th.lil plaintiff through the act of someone else, and there would be no more liaQility upon the part of the company than if this hl:td rushe(j. qut upon the platfoJ:m against the plaintiff,.and thrown her down, inwhioh case, I take it, could be no question of liability on the of the company. If,on the other hand, standing upon the tw.o rails, as the plaintiff's witnesses have testified, l;1e accidentally slipped and fell against the plaintiff, there is then no negligence proven either upon the part of the company or upon the part of ,the brakeman. It is one of tllOse accidents that will happen. It is unusual, and of which every traveler assumes the risk when it has not been produced by the act of the company, or the omission of its duty, or by the ne/l;ligent act of its agents. The court has to discover, in' this case no ground of legal liability upon the part of the defendant, and, however much it regrets.the injury which the:plaintiff has suffered, it couldnot discharge its duty under the law by permitting the case to go, to the jury, because should there be a verdict for the. plaintiff it would be the duty of the court to set it aside. Plaintiff moved for leave to .take a nonsuit, which was allowed.
Collector of Customs.
April 10, 1889.)
(Oircuit Oourt, S. D. New York.
The provision of Schedule K of the tariff act of March 3, 1883. for "all manufactures of wool of every description made wholly or in part of wool." (Hey!. Dig. par. 362,) covers all manufactures of wool whether they were made froUl wool by one step or by two, and covers all articles manufactured of wool which are not elsewhere provided for in the schedule.
2. SAME-CONSTRUC'lION OF STATUTE. "'W orsted coatings." or "cotton backed worsteds. " being goods of which the face is of worsted and the back of cotton warp and shoddy filling. are dutiable as "manufactures of wool of every description composed wholly 01' in part of wool," under the provision therefor in Schedule K of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, (Heyt Dig. par. 362,) and not as manufactnres of every description composed wholly or in part of worsted, (except such as are composed in part of wool,) under the succeeding provision of the same schedule in the act, (Heyl. Dig. par. 363.)
At Law. This was an action against a former collector of the port of New York to recover duties alleged to have been exacted in excess of the lawful rate on certain goods known in trade as "worsted coatings" or "cotton backed worsteds." The evidence showed that these goods had a face of worsted and a back of cotton warp and shoddy filling; that shoddy was a substance made by tearing into shreds woolen or worsted rags; and that the goods were worth less than 80 cents per pound. The goods had been returned by the appraiser as "manufactures of wool, worsted, and cot-
BULLocK 11. MAGONE.
ton," and· the collector had classified them as "manufactures of wool,"
and assessed the duHes accordingly. The importer claimed in his pm· test that the goods were "manufactures of worsted," and so dutiable. At the close of plaintiff's testimony counsel for defendant moved that It verdict be directed for defendant. Cha1'le,s Otirie, Edwin B. Smith, and Stephen G. Clarke, for plaintiff. Stephen A. Walker, U. S. Atty., and W. Wickhnm Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., for defendant.
LACOMBE, J., (orally.) I shall not determine this case upon any close analysis of mere phrase. I cannot escape the conviction that in the 362d paragraph it was the intention of congress to cover, and that they have used the proper words for covering, generally and comprehensively, manufactures of wool, whether they were made of wool by one step or by two, and that from that general class are to be differentiated only such other cases as they elsewhere refer to. In Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137, there was such differentiation by the express use of the words "manufactures of worsted." The use of that phraseology, coupled with the testimony in that case, as to the trade meaning of worsted, enabled the court to find in it provision for another class of articles. Here, however, there is nothing in the tariff act covering the goods now before us except the provision as to manufactures of every description composed wholly or in part of wool. Inasmuch as there is no differentiation of any manufactures of shoddy, waste, or flocks, I am led to the conclusion that manufactures into which the last-named articles enter are enumerated only under paragraph 362. I am therefore constrained to direct a verdict for the defendant.
Collector of Customs.
May 20, 1889.)
CUSTOMS DUTIES-ACTION TO RECOVER.
The exppnse of changing goods from one condition to another is a part of their dutiable value. and is not one of the charges made non-dutiable bv section 7 of the tariff act of March 3, 1883. ·
SAME-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.
Where an importer has caused rice purchased abroad by him to be ground before shipment into granules of sufficient fineness to entitle it. under the rulings of the treasury department. to be entered at a lower mte of duty than unground rice, the cost of granulation forms part of the dutiable value of the article. and cannot be deducted therefrom by the importer as a non-dutiable charge.
At Law. This was an action against the collector of the port of New York to recover duties alleged to have been improperly exacted on certain granulated rice. It appeared from the testimony that the secretary of the