of the words II comfit, sweetmeats, or fruits preserved in sugar" was; an.-J., had there be,en a conflict of testimony upon that point, I might have had to send it to you, gentlemen of the jury, to determine as to the meaning in trade and commerce of those terms, because, although the sub. group of fruits preserved in sugar and. dried is taken out of the general class, still, if it appeared that that sub.gflJup in trade and commerce did not cover some particular and specific article, it might be fairly urged that that particular article was not taken out of the general class by the use of the desigllation used for the other articles of the sub-group. But I do not find in this case any sufficient testimony to warrant sending the case to you upon that point. All.that appears upon that branch of it is the statement of certain dealers in dried fruits that they themselves do nothandlefruits preserved in I3Ugar in air-tight packages; and the further statement iii! th(t plaintiff that fQreign fruits preserved in sugar, syrup, and molasses, which come in as articles of importation, and which he hiJ;nself has dealt in, come generally in air-tight packages. That is all testi:r;nony in support that there is a trade meaning .to Qa given to the words "comfits, sweetmeats, or fruits preserved in sugar, syrup,and ·molasses," different-from the meaning which they would have in ordinary language;liuid which the. dictionary gives for the wor,ds employed. I do thinkthllt the testimopyis sufficient to war..ant, a submission of that poiht to the jury. Verdict-directed for defendant.,
(Circuit Oourt, So D.
York. April 4. 1889.)
Oertain manufactures of jute, less than 40 inches in width, sized, andbavfng a patent selvedge, found by the jury to be "paddings" or "canvas," and not ,"burlaps, " as known in the trade '311d commerce of this c.ollntry at and prior ,te, March 3, 1883.
CuSTOMS DUTIES-OJ,ASSIFICATION-!f:ANUFACTURES OF JUTE.
The terms "burlaps" and "paddfngs,' as in Schedule J of the tariff act of March 8. 1883, are 'eommercia1'terms, and to be construed accordingly,:
, The phdntiffs, the firm of Lamb & Griesbach, in 1884 imported into port of New York certain manufactures ofjute; varying in width from 18 to 24 inches, which they claimed to be liburlaps," dutiable at 30 per valorem under Schedule J of ,the tariff act of March 3, 1883, (T. 1. but which the defendant collector assessed at 35 per cent. ad 'lJq,lrqem the same schedule, (T. 1. 334) asf'canvas, paddings, r, or other manufll·ctures oUlax'jjute,'or hemp, or of ,which flax, or hemp shall be the compooont material of chief value, not spepilllly, enulilerated or provided for." The plaintiffs' evidence tended to merchandise in suit was known as "bllrlaps" in,trade and C ' ' "
. LAMB V. ROBERTSON.
commerce at the time of the passage of the tariff act of 1883, and the term "paddings" referred to a class of goods manufactured of jute and flax, or of jute and cotton, and not of jute exclusively. Pe:r contra, a number of domestic manufacturers and wholesale clothing dealers testified on behalf of the defendant that the terms "paddings" and "canvas" referred to articles sometimes manufactured wholly of jute, (as were the articles in suit,) and sometimes partly of jute and other materials; that there was a difference between the manufacture of "paddings" and of "burlaps," the former being more closely woven, of a finer grade of jute, and with a patent selvedge, which burlaps did not have; that the standard width of burlaps, as known in trade and commerce, was 40 inches, and the weight of the goods in trade always had reference to the weight of the 40-inch wide burlaps, and to 110 other width; that paddings were also sized, in order to make them stiff, and differed, in this respect, from the ordinary burlap of commerce.; that the narrow goods of this characfer (less than 40 inches wide) were sometimes called "paddings," and sometimes called "military" or "naval" canvas, and were not, prior to March 3,1883, known as "burlaps" in the commerce of this country· . .Stephen G. Clarke, Edwi'flB. Smith, and Chwrles Curie, for plaintiffs., . Stephen A. Walke:r, U. S. Atty., and Henry C. Platt, Asst. U. S. Atty., for defendant. , .
LACOMBE, J., (charging jury.) The question here is simply the determination of the commercial meaning of two words. Before you are samples of the goods which the plaintiffs actually imported, and upon which duty was exacted, and you are to determine by what name'such goods were known in trade and commerce in this country when congress legislated with regard to them. The plaintiffs say they were "burlaps," the defendant says they were "canvas," or "padrlings." The term ., burlaps" and the term" paddings " are found in the tariff act in force when these goods were imported, as in fact they were in the earlier revision of the statutes. They are plainly enough commercial terms; and, in general, unless a contrary rule of interpretation is manifest, when tariff acts use commercial terms of this character, they use them in the meaning which the importers and large dE-alers in this country gave to the terms at the time of the passage of the act in which they are found; and the <lommercial meaning of the terms as generally understood by the importers and large dealers in the article in this country at the time when the act was passed is the meaning of the term as used in the tariff acts. Instructed by the evidence in this case, it will be for you to determine whether these particular articles were, at the time when congress legislated with regard to them, known in trade and commerce in this country as "burlaps" or as" paddings." In weighing the evidence tqere are certain matters YOU; .should.take into consideration: First, you will. understand that the trade which by its usage settles the commercial names of goods, is the trade which is carried on between those who buy and sell atwhQlesale, where both th.ebuyer and the seller are engagedin the traffic in those goods as the regular business. of lives. is not .the trade
'bisOWD personal consumption, but the tradebetweeh the large dealers in and importers of the articles. Second, in this particular case the 'use: to whioh the articles are put is wholly material, and need not be taken into consideration by you at alL And siIniJarly the adaptability of the articles to use need not be considered by you. It is a question wholly of trade names. The use, therefore, to which the article is put is immaterial., The name abroad is also of no materiality whatever. It is the business of this country with which we are concerned. Also thennme stamped upon these goods, or others like them, at anytime is immaterial. The only question here is this: What was the commercial name of these articles when congress passed this tar.. iff act? If the committee of congress, having these articles before them Ilt the time, had turned to the trade of this country and said: "Gentle.. men, what name must be used to,include these artioles inourtariffact," what would have been the answer given them? If,from the evidence, yon are satisfied that known in trade as "burlaps," tbenyour verdict must be for the plaintiffs. If, on the contrary, you are satisfied that they were at that time not so known, but were known as "CiJ,nvas," 61' "paddings," then your -verdict must -be -for the defendant.
Verdict for defendant.
, . (Dinnct (JOU'l't, NdJ. Illinoy.
May B. 1889.)
A:t Law. 'Action by-D. H; Figk againstA. F · Seeberger,to recover back oustoms;dttties piid ,under: Protest.