HENNESSY". CITY OF ST. PAUL.
flces. Rev. St. Mo. §§ 623, 624,1061,1184,5376. The debt was contracted by those officElrs, and not by the county court. In the case of Potter v. Douglas Co., 87 Mo. 240, it was held that the constitutional prohibition now in question was leveled against a county becoming indebted through the action of the county court,-the ordinary contracting agent of the county,-and that it had uo application to an obligation cast on the county for the transportation of a prisoner to an adjoining county, and for his board while there confined in jail, inasmuch as the law made it the duty of the sheriff to take prisoners to an adjoining (Jounty, and there confine them, when there was no jail in the county where the offense was committed. In Rollins v. Lake Co., 34 Feel. Rep. 845, Judge BREWER held that a provision in the constitution of the state of Colorado, very similar to the one now under consideration, did not forbid a county ofthat state from becoming indebted for witness', juror's, and sheriff's fees, in excess of the amount limited by the constitution, because the laws of the state made it obligatory on counties to pay all suph fees. It seems, therefore, that it is settled, both in this state and in this circuit, that ,constitutional provisions limiting the amount of county indebtedness that may be incurred are to be construed as having reference to that class of debts which it is optional with the county court or other governing body of the county to incur, and that they are not to be taken as having reference 'to compulsory obligations cast on the county by operation of law. as where a county is required to pay the ordinary .expenses attending the maintenance of courts and the enforcement of the laws within the county, or where particular officers are required to provide at the expense ofthe county the necessary supplies for the proper discharge oftbe'duties of their office. As experience has heretofore shown that (Jounties and municipalities generally become embarrassed by lavish expenditures which they were under no legal obligation at the time to make, or that might at least have been deferred to a more convenient season, the construction adopted in the cases above cited is reasonable, and will most likely result in accomplishing the purpose had in view by the law-maker. Judgment will accordingly be entered for the plaintiff.
CITY OF ST. PAUL.
(Circuit Court, D. Minnesota. February 6, 1889.)
St. Paul Mun. Code. art. 32, p. 41, which confers upon the common council "full power and authority to rel1;lOve and abate any nuisance injurious to public health or safety, and to remove. or require to be removed. any build· ing which. by reason of dilapidatiou. defects in structure, or other causes, mayor shall have become imminently dangerous to life," etc.. does not can· fer upon the council the exclusive jurisdiction to determine what constitutes a nuisance.,but only authorizes the abatement of that whicl\ is in fact a common nuisance.
On motion for new trial.
Actic:mby David J. against the city .0f'St. caused b;y :tearing down and removing plaintiff'!lb}lilding. Verdict for defendant moves for anew trial.
Yowng &- Lightner, for plaintiff. W. P. Murray, for defendant.
NEJ..sON, J. A suit was brought against the defendant for tearing down and removing plaintiff's frame building located on Robert street, in the city of St. Paul, in this district. The building was rented at the times. fire daniaged it to the extent of from 30 to 50 per (lent. of its value. It was vacant and untenanted on April 30, 1886, and was declared by the common council of the city imminently dangerous to life and property by reason of fire and its dilapidated condition, and a nuisance, and on July 1,1886, was taken down. The act of the city is attempted to be justified under its chartel' and ordinances. The trial resulted in a verdict·for the plaintiff. The charter of the city of St. Paul gives the com;' nioncouncil power and authority to remove and abate any nuisance injurious to public health or safety, and to remove any building which, by reason of dilapidation :I< * * or other causes, may have or shall have become imminently dangerous to lite and property. City Charter, . p.- 41; art. 32, Mun. Code St. Paul. On October 7; 1869, the following orqinancewas passed (article 32, p. 41, Mun. Code St. Paul:) "'l'he common council shall have full power and authority to remove and abate anI nuisau(:e injurious to the public health or safety, and to remove, or requi"/l to be removed, auy building WhiCh, by reason of dilapidatitm·.defects in structure, or other causes; may have or stlal1 become imminently dangerous to life,or property," etc. . On4.pril.30, 1886, a resolution of the common council was approved by the mayor, authorizing the destruction and removal of plaintiff's, building. It was urged on the trial, and. it is pressed with some degree of earnestness, that under the charter and ordinance as above recited, the W!tS conferred upon the common council to deter-,. mine what constitutes a nuisance. I do not think so. The common council undoubtedly has the power to abate nuisances, and a dilapidated and vacant building, by reason of fire, and its temporary occupation by disorderly persons and trespassers, and its use as a receptacle of filth, may become a nuisanoe:a.s recognized by law. But unless a nuisance, as defined by the common law or by statute, exists, the act of the common council cannot make it one bya mere resolution. Such a doctrine might place)he property of the pevple, nO matter Yl!'hap, in fiwtmight be its and. character, at the,disposal of the without compensation. A nuisance cannot be created common by mere unless it isin some mannerinjuriotistothe public; snd ,the ordinance or declaration heretofore recited is no:defensein this suit, l111lessthe building is proved to bes common nuisail·ca. 'Powertoabl1te tit' suppress is confined to abating or.suppressiug that which is imminently dangerous to life and property, and a nuisance; and where the facts do not create, the danger, a resolution ON>1'-
V. LOUISVILtE &:N. B. CO.
dinance of the common council to the contrary cannot avail. 1 Wood, Nuis. §744; Everett v. City, 46 Iowa, 66; Yate8 v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. Underwood v. Green, 42 N. Y. 140. 497; Clark v. MayfYl", 13 In the case cited by counsel(Harvey v. Dewoody, 18 Ark. 252) the demurrer interposed by the plaintiff to the plea of:the defendant admitted the facts alleged, which showed the building a nuisance per Be. No evi, dence was excluded on the trial tending to show the building unsafe, and dangerous to life and property, and I find no error committed. Motion for ne,w trial denied.
& N. R. Co.
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Kentucky. January 7,1889.)
CURlERS-INTERSTAn COMMERCE DICIALPOWERS.·
Congress. in establishing "inferior courts," and prescribing their jurisdic· tion, must confer upon the judges appointed to administer t)lem the constitutional tenure of office,-, hat of holding "during gOO,d behavior, "-before they t , can 'be,come invested with any portion of the Judicial power of the manto ' ' "
, ' , "
'The act to regulate commerce does not undertake either to create an rioJ;' court," or to invest the commission appointed thereunder with judicial l1pwers or functions.
The interstate commerce commission is invested with only administrati'ye po:wers of supervision and' investigation, whi,ch fall far short of making ita couri, or its action jndiCiaL in the proper sense Of the term. Its action, or conclusion upon matters brought before it for investigation is neither final nor c()nc1usive; nor is it any authqrits: to enf()rce its decision or liWard. It hears. investigates, and reports upon complaints made before it. bilt 'Subsequent judicial' proceedings are contemplated and provided for as the remedy fQr the enforcement of the order or report of the commission in all cases Where the party 'against whom its decision is rendered does not. yield voluntary obedience tj:llireto. '
'. - The commission is charged with the duty of. ipvestigating and ,reporting tipo;n complaints; an<l the facts found or reported by it are only given the lorce and weight of prima jacie evidence i!1 judicial p.roceedings as may thereafter be had for the e'nforcement of Its recommendatIOn or order. The functi9ns of the cOIDmissionare those of referees or special commissioners, appointed to make preliminary investigation of, and report upon, matters for subsaqlfent judicial examination and determination. In respect to interstate commerce matters covered by the law, the commission may be regarded as the general referee of each and every circuitcollrt of the United States upon which the jurisdiction is conferred of enforcing the rights, duties, and obli'gations recognized an'll enforced by said law. . 'C();ngress, under itssoverllign andexcIusive power to regulate commerce amorig the several states. hall the power to create a commission for the pur. pose of supervising. investigating. and matters or complaints connected with or growingOl1t of interstate commerce; and no valid constitutional objection can be urged against making the findings of the commissionprimafacieevidence in subsequent judicial proceedings. Such a provision merely prew.:ribes a rule of ,evidence, clearly within well-recogllizedpowera of the legislature, and in 'no way encroaches upon the court's proper funclions. - , .
SAME"":"POWER OF CONGRESS.