(Oircuit Oourt, E. D. A.rkansas. June, 1888.)
UNITED STATES-PUBLIC LANDS-JURISDICTION.
Where l!tnd has been sold to the United States government, and jurisdictiOll over the same has been ceded to it by the state legislature, reserving the right to serve personal process thereon. no process issuing out of a state court upon a judgment. lien to which the land was subject at the time of sale can affect the title thereto.
At Law. Action to recover land. N. M. &G. B. Rose and J. W. Martin, for plaintiff. J. W. House, for defendants. BREWER" J. This is an action brought to recover possession of the south half of block 98, in the city of Little Rock, the same being the ground on which is situated the post-office building. Under the practice which obtains in this state, exceptions were filed to the deeds and other documentary evidence exhibited by plaintiff, and relied on as evidences of title. One matter only shall I 110tice, for that is fatal to plaintiff's right to recover. On the 15th of May, 1874, one M. W. Benjamin, who had theretofore been the owner of the property, made a final conveyance to the United States. On the 4th of April, 1874, J. W. Martin recovered a judgment in the Pulaski circuit cOllrt against said Benjamin. Execution was issued on that judgment in March, 1875, this property levied on and sold to plaintiff. On June 7, 1872, the congress of the United States passed an act as follows: "Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of t1le United States of America in congress assembled, that the secretary of the treasury be, and he is h'ereby, authorized and directed to purchase a site for, and cause to be constrncted, a suitable building.. with a fire-proof vault extending to each story, at the city of Little Rock, in the state of Arkansas, for the accommodation of ,the United States circuit and district courts, post-office, internal revenlle,and other and for thispllrpose there is hereby appropriated out of any money in UHi treasury not otherwise appropriated the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, to be expended under the direction of the secretary of the treasnry, who shall Ca\lSe proper plans 'and estimates to be made, so that no expenditure shall be made or authorized for the full completion of said building and payment for the site thereof beyond the amount herein appropriated: provided, that no part of the sum herein appropriated shall be used or expended until a valid title to the site of said building shall be vested in the United States, and until the state of Arkansas shall duly release and relinquish its jurisdiction over the same, and its right to tax said site, and the property which may be thereon, during the time the United States shall be or remain the owner thereof. Approved June 7, 1872." The legislature of Arkansas, on the 21st day of February, 1873, passed the following act, to-wit: "The state of Arkansas hereby consents to the purchase by the United 8tates of a site for public bUildings, * 'I< * and hereby cedes and grants.
MARTIN V. HOUSE.
jurisdiction to the United States over any lot or lots, parcel, or block of ground within th,e corporate limits of the city of Little Hock, not exceeding in area three hundred (300) feet square, which shall or may be purchased by the United States as a site for a building for the accommodation of t.he United States circnit and district courts, post-omce, internal revenue, and other government offices, under the act of congress appl'oved June 7, 1872; and the said state hereby releases and relinquishes her right to tax said site, and all improvements which may be thereon, during the time the United States shall be and remain the owner thereof: provided, that this grant of jurisdiction shall not prevent the execution of any process of this state, civil or criminal, on any person who may be on said premises." The effect of these two acts was to vest exclusive jurisdiction over this tract of ground in the United States government, and this by virtue of section 8, art. 1, of the United States constitution. Now, at the time the cession of jurisdiction became operative and final, to-wit, on :May 15, 1874, the government received a good title, as well as exclusive jurisdiction. True, the property was subject to a judgment lien, and, if the property had remained in the territorial jurisdiction of the state of Arkansas, this judgment lien might have ripened, through proceedings in the state courts, into a perfect title; but after the cession of jurisdiction the power of the Arkansas state courts over the property ceased. No process could issue out of any state court to disturb the title or affect the property. I do not mean to say that the cession of jurisdiction would destroy the lien, but it did compel the enforcement of any rights which the judgment creditor had by proceedings in the federal courts. The reservation as to service of process is as expressed to process which is purely personal, and therefore, ex vi termini, excludes process, mesne or final, touching property, real or personal. This seems to be the general consenSU8 of opinion, as expressed in the various cases cited by the learned district attorney in his brief. The most authoritative case cited by him is that of Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 995, from which I make this quotation: "When the title is acquired by purchase, by consent of the legislatures of the states, the federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all state authority. This follows from the declaration of the constitution that congress shall have 'like .authority' over such places as it has over the district which is the seat of government; that is, the power of' exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever.' Broader or clearer language could not be used to exclude all other authority than that.of congress; and that no other authority can be exercised over them has been the uniform opinion of federal and state tribunals, and of the attorneys general. The reservation which has usually accompanied the consent of the states thllt civil and criminal process of the state courts may be served in the places purchased, is not considered as interfering in any respect with the supremacy of the United States over them, but is admitted to preve'ilt them from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice; and congress, by statute passed in 1795, declared that cessions from the states of the jurisdiction of places where light-houses; beacons, buoys, or public piers were or might be .erected, with, such reservations, should be deemed sufficient for the support and erectioJ;l of such structures, and, if no such reservation had been made, or in future cessions for those purposes should be omitted, civil and criminal process, issued uwler the authority of the state or of the United States, might -be served and executed within them. 1 St. 426, c. 40."
Several other cases are noticed by the court in subsequent portions of the opinion. In view of the decision of the supreme court in that case, further discussion by me would se"lll superfluous. The exceptions will be sustained.
UNITED STATES V. CUDDY.
(District Oourt, S. D. Oalifornia. August 26, 1889.)
An indictment for perjury which charges that defendant took an oath before Judge R. in the United States district court, in open court, which oath was administered by the duly-authorized clerk, who had authority to administer the oath, in a matter then pending, that he would tell the truth, and that he did willfully and corruptly swear to material matter which is set out in the indictment, is sufficient under Hev, Rt, S, S 5392, deelaring such a person swearing to any material matter which he does not believe to be true to be guilty of perjury, and section 5396, prOViding that it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged, and by what court, and before whom the oath was taken, with proper averments tll falsify the matter wherein the perjury is assigned.
On indictment for pm:jury. A. W. Hutton. U. S. Atty. Ross, J. The question in this case is as to the the sufficiency of the indictment, which charges that defendant, at a certain time and place, within the jurisdiction of this court"After having taken an oath before the Honorable E. M, Ross, judge of said court,-which oath was administered to the said Cuddy in open court on said day by E. H. Owen, the dUly-appointE:'d, qualified, and acting clerk of said court, he, the said,Owen, as such, being then and there a person haVing competent autbority to administer said oath,--that in the matter then and there pending, entitled' In the .Matter of th'e Contempt of Thomas J, CUddy,' he would tell the truth, the whole truth, 'and nothing but the truth, then and there willfully, falsely, corruptly, and contrary to such oath. did state certain material matter in his testimony then and there adJuced, in open courL as aforesaid, at (he time and in the manner aforesaid, being in words and substance as follows, to-wit: 'Ididn't know that Mr. McGarvin, or any other gentleman in particular, would be called on this occasion, the trial of the case of the Vnited States vs. W. More Young, which was a criminal cause pending against the said You ng in the said court, and set for trial for February 12,1889.) I never dreamed that he was to be a juryman, and don't now. (Meaning a juror in the cause last-above named.) I didn't know Mr. McGarvin was a juror. Didn't know anything about it. Didn't give the matter a thought. (Meaning that he, the said Cuddy, didn't know that the said McGarvin was a petit, to-wit, a terin-trial, juror in said court at the time and at the place first above named.) I had no idea that Mr. McGarvin was one of them at this time. I didn't know anythirlg about it.' (Meaning', by the words 'one of thein,' one of the term-trial jurors duly impaneled and sworn in the said court, as aforesaid.) Whereas, in truth and in fact, the said Thomas J. Cuddy did know that the said Robert McGarvin was a petit, to-wit, a term-