ALEXANDERH,. MALL &: C9. t1., ULliRICB.
tern. For el\ch and all of these reasons, we are fully satisfied that the prisoner is not entitled to any credits whatever, and it is so adjudged. And the sheriff of Alameda county is adjudged and directed to hold the prisoner in confinement for the full term specified in the judgment for contempt, without any deductions or credits.
,DiBtrict Court, No D·. Ohio, W; D. December Term, 1888.)
BABKRUPTCy-DISCHARGE-FRAUD-LIMITATION OF ACTION.
The period of two years, within w:bich a petition vacate the discparge of a bankrupt for fraud must· be filed under Rev. St. U. 'S.§ 5120, begins to rUIl from the date of the discharge, and not from the discovery of the fraud. ,;
In Bankruptcy. The petition was filed by the petitioner, who was a creditor ofand had 11. provable claim against the defendant, a bankrupt, to set aside a discharge granted to him in February, 1879, on the ground that the bankrupt hll.d been guilty of fraud in his application for the benefit of the bankrupt law. The petition was filed in this case on the 27th. of August, A. D. 1888. The defendant filed a demurrer on the ground that the petition to set aside the discharge was notilled within two years from the discharge. It was claimed that the limitation began to run only at the time the frauds were discovered. J. A. ChU8e, for'petitioner. A. Farg-uharsDn, for defendant.
WEI.KER, J. Section 5120 of the Revised Statutes (bankruptlaw) provided an absolute bar, where the petition was not filed within two years from the date of the discharge. The limitation is not in any way controlled by the discovery of the fraud; and the limita.tion provided by law in actions by or against assignees in bankruptcy founded upon frauds, lI.nd providing that the limitation begins to run from the discovering of the fraud does not ,apply in this class of proceedings. The demurrer is therefore sustained, and petition. dismissed, with costs;
CAlty, et' al. v.' LoVELL MANUF'G CO., Limited.
«(Jir'cuit(Jouri. lv. D. PenmyZvania. January 26, 1889.)
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-INFRINGEMENT-DAMAGES-LICENSE FEE.
Two licenses for the future use of a patented process at a specified rate per ponnd of springs shown to !lave bel:l.n regularly paid by the licensees, although one of said licenses was granted only a few days before the bill in this case was filed, and the other was granted during its pendency. and in each instance there was also the payment of a gross sum for past infringement, held to be admissible in this snit l1s evkfence tending to show an established license fee; and sufficient, in connection with evidence of a previous settlement between the patentell apd histirmat the s4me, ratll for the permitted use of said process, and other evidence of the reasonableness of said rate, to charge the defendant with on that basis.
" InEquity.· for infringement of patent. bee 31 Fed. Rep. 344. On exceptions to master's report. Witter &- Kenyon, for complainants. John K. Ha,Uock and W. Bnkewell &- Sons, for respondent. Before McKENNAN and ACHESON, JJ. PER CURIAM. The ma.ster, being of opinion that the license for the future Use of the pa tented· process at· the rote of two <lents per pound' of springs, granted 10,&. H. Wolff & Co., Limited, on March 2, 1885, and the like license, at the same rate, granted to Gibson, Parish & Co., on November14, 1885, were inadmissible as evidence, refused to hold the defendants liable for damages :upon the basis of au established license fee. And as he has found that there is no satisfactory evidence disclos-;. ing what part, if any, of the defendants' profits was due to the use of , the patented process, or to show that the plaintiffs had sustained a loss of trade, or any other special damage, the up-shot of the matter is that, if the master's report stands, the plaintiff's will receive nothing but nominal damages for the defendants' ipJringement. Is this ajust conclusion to, this litigation? The only reason assi/1:ned by: the learned master for hisrejeetion oftha licenses as,jtemsofproof is that llthey were practically settlements of pending litigations between the complainants and said licenses." and in ,the case of the Wolff license) were uroade aftertbe commencement and during the pendnncy" of this suit. But to determine properly the question of the admissibility of these licenses as evidence, and the effect to be given to them, it is, we think. necessary, not ouly to consider more closely than the master seems to have done the licenses themselves, and the circumstances under which they were executed, but also to take a somewhat broader view of the case as a whole than his report presents. And reversing the above order of procedure, we first remark that this record throughout exhibits proof of the real merit of the Cary invention, and it is clearly shown that the patented process had great money value. For example, in each of the fou,r proved instances in which there were settlements for past infringements, substantial damages therefor were paid to the plaintiffs.