(District Court, D. New J(ff'sey.
PILOTS-WAGES-WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
May 25, 1889.)
Where the sale question arising upon It libel by It pilot for wages is as to when the rharterers informed the libelant that he was to look to one of the charterers individually for payment. and the two charterers directly contradict the libelant. there being no other testimony on that point. the witnesses being equally worthy of credit, the weight of evidence is against the libelant.
In Admiralty. Libel for wages. Anson B. &tewart, for libelant. Bedle, Muirheid & McGee, for respondent. W AI,ES, J. The libelant sues to recover a balance of wages alleged to be due to him for two months' services as a pilot on board the Ruth. The contest is whether he has a lien on the vessel, or must look for payment to the person who employed him. He says that he was emany ployed by Lamson, who acted as master, but that he did not shipping articles, and that he rendered the services sued for The defense is that he undertook the employment on a special contract, and on the personal credit of Lamson,-one of the charterers of the boat,-and without the knowledge of the owners. The testimony is made up of positive and contradi0ting assertions. The libelant admits that he knew before going on the boat the character of the business she was to be engaged in, but that he was ignorant of the precise terms of the agreement between Lamson and Leslie, who had jointly chartered her, until some time afterwards. Lamson and Leslie both swear that before the libelant engaged as pilot, he was made fully acquainted with everything concerning the business, and that he was to receive his pay from Lamson. They also say that he was incompetent, and of no use as a pilot, except that the presence of a licensed pilot on board was required by law. The boat was unsuccessful, and her charterers ran in debt. The question of fact is narrowed to the single one as to the time when the libelant was informed of the terms of the agreement between Lamson and Leslie, and that he was to look to Lamson for his wages; and on this point, the parties to the contract, including Leslie, being the only witnesses, and all being entitled to equal credit, the weight of the evidence is against the libelant, and his libel must therefore be dismissed.
FLEITAS V. MELLEN.
(Circuit Court, E.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-MORTGAGE BY HUSBAND TO WIFE-DISCHARGE TN BANK' RUPTCY.
Under a marriage contract, the wife took a mortgage for money, being a part of her paraphernal estate. received by her husband at the time of mar· riage. The mortgage was recorded, and afterwards the husband was dis· charged as a bankrupt. but the wife had no connection with the bankruptcy proceedings. After his discharge the husband acquired the land in controversy, which he mortgaged to defendant. Afterwards the wife obtained judg· ment of separation of properlY against the husband for the amount of her mortgage, and seized and sold the land, purchased it herself at the sheriff's sale. and sued to prevent defendant from enforcing his mortgag"e. He d. that the lien of the wife's mortgage. so far as it applied to the husband's after-acquired land. was acquitted by his discharge in bankruptcy.
BANKIWPTCy-'VHO MAY PLEAD DISCHARGE.
In such case the bankrupt's discharge might properly be urged by the de· fendant.
In Equity. On bill for injunction. J. R. Beckwith, for complainant. T. J. Semmes, for defendants.
BILLINGS, J. This is a case presenting the question whether a debt which the husband owed to the wife for a portion of her paraphernal estate, received by him at the time of marriage, was, so far as relates to a lien upon his alter-acquired real estate, acquitted by a discharge in bankruptcy. On the 6th day of February, 1868, the complainant, then Mary Corinne Warren, was married to Francis B. Fleitas. The marriage and residence of the parties to the marriage were within this state. There was a marriage contract, by which, as well as by the law of Louisiana, the wife had a mortgage upon the husband's property for the sum of $20,000 of her money received by him at the time of the marriage. Subsequently, September 20, 1870, when the constitution of the state had abolished tacit mortgages, this mortgage was duly recorded in the parish where the propertyin dispute in this case is situated. Some time in the year 1877 the husband, Francis B. Fleitas, was discharged as a bankrupt." It does not appear that the complainant, by any act of hers, connected hersell with the proceedings in the bankruptcy of her husband. Subsequently to the discharge, the husband, Fleitas, acquired the two plantations, which are the SUbject-matter of this suit. In 1884 he executed a mortgage npon them known as the Richardson mortgage, to which the complainant is not a party. In 1887, September 10th, the complainant obtained a judgment of separation of property against her husband, Francis B. Fleitas, for this amount $20,000 of the wife's paraphernal property, with a declared privilege, and seized and sold the property, the two plantations in dispute, purchased them herself at the sheriff's sale, and now files this, her bill, to prevent the defendants from enforcing the Richardson mortgage against the property so purchased by her. Thus is the question prev.39.1f.no.3-9