CO.·tI. THE GUIDINq STAR.
Waring, for libelant. T. B. ThomM, for respondents.
MORRIS, J. In cases of a similar class which have come before this court I have decided that when a price is demanded and paid, the persons paying that price must have the same accommodations, and there must be a bona fide effort on the part of the carrier to furnish the same accommodatiom:;. The Sue, 22 Fed. Rep. 843. When public sentiment demands a separation of the passengers, it must be gratified to some extent. While this sentiment prevails among the traveling public, although unreasonable and foolish, it cannot be said that the carrier must be compelled to sacrifice his business in order to combat it. Within reasonable limits the carrier must be allowed to manage his own affairs. In this case, although the petitioner suffered some discomfort and humiliation, he was not obliged to leave the table, and his supper was served, and I do not find that he was discriminated against in any manner which can be made the ground of a legal action. It was foolish and unreasonable, as I have said, in the other passengers to object to sit at the same table with this libelant, who is a well-behaved, educated minister oithe Christian religion,simply because he may have negro blood in his veins, but the owners of the steam-boat cannot be held responsible in damages for that. There is Some ground for a suspicion that the petitioner was notsufficiently protected by the officers of the steam-boltt from the threats and indignities at the hands of certain passengers, but the proof fails· to establish it, and they testified that they did all they could to prevent it. I therefore must dismiss the libel, but withoutcosts.
WESTERN MANUF'G Co. v. THE GUIDING STAB.
(Circuit Court. S. D. Ohio,
CARRIERS-OF' GOODs-LIABILITY FOR Loss-BURDEN OF PROOF.
On a libel for damage to butterine during transportation, respondent has the burden of proving defective cooperage of the tubs containing it, or its nat· ure or quality, and the action of the wel\ther upon it, froJD which respondent l\lleges the daml\ge resulted. The defense that the daml\ge resulted from the nl\ture of the butterine under the l\ction of the weather. is not estl\blished where it is shown thl\t the but· terine Wl\S ml\nufl\ctured with specil\l reference to the temperature l\t the points of shipment l\nd delivery, l\nd had withstood a test of 92 deg., l\nd was In good condition when shipped, l\nd thl\t other shipments of similar quality l\nd cooperl\ge, on the same and other vessels, ml\de at l\nd about the Sl\me time, in the same state of weather, were delivered in good condition, 'and where proper ventilation is not shown. The tubs having been in good condition when shipped, l\nd in bad condi· tion when delivered, many of them being broken in, proper stowage, which is a part of the obligation to carry safely, will not be presumed, though the place of stowl\ge may have been selected '
The difference between the price for which the article was sold and its market value at the place of delivery on its arrival, had it been in good condition, with interest, is the proper measure of damages. I. ·SiMB.· ' . i . . · of libelant's agent in going to the place of delivery to Inves. as to the butterine which had been rejected, are not .a proper charge 'agaln'st respon den t. . .
In Admiralty. Libel for damages. On appeal from district court. . Libel by. the Western Manufacturing Company against the steamer Guiding Star, for damage to goods in course of carriage. Decree for respondent, and libelalltappeals. . 'Lincoln, Stephens &: Lincoln, for libelant. Follett, Hyman kKeUey, JACKsoN,J.· The e"idence in this case clearly establishes that the butterine consigned by libelant to C. H. Dolson and Smith Bros. & 00. was of good quality, in good condition, and putut:> in good tubs or packages, suitably andproperly coopered. The bills of ladingissued by the respondent admit that the consignments were received in good order, and were by it to be delivered to the consignees at New Orleans "in like good order,""dangers of fire, navigation;"explosion, and collision excepted;" It is also' clear1yshown by the testimony, and not controverted by the' respondent, that when thebutterine .arrived at New Orleans it was in a damaged condition, unmerchantable, and its market value reduced about 50 per cent.. ' It is neither claimed by respondent, nor shown by the proof, that this loss or damage to the butterine, which occurred while in transit, was caused or occasioned by anyone or all of the excepted dangers mentioned in the bill of lading. The defenses set up and relied upon by respondent in the court below and in this court are: First, that libelant selected the place on the steam-boat where the packages of butterine . should be stowed, and where the same were in fact stowed, 'as the coolest and best position on the boat; and, secondly, that the tubs in which the butterinewas'Packed were insecure, and insufficient for the purpose, and that the loss or q.amageresulting to the butterine.during its tran,sportationJo New Orleans was occaSioned by the construction or cooperage of thetubs.l in'connection with the heat of the weather at the time . of shi'Pfuent' and dudng the transit. The proof does not establish that libelant or its agent selected the '. place of: stowage for the freight; libelant's agent only requested that it should be stowed in the coolest place on the boat, and the clerk (Jones) ana. mate (HaJ.'rison) both designated and selected the forward hold, near breast-hooks, as beillg''thesafest and coolest place on the a' reason for that opinion and that selectioo.;"lhat the scuttle-hatch would be open, and a current of air would be passing through,,!hich wouldkeep that part of the hold cooL" But while this first gtound; o(defet;lse is not it does not appear that t,his.seleetioll was hnpro.pedy made, or thatresi>ondent is chargeable with fault as to the place of stowage, since it is show-nby the evidence that the for-
COd'. THE GutDING STAR.
ward, part of thethold,in ,hot weather,is the coolest lOcation' or· position on the b(>llt for, articles of character, or such as need and require protectiOIi-from the sun or heat, provided the scuttle-hatch is kept Open, to give it proper ventilation. In respect, to the second, ground of defense the, burden of proof rests upon respondent to establish that the loss or damage to the butterine was caused, or occasioned by the insecure and insufficient tubs in which it was packed, or by the defective cooperage of such tubs, as alleged in its answer, in order to exempt itself from liability. It is not claimed, in the answer that the loss or damage to the butteriue complained of resulte,d from any intrinsic or inherent quality of the article itself, but only from the defective character of the tubs in which it was packed. In the argument of the case, however, counsel.for respondent have insisted that the loss or damage occurred from the character of the butterine, which it is claimed melted, and became liquefied, by reason of the temperature of the atmosphere, and in that' condition, with defeotive coopering of the tubs, was lost or injured., Without stopping to consider whether raspondent can have the benefit of this latter claim, not relied on in ite answer, we may say that this, as well as the defense of defective cooperage of the packages, casts upon respondent the burden of proof, in order to escape liability for the loss or damage to the freight occurring while in transit. As stated in Hastings v. Pepper, 11 Pick. 43, cited with approval by the supreme court in Nelson v. Woodruff, 1 Black, 160, the well-settled rule of law is that, when loss or damage occurs to freight transported by a common,carrier, "the presumption of law is that it was occasioned bythe act or default of the'carrier, and of course the burden of proof is upon him to show that it arose from a cause existing before his receipt of the goods for carriage, and for which he is not responsible." It is also settled that a common carrier is not responsible for the ordinary evaporation of liquids occurring in course of transit, or for leakage arising from secret defects in the casks, which existed, but were not apparent, when received for carriage; nor for 1088 or injury occasioned by the peculiar nature of the article carried at a particular season of the year, such as. that resulting from the fermentation of molasses, or the leakage of liquid lard from barrels, although the bill of lading issued therefor describes the freight as received in good order, and undertakes to deliver the same at tion in like good order; but in all such cases, when)oss or damage does occur during the course of transportation, it is incumbent upon the car.. rier to establish by satisfactory proof that such loss or inj ary was occasioned by causes, which he could not control, resulting from the nature and condition of the article,---ras secret defects of the casks, barrels, or vessels, in which it is packed. Nelson v. Woodruff,. 1 Black, 158-163, and cases there cited, fully illustrate these general principles. When the loss or damage results oris occasioned by any of the excepted p(:lrils or dangers mentioned in the bill of lading, the shipper must prima facU bear the loss; but he may impose it upon the carrier by proving negligence, or that it might have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and attention on the part.of the carrier. Reasonable ca,l,'e, diligence, and skill
are demanded and required of carriers even'in respect to losses resulting from danp;ers and perils excepted in bills of lading. When the carrier shows that the damage complained of was occasioned by an excepted peril, the burden of proof then rests upon the shipper to establish negligence or want dfproper care and diligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold him liable. But when the damage is not occasioned by one of the perils from which the carrier has exemptad himself by the bill of la:Hng, as in the present case, the shipper is not called upon to show actual blame, fault, or neglil!:ence on the part of the carrier in order to hold him liable. In such cases the loss or injury to the shipper's goods while in course of carriage is sufficient proof of negligence or misconduct, and of prima facie liability ,and the onU8 probandi is then on the carrier to exempt himself. Everything is negligence on the part of a common , carrier which the law or his express contract does not excuse. It is enough for the shipper to show that his goods reached their destination in a damaged condition in order to render the common carrier liable, and the burden of proof is then on the carrier to show, and show satisfactorily, that it was occasioned by, or resulted from, such causes as will exempt him from liability. These principles are very clearly laid down in Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. 280; nor is there anything to the contrary announced in Neillon v. Woodruff, 1 Black, 158, cited and relied on by counsel for respondent. ' Now, testing the present case by the foregoing rules, the question, and the only question, presented is, has the respondent satisfactorily established its defense, either that libelant's butterine was damaged by the insecure or defective cooperage of the tubs containing the same, or that such damage resulted from the nature or quality of the butterine itself under the action of the weather, while being transported, so as to exempt it from liability for the injury? After a careful examination of the evidence, we think neither of said defenses is sustained. The testimony shows no defective cooperage in the packages; on the contrary, it is affirmatively established that the tubs in which the butterine was packed and shipped were of good and proper material, were well made, and in all respects secure and sufficient. They were such as libelant habitually used in shipping butterine, and in all other instances, with perhaps one exception, proved secure and sufficient. They were in fact, as recited in the bill of lading, in good order when received by the respondent, but when delivered they were in bad order and condition,-many of them were broken in at the heads or ends, and their contents entirely gone, showing that they had been subjected to rough handling, or improper stowage, by contact with, or pressure from, other freights. Mere melting or liquefaction of the butterine might have occasioned leakage, but would hardly have caused the breaking or the bursting in of the heads or ends of the tubs. In this connection it is important to notice that, while the place of storage may have been selected without fault, respondent has not shown or stated any fact or facts as to the stowage itself, or how the tubs of butterine were placed or deposited in respect to other freights, whether beneathor:abovesuchotherfreight; whether properly or improperly stowed
WESTERN HANUF'G CO. tI. THE GUIDING STAB.
does not appear from the evidence. The court is not to presume, in the absence of proof and in favor of the carrier, that the freight was properly stowed. Its character was known to respondent when it was received for carriage, and respondent's duty to stow it properly in the place seof its obligation to carry safely. No examilected was certainly a nation was made during the trip to ascertain the condition of the tubs or their contents, or to see whether the freight was being injured or aged from any cause. In Nelson v. Woodruff, 1 Black, 158, the carrier showed affirmatively that the barrels of lard were deposited, not only in a suitable place, but that they were carefully and properly stowed in that place. If we look to the opinions expressed by the witnesses, only one suggests that the damage to the butterille resulted from defective. erage, while the great majority of them, and those most competent to judge, being dealers in butterine, express the most decided conviction that the injury resulted from bad or iniproper stowage. But, without re':' viewing the evidence in detail, it is sufficient to say that it falls short of establishing, in any satisfactory way, respondent's defense of insecure, insufficient, or defective cooperage as the cause of the damage to the terine. How stands the case on the other defense relied upon in argument; that the loss or injury resulted from the nature or quality of the butterine, under the action of the hot season of the year in which it was shipped? It is clearly shown that this butterine was specially ured to stand the temperature of summer heat, both at Cincinnati and at New Orleans; that it was subjected to an actual test of 92 deg. to 93' deg. of heat, and remained solid; that it was firm and solid when delivered to and received by the carrier; that other shipments of butterine; prepared in the same manner, and subjected to the same tests, aild consigned to New Orleans, were made by libelant a few days before and a few days after the consignment in question, anq when the weather was just as warm I and that they all reached their destination in good order and condition, and were received 1:>Y the consignees without complaint.. In one instance,-a shipment made a week later,-the boat was stranded on the way down, and subjected to unusual delay in arriving at New Orleans, yet the butterine reached there safely, and in good order. It furthermore appears that other consignments of butterine similar in quality and cooperage were shipped by libelant on respondent's boat onthh; same trip, consigned to'Vicksburgh and New Orleans, which reached their tination in good order. The fact that other butterine of the same char-' acter and quality, manufactured and packed in the same way, went through the same trip on the same boat in good order, without melting or becoming liquefied, goes far to establish that the injury on the lots' consigned to Dolson and Smith Bros & Co. was not occasioned by the intrinsic quality or inherent defects in the nature of the butterine itself, developed by the state of the weather when shipped and during the transit. It certainly does not establish the defense relied on by respondent, nor bring the present case within the decision of Nelson v. Woodruff, 1 Black, 158-163, where the lard was actually shipped in bad condition,
being p1eltedand in /loliquid or sbapQ, liable to loss.from leakage, when delivered toand.reoeived by the carrier, in bot weat.her. The presentis clearly distinguishable from that case in its material and control. ling facts. Again, it is shown that, in transporting articles.of a perishable character, or such as require protection from the sun or heat when the scuttle-hatch, or forward stowed in thE) forward hold of a hatchway, should be kept open as much as possible, in order to give such freight proper ventilation; and it is in proof that respondent's proper officers assured the agents of libelant that "the scuttle-hatch would be open,aJ,ld a current of air would be passing through, [the for wardhold where the buttel'ine was stowed,] which would keep that part of the hold n}ce and. cool.." It is not only not shown that this proper ventilation was given by opening or keeping open the scuttle-hatch during the trip, but the contrary is fairly inferable from. the testimony. The. necessity of keeping t.he butterine cool, or as cool as its place of stowage would permit or allow without injury to other freights, was not only understood by, but was incumbent upon, respondent in the performance of its transportationservice; and it has failed to show that such care as it represented would be taken, in having the hold ventilated by keeping the aCl,lttle-hatch open during the trip, or as much so as possible, was carried out and obs!lrved on its part. Under such facts and circumstances, the cases cited and relied on by counsel for respondent do not support its defense that the injury resulted from causes over which it had no control. We do not deem it necessary to review those cases in detail. They are not in conflict with the well-settled rules of law stated above; and, applying those principles to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that respondent's defenses have not been made out or satisfactorily established, and that on the showing made the prima facie case in favor of libelant is not rebutted. The conclusion of the court is, therefore, that respondent is liable to libelant for the injury which the butteripe sustained while in transit to New Orleans. The proof shows that the butterine in 4uestion was worth in the New Orleans market on June 19, 1879, from 15 to 16 cents pel' pound, had it arrived there in good order. In its damaged condition it sold for cents per pound. Respondent is liable f<lr this difference, amounting to $580.20, on which interest is allowed from June 19,1879. The expenses of libelant's agent in going to New Orleans to look after the rejected butterine are not allowed as a proper charge against respondent. The de6ree of the district court is reversed, and a decree will be entered in this court in favor of libelaQt and against respondent. for said sum of $580,20, with interest from June 19, 1879, and respondent will be taxed with the costs of the cal}se in thiB court and in the court below. Let a judgment be accordingly BO entered.
INGHAM fl. PIERCE.
647 et at.
w: D. Michigan,
S. D. July 30, 1888.)
COSTs-ATTORNEYs'FEES FOR DEPOSITIONS.
Rev. St. U. S.§ 824, allowing solicitors $2.50 fees "for each deposition taken and admitted in evidence in a cause," includes as well depositions in the ordinary W8Y under equity rule 67 8S those taken otherwise. Overruling Tuck v. Olds, 29 Fed. Rep. 883.
Appeal from Taxation of Costs in District Court. In this case, a decree having been entered dismissing the bill with cost.s to the defendants, the clerk, on the application of the defendants being required to tax them, disallowed an item for solicitor's fees 'of "23 depositions at $2.50, $57.50,"on,the authority of Tuck v. Olds, 29 Fed. Rep. 883. The depositions were taken at various places, some within and Bome without the'distdct, before notaries public, under a stipulation that they, should be treated as of the same force and effec.t as if taken under the. sixty-seventh rule regularly appointed special examiners.An appeal having been taken from this disallowance, the di&o tric;t judge, then presiding, reserved the question until the circuit jUdge. should be in attendance. "'::1' RoBs Shinn, (DryenJorth &: Dryenjorth, of counsel,) for complainants. Taggart &: Denison, for defeJ;1dants. Before.JAp:K;SON and SEVERENS, J J. JACKSON, J" (orally.) The district judge, in deciding the present point in Tuck v. Olds, 29 Fed. Rep. 883, followed the course of indicated by Judge TREAT in StraU88 v. Meyer, 22 Fed. Rep. 467. tri, the latter case the language employed by the judge was,somewhat wider than the decillion. We do not think it is necessary to criticise that case,' however, for it is madetoappear to us that throughout this circuit,at least, and as it would seem in the others generally, the practice has been; and is, to aUow such costs in like Rev. St. § 824. And among the reported cases, see Jerman v. Stewart, 12 Fed. Rep. 271; Stimpson v· .Brook$, 3 Blatchf. 456; Factory v. Corning, 7 Blatchf. 16; Wooster v. Ha7),dy, 23 Blatchf. 112, 23 Fed. Rep. 49. Without examining the question on its original merits, we are that the practical of the statute in the other directjon has been generally in the courts of this circuit so long established, and fOf the sake of uniformity, as well, we should overrule the decision in Tuck v. Olds in this allow this item to be taxed. accordingly. . SEVERENS, District Judge, desires that I s40uld express his concurrence .in this opinion.