plied its officers with reasons for keeping silent; and so we say that the railway company is still at liberty to rescind rescission does not mean the contract if it wishes to do so j that either party may to its own use the joint property of both, acq]1ired ,under the contract, without paying therefor. 2 Chitty's Contracts, l089n, In so far as the con., tract has been both parties are bound, and the right of each in the property acquired pursuant to its provisions must be respected. The seizure of the line OIl. the twentyseventh of February, by the railway company, was clearly as illegal as if the contract were free from objections. Whether there is any means by which either party may acquire the interest of· the other in the property in controversy is not a question now presented for consideration. Nor is it necessary to ascertain what interest each party has in the telegraph line. It is enough that the property is owned by the parties to the contract jointly, and that the railway company has wrested the possession from its associate without wanant or authority of law. The parties must be restored to the position in which they were before the seizure, l1nd for that purpose the injunction will be allowed.
NOTE. Bee Weste'rn Union Telegraph Co. v. Union Paciftc Railwav Co. 8 FED. REp. 721.
UNITED STATES V. HART.
((Jtroult Court, W. D. TennesBe8. --,1880.)
SUCCESSION TAX-CONSTRUCTION OD' A DEED-ADEQUATE CONSIDERATlON.-A deed from a mother to her sons conveying land" for and in
consideration of love and affection, and the further consideration of the assistance they have rendered me since the death of my husband," is not a deed of gift made without valuable and adequate consideration, so that the grantees take a succession subject to a tax, within the meaning of the act of,June 30,1864. Section 132, 13 St. 288.
W. W. Murray, for plaintiff. Han'is d Turley, for defendant.
D. J. This case is BubniHted' for the
tion of a deed' from Nancy Boon to her sons, whereby she veys to them a tract of land "for and in consideration of the love and affection that I have for my sons, and the ,further consideration of the assistance they have rendered me since the death of my husband." .There is no proof obtainable of the character of the assistance rendered by the sons, nor of the extent of it, but it is itgreed by the p!trties that if the deed on the face of it imports 'a deed of gift without valuable and adequate consideration. the grantees took a succession liable to the tax imposed by the internal revenue act of June 30, 1864, (13 St. 288,) and the United States is entitled to recover the land in this action 01 ejectment against the defendant in possession. The succession tax cannot be defeated by reciting a nominal consideration which would be deemed valuable in the technical sense of that term, for the act of congress says the consideration must not only be valuable but adequate·. Chancellor Kent says that not'Vithstanding the high moral obligation of a child to support a parent, there is no legal obligation to do it. 2 Kent. 208. And while it is true that the law implies no promise on the part of the parent to pay for necessaries, and in the absence of a contract to do so will not presume one, there is no doubt that such a contract may be a valuable and adequate consideration to support a deed -of bargain and sale. Lynn v. Lynn, 29 Pa. St. 369; Keeler v. Baker, 1 Heisk. 639. I think it is plain, from the recital of this deed, that there was some other consideration than bare love and affection, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the recital of it imports that it was, in the sense of the law, sufficiently valuable and adequate to take the case out of the category of a deed of gift. If the recital of the further consideration appeared on the face of it to be nominal only, the ruling would be otherwise; but it does not so appear. The assistance may have been of a kind which would find no adequate compensation in' the transfer of this land, or it may have been very slight. The grantor seems to have appreciated it, and, in the
absence of exact knowledge, we cannot say that it was only nominal, or only necessaries for which she was not bound to pay. Judgment for the defendant.
(C'e'rcuit Oourt, E. D. Arkama8. October, 1880.)
1. ATTACHMENT-REMOVAL OF PROPERTY OUT OF THE STATE-ARKANSAS BTATUTES.-A statute in Arkansas declares a creditor may have an attachment against his debtor who" is about to remove, or has removed, his property, or a material part thereof, out of this state, not leav. ing enough therein to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, or the claim of said defendant's creditors." Held, that a merchant who did not have property enough to payhis debts, and who invested a material portion of his assets in cotton and shipped it out of the state, was liable to attachment under this statute j that the plaintiff did not have to show the removal was made for a fraudulent purpose j and that the fact that the shipments of cotton out of the state were usual and customary with the defendant and with merchants generally doing business in the state, constituted no de· fence to the attachment.
Attachment. The plaintiff sued out an attachment against the property of 'the defendant. The affidavit for the attachment was based on the sixth subdivision of section 388, Gantt's Digest, which declares the plaintiff may have an attachment against his debtor who "is about to remove, or has removed, his property, or a material part thereof, out of this state, not leaving enough thereinto satisfy the plaintiff's claim, or the claim of said defendant's creditors." The defendant filed an affidavit denying the of attachment. On the trial of this issue it was shown that the defendant was a retail merchant, doing business at Arkadelphia, in this state j that at and before the time the attachment was sued out he was insolvent, and wholly unable to consisted chiefly, if not alto. pay his debts j that his