade," as used in section 2 of the act of congress approved June 19, 1886, (24 St. at Large, 80,) include vessels engaged in the carrying trade on navigable rivers, or is to be limited to vessels engaged in the carrying trade along the sea-coast. The district judge held, and gave judgment accordingly, that "coastwise trade" means trade or intercourse carried on by sea between two ports or places belonging to the same conntry. and does not include trade carried on on the navigable rivers. I am inclined to the opinion that this interpretation is too narrow. In the statutes of the United States relating to commerce, navigation,and revenue, the words "coasting trade" and "coastwise trade" are used synonymously. See act April 14, 1814, (Rev. St.§§ 2518, 4358;) 160p. Atty. Gen. 247. In the case of Gibbons v. Og(1en, 9 Wheat. 214, it is said by Chief Justice MARSHALL, in giving the opinion of the court: '" The coasting trade' is a ,term well understood. The law has defined it, and aU know its meaning perfectly. The act describes with great minutl:juess the variousoperatio'ns of a vessel engaged in it, and it cannot, we think, be doubted that a voyage .from New Jersey to New York 18 one of thl?se operations." In the case of Steo:m-BoatCo.v. Li'lYingBton, 8 Cow. 747, Chief Justice SAVAGE, giv.ing the opinion of the majority of the court, says: "This brings me to the inquiry, what iathe coasting trade? . to tilis inquiryia·ti> be foundirithe laws of congress, the first of w'hich is entitled ·An act for registering and clearing vessels, regulating the coast1,1789, but moTe-paring trade,
tlcularly in · An act for enrolling and licensing ships or vessels to be em· ployed in the coasting trade and fisherieS, and for regWating the same, ' passed February 18, 1793. It cannot be necessary to enter into a minut..:! analysis of the sectiuns of this last-mentioned act, a general reference to some of its provisions being sumcien t for my present purpose. This act contains in the first section a prohibition to all vessels ,except those authorized, as is therein provided, frOm carrying on the coastinK trade; The ·license then gives the authority, or the act regulates a right previously existing. (and it is. in my jUdgment, immaterial which, for the purpose of deciding. this controversy,) and partiCUlarly specifies the mode of carrying on trade in certain vessels on the coast or a navigable river, between districts in different states and districts in the same sta.te, and different plaees in the same district.fl'his then is the defi nitiou given by congress to the term ·the coasting trade.' c;Jhief Justice MARSHALL so understands it when he says: · The "coasting trade" is a· term well understood. The lawhas defined It, and all know its meaning perfectly. The act describes with great mintiteness the various operations of a vessel engaged in it.' According to the definition of the' coasting trade.' as extracted from the act of congress pf February 18·. 1793, it means commercial intercourse, carried on between different districts in different statf's, between different districts in the same state, and between differ!lnt places in the same district.· on sea-coast, or ona navigable river. Agreeably to this definition, a voyage in a vessel of suitable tonnage from New York to Albany is as much a coasting voyage as from Boston to Plymouth, or New Bedford." See Walker v. Blackwell,1 Wend. 557; 1 Kent, Com. 438; Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black, 603; sections 432S, 4348; 4349, 4351, 4352, 4354, 4355, 4359, Rev. St·. In these sections congress in the ing trade vessels hound from It district in one, state to a district in the same or any. other state, whether they navigate rivers or the sea-coast proper. .. . . . The teedI'd in tQe case shows that the original account of plaintiff for fees as shipping commissioner was parUy allowed by the treasury de.. partment, and, as allowed, included fees fOf shipments upon vessels solely navigating Alabama rivers; from which it would seem that the construction given by the treasury department of the meaning of "coasting" or "coastwise" trade does not restrict the said words ,to trade on the seacoast. 1 have examined. the two cases cited in the court below from 1 Newberry.1 The point in. each case was whether or not a terry-boat was engaged in the cOllsting trade. . Keeping that point in view. and considering that rivers have shores along which boats can coast to touch and trade, those decisions do not conflict with the case cited from. 3 Cow. BUpra. In my opinion, the district. judge erred in sustaining the de.. lDurrer to the plaintiff's petition, and his judgment should be reversed. .. The finding of facts in the district court does not cover the issues raised, by the plaintiff's petition with regard to his fees on navigable rivers, and the case will have to be rem.anqed for further evidence and findings of facts. .Judgment will be entered remanding the case to the district court, with instructions to overrule the. demurrer of the United States to plaintiff's petition, and thereafter proceed as justice and equity may require.
lTlleJa1lleB Morrison, 1 Newb. Adm. 241; The Willlam Pope,
LANGDON V. BRANCH.
et al. v.
(Oircuit Oourt, S. D. Georgia, E. D. November 20, 1888.)
CORPORATIONS ..:...TRAFFIClUNG IN STOCK OF COMPETING CoRPORATION ROAD COMPANIES.
An insolvent construction company contracted to build a railway for a corporation, and received nearly all of the latter's stockl\. bonds, and assets as security for its outlay. Without beginning the work, the persons in control of the construction company transferred all the stock to the persons managing another railway already in operation. among whom were the president and many of its directors. The funds of the latter corporation were used in purchasing the stock of the construction company, and in this manner the said stock, and the stock and assets,M the projected road, were controlled by the same management as the road then in operation. The latter began at the same point, and ran for nearly the same distance, and in the same general direction, as the projected line, which would be, when completed, a competing line. Held. that the evident purpose and effect of th,e transaction was to violate by indirection Const. Ga. art, 4, § 2, par. 4, the pnrchll.se of the stock of one corporation by another, and any contract between them tendIng to lessen competition in their respective businesses or to encourage monopoly, illegal and void. Equity will enjoin the carrying out of such an agreement. and will seize the assets of the insolvent construction company at the instance of persons who have loaned money to its president and sole manager to use in building the road, on the faith of his 'pledge of a share of the profits derived from the work; the company occupying as to them the relationship of derelict trustees.
SAME-INJUNCTION-RIGHTS OF PLEDGEES.
Three creditors. each of whom severally loaned money to the president for the purpose mentioned, under pledges of portions of the profits, may join in a bill for such relief.
In "Equity. Bill for injunction. The complainants, Richard Langdon, J. C. McNaughton, and L., A. Conwell, citizens of the state of Pennsylvania, bring their bill against the Savannah, Dublin & Western Short-Line Railway, a corporation of this district; the United States & Improvement Company of New Jersey, doing business in the city of Savannah; James A. Simmons, of the state ofNew York; Thomas P. Branch, a citizen of this district; and the Central Rililroad & Banking Company of Georgia,-and allege that the Savannah, Dublin & Western Short-Line Railway Company is incorporated to build and operate a railway from Savannah to Dublin and icus; that the Macon & Dublin Railway Company is incorporated to build a railroad from Macon to Dublin; that the former bought all the charter rights and franchises of the latter, and in that manner became authorized to build and equip a railroad from Savannah to Macon; that on the 18th of March the Savannah, Dublin & Western Short-Line Railway Company (which, for conciseness, we will term the IShort-Line Comv.any) and John McKetchney made a contract by which the company deposited with McKetchney all its capital stock except $60,000, its mortgage bonds to the amount of 83,000,000, with its local aid and all the bonds to be issued on that part of the road between Dublin and Macon,-the entire property to be delivered, to be held by McKetchney as security for all of his outlay on the road, with full power to sell or pledge the same to v.37F.no.l0-29