BULLocK 11. MAGONE.
ton," and· the collector had classified them as "manufactures of wool,"
and assessed the duHes accordingly. The importer claimed in his pm· test that the goods were "manufactures of worsted," and so dutiable. At the close of plaintiff's testimony counsel for defendant moved that It verdict be directed for defendant. Cha1'le,s Otirie, Edwin B. Smith, and Stephen G. Clarke, for plaintiff. Stephen A. Walker, U. S. Atty., and W. Wickhnm Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., for defendant.
LACOMBE, J., (orally.) I shall not determine this case upon any close analysis of mere phrase. I cannot escape the conviction that in the 362d paragraph it was the intention of congress to cover, and that they have used the proper words for covering, generally and comprehensively, manufactures of wool, whether they were made of wool by one step or by two, and that from that general class are to be differentiated only such other cases as they elsewhere refer to. In Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137, there was such differentiation by the express use of the words "manufactures of worsted." The use of that phraseology, coupled with the testimony in that case, as to the trade meaning of worsted, enabled the court to find in it provision for another class of articles. Here, however, there is nothing in the tariff act covering the goods now before us except the provision as to manufactures of every description composed wholly or in part of wool. Inasmuch as there is no differentiation of any manufactures of shoddy, waste, or flocks, I am led to the conclusion that manufactures into which the last-named articles enter are enumerated only under paragraph 362. I am therefore constrained to direct a verdict for the defendant.
Collector of Customs.
May 20, 1889.)
(Oircuit Oourt, S. D. New York.
CUSTOMS DUTIES-ACTION TO RECOVER.
The exppnse of changing goods from one condition to another is a part of their dutiable value. and is not one of the charges made non-dutiable bv section 7 of the tariff act of March 3, 1883. ·
SAME-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.
Where an importer has caused rice purchased abroad by him to be ground before shipment into granules of sufficient fineness to entitle it. under the rulings of the treasury department. to be entered at a lower mte of duty than unground rice, the cost of granulation forms part of the dutiable value of the article. and cannot be deducted therefrom by the importer as a non-dutiable charge.
At Law. This was an action against the collector of the port of New York to recover duties alleged to have been improperly exacted on certain granulated rice. It appeared from the testimony that the secretary of the
treas1uy had decided that when cleaned rice was ground to a certain degree of fineness it should be entitled to entry at a duty of 20 prr cent., as rice-meal, but that, if the grains were larger than the prescribed standard, the article should be dutiable as cleaned rice, at 2 cents per pound. The plaintiff had imported rice from Copenhagen, and, solely for the purpose of getting advantage of the lower rate of duty, had caused the rice to be ground before shipment to the degree of fineness of the standard fixed by the secretary. The collector had exacted duty upon the value of the article in the condition in which it was imported, including therein the cost of granulation. The importer protested against th8 exaction, and claimed that the cost of granulation should be deducted from the value, inasmuch as the granulation had been done solely in deference to the rulings of the treasury department, and its cost was a non-dutiable charge, under section 7 of the tariff act of March 3, 1883. At the close of plaintiff's case defendant's counsel moved that a verdict be directed in his favor. Joshua kf. Fiero and Green B. RW/J,m, for plaintiff. Stephen A. Walker, U. S. Atty., and W. Wickham Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., for defendant.
LACOMBE, J., (orally.) The difficulty with this case is that the expense which has been incurred is not an expense that had anythillg to do with the shipment or transportation of the article to the United States. It is an expense which the importer for his own pleasure has put upon the article that he bought, and it enters into the value of the article waen it lea ves the other side. Congress in the act of 1883 has providec1_ that those expenses which, before shipment, were incurred in order to get the article on shipboard in such proper condition for transportation as to conform to the customs of trade in that regard should be excl uded from the valuation. The expenses of packing, boxes, cartons, etc., all of which were essential elements in the process of shipment and transportation, are thus excluded under the act of 1883, but this case presents no element of that kind at all. If, for any reason of his own, the importer decided to color these grains some particular color, that would have nothing to do with their transportation, nor has his making them larger or smaller, so long as such charge does not operate to facilitate such transport. I do not see that the charge falls within the kind of charges that are covered by the amendment of 1883, but that it is fairly to be considered as entering into the value of the article. I shall therefore direct a verdict for the defendant.
IN RE CARRIER.
w: D. Pennsylvania.
Where the account of an assignee in bankruptcy, at the instance of his successor, was referred to a register to audit, and, if necessery, to restate it, and there was a full hearing before the register, who did uot undertake to restate the account until after the lapse of nearly eight years, held that, while such inexcusable delay might not operate as an abandonment of the proceeding, yet the court would not sustain any surcharge unless the accountant's liability was indubitably established, and every reasonable presumption would be made in his favor. Under the bankrupt law of 1867, where one of two joint debtors becomes bankrupt, the creditor may set off the debt against his separate indebtedness to the bankrupt.
SAME-SALE AND PURCHASE BY ASSIGNEE IN HIS OWN RIGHT IN STATE COURT.
Where real estate of a bankrupt came to his assignee in bankruptcy incumbered with prior liens exceeding its value, the assi,\,nee himself being one of the judgment· lien creditors, it was competent for the bankrupt court to grant to the assignee leave to proceed in the state court to sell the property on his judgment, and to bid in his individual right at the sheriff's sale.
Where, in the exercise of such authority, the assignee purchased at the sheriff's sale in his own right and with his own money, and afterwards sold the property at an advance, he is not chargeable in his account as assignee with the profit he thus made. no fraud or misconduct being imputable to him, and the sheriff's sale having been conducted openly and fairly.
In Bankruptcy. Sur exceptions to the register's report upon the account of Richard Arthurs, late assignee. Jenks &- Clark, Miller &- 1J.fcBride, and H. C. Campbell, for exceptants. Levi Bird Duff and W. S. Purviance, for report. ACHESON, J. John Carrier and Andrew F. Baum were adjudged bankrupts on June 22, 1874, and on the 28th day of the succeeding September James Bredin, J. M. Wilcoxon, and Gilles McGregor became their assignees in bankruptcy. These assignees were successively discharged, and on February 19, 1877. Richard Arthurs was appointed the assignee. He acted in that capacity until April 12, 1880, when, upon his own petition, he was discharged from the trust, and Levi Bird Duff was then appointed assignee. On August 5, 1880, Arthurs filed his final account in court, and on November 11, 1880, he filed with the register a similar account, but in a more formal shape. The account showed a balance of $1,275.78 in the hands of the accountant. Shortly thereafter he honored a draft for $1,000 which his successor drew on him; and thus there then remained in his hands, apparently, the small balance of $275.78 only. On March 4, 1881, the new assignee presented his petition to the court, setting forth that he had reason to believe that Arthurs' account was incorrect, and he annexed to his petition specifications of objection thereto; and thereupon, at his instance, the court made an order referring the account and objections to the register, who was directed v.39F.no.3-13