LONGSTREET' V. STE.UI-BOAT B. B. SPlUNGBa.
(District Court, 8. D. Ohio.
agreement, the law will imply that the employment of a seaman upon
a steam-boat is for the trip which she is then engaged in.
2. RIGHTS OF INJURED SEAMEN.-A seaman who, without his fault, is
injured in the service of the boat, is entitled to his wages for the trip or.other period of service which he had then entered upon, and to be cured at the expense of the boat.
In Admiralty. Hearing on libel, answer a.nd testimony. The libel alleged that on December 13, 1879, the master engaged the libellant as fireman on the Springer for the trip from Cincinnati to New ·Orleans and return, at the wages of $85 per month; that he entered upon his duties as such fireman, and that on December 17, 1879, while in the performance of the same, he was directed by said master to disengage a tree that had caught in one 'of the wheels of said steam-boat, and while occupied ill disengaging said tree, without any fault or negligence on his part,. his arm was caught between said tree and wheel, and crushed and bruised so that he was wholly disabled for the remainder of said trip; that said trip lasted 32 days, for which he claimed full wages; that he was put to expense for medical attendance and supplies and subsistence to the amount of $50; for all of which he prayed the decree of the court. The answer denied all of the above-mentioned allegations except the mere fact of injury, and averred that the same had been caused solely by libellant's negligence. Bateman d Harper, for libellant. Matthews, Ramsey It for claimants. SWING, D. J. The evidence, I believe, establishes an employment for a month. But even if the fact was otherWise, and there was no express agreement as to the length of the employment, the law would imply that it was for the trip. Worth v. Steam-boat Lioness No. 93, 3 Fed. Rep. 922 ; Jansen
'"Reported by Florien Giauque and J. C. Harper, of the Cincinnati bar.
v. The Heinrich, Crabbe, 226. The trip having occupied 110 month, it makes no difference which way it is As to the question of injury : The libellant was directed by the captain, or some other superior officer of the boat, to remove the obstruction from the wheel. It was a perilous undertaking; he used all ordinary care, but was injured. I understand the law to be that where a seaman is injured in the service of the boat, without any fault on his part, he is entitled to his full wages for the trip or period for which he was employed,and the expense incurred in his cure. Neilson v. The Laura, 2 Sawy. 242; The North America, 5 Ben. 486; Morgan v. The Beri Flint, 6 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 707; S. C. 1 Abb. U. S. 126; Sims v. Jackson, 1 Wash. 414; The Nimrod, Ware, I, 9; The Forest, ld. 420; Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mass. 541; Reed v. Oanfield, 1 Sumn. 195. This is So well-established doctrine of admiralty law; and, the libellant having brought himself within the rule, he is entitled to recover. There is no dispute as to the fact that the libellant was severely injured, and, in consequence thereof, unable to perform his duties as fireman during the remainder of the trip. The evidence shows that he was to receive $35 per month; that the expense of medical attendance amounted to $15, and of ice, medicines, and other supplies furnished during sickness, $10; in all, $60; and a decree will accordingly be entered for that amount.
BTTING V.:uUX'S BXEOUTOL
and others v.
tCirC1./.it Court, E.D. Virginia. June, 1880.)
1. EQUITY - STATUTE OF LnuTATIONS - CONCURRENT JURISDICTION.-A court of equity is only bound to apply the statute of limitations where its jurisdiction is concurrent with that of a court of law.
2. BAME-SAME-ExcLUSIVlll JURISDICTION.-A court of equity generally
acts in analogy to the statute of limitations, but is not bound by it, where its jurisdiction is ei<:lusive of that of a court of law.
S. BAME-:-SAMlll- LACHEs. - A court of equity, however, does not act in analogy to the statute of limitations where there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights, or long and unreasonable acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights.
BAME-:-SAME-:-TRUSTEE AND CESTUI QUE TRUST.-It is a generalrnle that, as between a trustee and his (j'IU trU8t, neither the statute of limitations, nor the rule of analogy, nor lapse of time will, in general, affect the right of the beneficiary to redress; yet equity will in such cases, when the circumstances require it, enforce against the ce8ti que trU8t, especially where the rights of third persons are con. cerned, its own peculiar maxim, et non dormientibu8 jura I'Ub8erviunt. II. BAME-SAME-:-B.um.-Among such exceptional cases are (1) those in which the public convenience requires that there shall be a speedy end of strife; (2) those in which some of the principal parties, in transactions sought to be reviewed, are dead and their vouchers lost.; (3) those in which the court could not be certain, from lapse of time, that relief, apparently proper, would certainly be just; and (4) those in which the disturbance of purchasers or transactions acquiesced in for a greater or less time would prejudice the vested rights of third persons. 6. SAME-SAME-SAMlIl--AcQUIESCENcE.-Held, under the circumstances of this case, that an acquiescence for 12 years in an investment of a trust fund in confederate bonds would prevent the que trust from recovering the scaled value of the confederate money with which such bonds were purchased, at the expense of the subsequent creditors of the trustee.
In Chancery. Samuel Marx, of Richmond, Virginia, died in the fall of 1860, leaving a. large estate, consisting in part of real estate, v.4,no.8-48