COLEMAN HARDWARIJ) CO. V. KELLOGG.
COLEMAN HARDWARE CO.
et al. v.
(C rcuit Court, N. D. III noia. May 27 1889. \
P ATENTS-SASH- BALANC'E-INFRINGEMENT.
The patent granted September 11" 1883. to Warren Shumrtrd for a "sashbalance." which has a brake so arrauged as tobe adjustable from the outside, tbe brake being an ordinary brake·shoe bearing on the periphery t)f the drum, with the pressure secured by a spring. is infringed by the use of a band brake, bearing on the periphery of the drum. and adjustable from the outside; bandbrakes having been well-known equivalents for spri.ng-brakes at the time of the issue of the Shumard patent.
In Equity. On motion for injunction. Bill to restrain infringement of a patent by the Coleman Hardware Company and others against Kellogg · Johnson & Bliss, im1.Ileadedwith the Pullman Sash-Balance Company. Banning & Banning & Payson, for complainants. George P. Barton, for defendants. BWDGETT, J This is a motion for an injunction to restrain the infringement by defendants of a patent granted September 18, 1883, to Warren Shumard, for a sash-balance. The device covered by this patent is what is known as a "spring-balance" for a window-sash, instead ot the ordinary pulley balance. The proof now before me shows that this class of devices is not new, one of the patents cited having been issued in 1856; but the feature in the complainnnts' patent, which seems to me to be new and meritorious, is the brake so arranged that it is adjustable from the outside. Defendants' patent also shows a brake adjustable from the outside, and differing only from the complainants' in the fact that it is what is known as a "band-brake," bearing upon the periphery of the dru,11 , while complainants' brake is the ordinary brake-shoe, bearing upon the periphery of the drum, and the pressure secured by a spring. There is no essential difference in the function of the two brakes, but the was a well-known equivalent for a spring-brake like the complainants' at the time complainants' patent was issued. I think, therefore, as at present ad vised from the proof before me, that the difference, so far as the brake is concerned, between complainants' and defendants' device is merely colorable, and that defendants infringe upon this feature of complainants' patent, and possibly upon other features. An injunction will therefore be ordered according to the prayer of the bill.
FEDERAL REPORTER, vol. 39. DOOLITTLE KNOBEl.OCH et al.
(District Court, D. South Oarolina. June 14, 1889.)
A ciaim against owner of a vessel for services in pnrcbasin,g her. and in traveling on bel', looking aftertbe owner's interests, but bavingnll control over or concern in the navigation of tbe vessel, and for advances to the master and vessel as the owner's agent, is not within the jurisdiction of admiralty
In Admiralty. Lihel for services and advances by Alvin Doolittle agoainst William Knobeloch, owner of steamer Bellevue, and the steamer Bellevue. Trenholm & Rhett, for libelant. W. J. Gayer and Mitchell & Smith, for respondent. SIMONTON, J. The libel sets up a claim against the steamE'r in rem and bel' owner, the respondent, in personam, for services and ad\'ances. The services were going to New York as the agent of Knobeloch, and purchasing for him the steamer Bellevue, and coming in her on hcr voyage from New York to Cbarleston, looking generally after the interests of the owner; not, however, having any control or concern in the navigation of tl1e vessel. The advances consist of cash to the master from time to time, and moneys paid tor supplies 10 the steamer, pilotage, and dock fees. The libel was amended by striking out all claim in rem on the steamer. Respoudmt excepts to the jurisdiction of the court. The jurisdiction in admiralty depends primarily upon the nature of the contract, and is limited to contracts, claims, amI services purely maritime, and touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and ·navigation. The Jefferson, 20 How. 393. It is not easy to get an exact definition of the term "maritime contract." It is lar easier to say what is not a maritime contract. "The true criterion," says that eminent jurist, Mr. Justice BRADLEY, "is the nature and subject-matter of the contract, as whether it hilS refl:'rence to maritime services or maritime transactions." Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1. Mr. Browne, in his work on Civil and Admiralty Law, (vohme 2, page 82,) asks the question: "What contracts should be cognizable in adlllimlty?" and answers it: "All contracts which relate purely to maritime afi'airs." "Maritime contracts are such as relate to commerce and navigation," says Justice CLIFFORD. 'The Orpheus, 2 Cliff. 29. The English courts limit courts of admiralty by the locality of the contract. Our courts look to the subjeet-matter. De Lovw v. Bait, 2 Gall. 3U8. But "to be a maritime contract, * * 'I' it is not enough that the subject-matter of it, the consideration, the service, is to be done on the flea. It must be in its nature maritime. It must relate to maritime afhlirs. It must have a connection with the nnviga,.. tion of the ship, with her equipment or preservation, or with the mamtenance or preservation of the crew, who are necessary to the navigation and safety of the ship. Thus a carpenter, a surgeon, a steward, though