(Circuit Court, N. D. illinoi8. July 22,1889.)
The wife of the manager of a corporation borrowed $600 from a stockholder, and bought ,half of the capital stock. This Wll.S all the money ever put into the business by her or her husband., From the earnings of the business, conducted entirely by the husband, 'real estate was bought, and title taken in the wife's name. Held, that the land, being acquired entirely by the labor of the husband, was liable for his debts existing at that time.
In Equity. Creditor's bill. G. F. Westover, for complainant. Bisbee, Ahrens & Decker, for defendants.
BLODGETT, J., (orally.) This is a creditor's bill by which the complainant seeks to reeover the amount of a judgment rendered in favor of the firm of which the complainant is the surviving partner against the firm of Lawrence & Martin on property, the title'to which stands in the name of the defendant Carrie E. Martin, the wife of the defendant Morris T. Martin. It appears from the proof in the case that the defendant Carrie E. Martin holds the title to the real estate in question, and that all the said real estate was t)aid for with money earned in the business of the Phcenix Grain & Stock Exchange, a "bucket-shop" concern in this city, of which the defendant Morris T. Martin was the manager. Mrs. Martin never invested any money in this corporation. She became a subscriber to one-half the capital stock of the company at the time it was formed. She borrowed, as the proof shows, from one of the stockholders the sum of $600, which was all the money that was ever put into the business, as far as the Martins were concerned. From the earnings of this business-the business which was conducted by Martin as its manager-the $600-note was paid and the real estate in question was bought and paid for, the title simply being taken in the name of Mrs. Martin. The defendant Morris T. Martin being in debt to the complainant at this time, I do not think he could secrete his earnings in the name of his wife to the delay or in fraud of his creditors. This is property that has not been earned or acquired by any effort or instrumentality of Mrs. Martin, nor is it the outcome of any investment by her; but it has been accumulated solely by the shrewd conduct and business ability of Morris Martin himself. There will be a decree in favor of the com· plainant.
UNION STEAM-BOAT CO. V. CITY OF CHICAGO.
UNION STEAM-BoAT CO. et
CITY OF CHICAGO et
(Oircuit Oourt, N. D. Illinois.
Where the action of a city in e:.:ecuting a public work is within the scope of hs authority, and free from fraud and corruption, it will not be enjoined, though the methods adopted result in special damage to complainant.
In Equity. On motion for injunction. Schuyler & Kremer and Sidney Smith, for complainants.
FULLER, Chief Justice. I assume for the purposes of this motion that the complainl,lnts sustain by reason of the acts complained of peculiar damages of a different kind from those sustained by the general public. The test is not one of degree bnt of kind, and many averments of the bill present only the case of an alleged obstruction of a public and common right, resulting in injuries to the complainants and the public, the same in kind. But it is not necessary to rule upon objection in this regard, in the view that I take in the premises. The public work in question is being carried on by the authority of the city of Chicago, in pursuance of power to that end vested in the municipality. In Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185, it was held that" until congress acts on the subject, the power of the state over bridges across its navigable streams is plenary;" and the leading cases, Willson v. lI1arsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, and Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 \Vall. 713, together with others, were cited and approved. In these and numerous other decisions of the supreme court, building bridges and the like are assigned to that class of subjects which can be best regulated by rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of different localities, and limited in their operation to such localities respectively. The nature of the subject is not such as to require the exclusive legislation of congress. The Escanaba Case involved an ordinance of the city of Chicago, and Mr. Justice FIEI,D, in delivering the opinion, says that "nowhere could the power to control the bridges in that city, their construction, form, and strength, and the size of their draws, and the manner and times of using them, be better vested than with the state, or the authorities of the city upon whom it has devolved that duty." This extract is quoted by the supreme court of Illinois in lI1cCartney v. Railroad Co., 112 Ill. 611-635, and that court thus proceeds: "The city we look upon as the representative of the state, with respect to the control of streets, and high ways. and bridges, within the city limits. * * * The :>tate itself, no doubt, might construct the bridge. It might, as the legislature has here done, vest the local government of the city with authority to build the bridge. But it is claimed that the authority is reposed only in the city itself to build bridges, and is a power which is incapable of being delegated by the city to another. 1Ve do not consider that there is any delegation of the power in the case. The city, through the corporation, does build the bridge. It matters little by what hand the bridge is built, or who lets the contract for