UNION STEAM-BOAT CO. V. CITY OF CHICAGO.
UNION STEAM-BoAT CO. et
CITY OF CHICAGO et
(Oircuit Oourt, N. D. Illinois.
Where the action of a city in e:.:ecuting a public work is within the scope of hs authority, and free from fraud and corruption, it will not be enjoined, though the methods adopted result in special damage to complainant.
In Equity. On motion for injunction. Schuyler & Kremer and Sidney Smith, for complainants.
FULLER, Chief Justice. I assume for the purposes of this motion that the complainl,lnts sustain by reason of the acts complained of peculiar damages of a different kind from those sustained by the general public. The test is not one of degree bnt of kind, and many averments of the bill present only the case of an alleged obstruction of a public and common right, resulting in injuries to the complainants and the public, the same in kind. But it is not necessary to rule upon objection in this regard, in the view that I take in the premises. The public work in question is being carried on by the authority of the city of Chicago, in pursuance of power to that end vested in the municipality. In Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185, it was held that" until congress acts on the subject, the power of the state over bridges across its navigable streams is plenary;" and the leading cases, Willson v. lI1arsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, and Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 \Vall. 713, together with others, were cited and approved. In these and numerous other decisions of the supreme court, building bridges and the like are assigned to that class of subjects which can be best regulated by rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of different localities, and limited in their operation to such localities respectively. The nature of the subject is not such as to require the exclusive legislation of congress. The Escanaba Case involved an ordinance of the city of Chicago, and Mr. Justice FIEI,D, in delivering the opinion, says that "nowhere could the power to control the bridges in that city, their construction, form, and strength, and the size of their draws, and the manner and times of using them, be better vested than with the state, or the authorities of the city upon whom it has devolved that duty." This extract is quoted by the supreme court of Illinois in lI1cCartney v. Railroad Co., 112 Ill. 611-635, and that court thus proceeds: "The city we look upon as the representative of the state, with respect to the control of streets, and high ways. and bridges, within the city limits. * * * The :>tate itself, no doubt, might construct the bridge. It might, as the legislature has here done, vest the local government of the city with authority to build the bridge. But it is claimed that the authority is reposed only in the city itself to build bridges, and is a power which is incapable of being delegated by the city to another. 1Ve do not consider that there is any delegation of the power in the case. The city, through the corporation, does build the bridge. It matters little by what hand the bridge is built, or who lets the contract for
the construction. The essential thing is determining whether the public interest calls for a bridge, and where and in what manner it shall be built, and this is done by the city authorities." It is not contended that the city has proceeded or is proceeding in excess of its powers, but it is insisted that the work ought to have been authorized or directed at a different season of the year, or commenced earlier, and prosecuted with greater dispatch, and that the obstruction at this time is such as to render the city's action so unreasonable as to justify the interposition of the court to arrest it. But the power to make the improvement necessarily implies the right to determine upon the plan and method of doing itj and the general rule forbids interference by judicial authority with such determination, when exercised in good faith, within the scope of the power conferred. I do not think it can be reasonably claimed that the record before me makes out fraud, corruption, or unfair dealing amounting to fraud, and, in my judgment, the case does not fall within any exception which might be held to justify the interference applied for. The motion for an injunction must therefore be denied.
et al: v.
(Circuit OIJurt. N. D. Illinois.
September 9, 1889.)
NEGOTIABLE PAPER-LIABILITY BETWEEN
An accommodation indorsllr of a bill of exchange, meeting the debt when legally charged with its payment, becomes a holder for value of the bill, and may recover thereon against an accommodation acceptor the full amount paid, notwithstanding he knew at the time of indorsement that the acceptance was for accommodation. An accommodation acceptor of a bill of exchange has no claim for contribution against subsequent accommodation indorsers. though the indorsers knew the acceptance to be without consideration. In an action by two accommodation indorsers of a bill of exchange against a prior accommodation acceptor, it is no defense to the claim of plaintiffs for payment of the bill that the proceeds of the bili when discounted were applied by the drawer to the payment of paper on which one of the plaintiffs was an indorser.
CONTRIBUTION-BETWEEN ACCOMMODATION PARTIES.
At Law. On motion for new trial. J. A. Sleeper, for plaintiff's. A. & C. B. McCoy, for defendant.
JENKINS, J. The defendant moves to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff's, and for a new trial, mainly upon the ground that upon the prooJs disclosed a recovery is not sanctioned by the law. The action is by the plaintiffs as indorsers against the defendant as acceptor of a certain inland bill of exchange, dated April 1, 1886, for $3,000, at 90 days, drawn by