THE SCHOONER .MARY CHLLTON.
THE SCHOONER MARY CHILTON.;
(District Court, 8..
New York. November, 1880.)
Where the claimant (owner) of the vessel, who personally contracted with the libellant for repairs made at his dock. in Brooklyn, New York, resided at the time, and had long before resided, in New York city, and the vessel at the time was registered at New London, Con" necticut, and had "New London" painted on the stern, and the owner informed libellants that she was registered there, was mortgaged, and that he could ascertain about her from the collector there; Held, that these facts did not import a representation that the claimant lived in New London. That while the owner, if he has misled tl!.e libellant by representations as to the vessel being foreign or domestic, may be estopped to deny such representations, (The E. A. Barnatrd, 2 FEn. REp. 712, 716,) Still the libellant does· not appear to have been misled by them. The libellant, knowing that the claimant had bought the vessel, was bound to inquire as to his place ofresidence. That the'vessel, being in the port where her owner resided when the repairs were made, was a domeStic v6ilsel,:and no lieu attached by the maritime law. The Albany, 4 Dill. 439. That no lien therefor attached under the laws of New York,the necessary specifications not having been tiled. .
,Robert Payne, for libellant. W ·. W. Good1'ich, for claimant.
CHOATE, D. J. This is a suit for labor '/tnd materials nished in repairing the schooner Mary Chilton. The repairs were put upon her at the libellant's dock in Brooklyn. The libel claims .' lien therefor both by the maritime law and by the state law. As to a lien by the state law there is no proof that the libellant filed the necessary specification. As to a general maritime lien it is shown that the owner of the vessel, who personally contracted with the libellant for the repairs, then and long before resided in New York city. The vessel had been registered at New London, Conn., and "New Londou" was painted on her stern when the vessel came to the libel-
lant's dock. The owner also informed libellant that she was registered at New London,' and that there was a mortgage on her, and that he could ascertain about the vessel by telegraphing to the collector there. The vessel being in the port where her owner resided was a domestic vessel, and 1l.0 lien. attached for the repairs by the maritime law. The Albany, 4: Dill. 439. If the owner misled the libellant as to her char... acter, as being foreign or domestic, he may be estopped to deny his representations as to her character. The E. A. Barnard, 2 FED. REP. 712, 716. It is claimed by the libellant that there is such an estoppel in this case. I cannot find, however, that the libellant was misled by any representation of the owner as to his residence, or as to the character of the vessel. The libellant was informed that the claimant had bought the vessel, and he made no inquiry as to claimant's place of residence. I do not think that the name "New London" painted on the stern, or the information that the vessel was registered there, were or imported a representation that he lived there. The proper inference to be drawn from what the libellant was told was rather that the vessel had once belonged to somebody who lived in New London, but that now she belonged to this claimant. The libellant had no reason to suppose that the claimant did not live in New York, and on inquiry he would have ascertained that he did live here. I think the facts do not warrant the conclusion that the claimant is estopped to make this Libel dismissed with costs.
BUCK V. PIEDMONT
ARLINGTON LIFE INS. 00.
& ARLINGTON LIFE INs. Co. and others.
December 23, 1880.)
(Circuit Court, E. D. Virginia.
JunIsDIcTION OF FEDERAL COURT - BILL FILED IN 81'ATE CoURT8u1'1' NOT AT ISSLJE.-On Novcmber 30, 1880, the defendant corpora-
tion, an msolvent life insurance company, domg busmess at Richmond, Va., and having policies distributed in many states of the union, by order of its board of directors, but without any previous authority from. its stockholders, conveyed all its property to its Vicepresident in trust, for the benefit of creditors, subject to certain conditions and preferences, duly set forth in the deed creating said trust. on foot a suit in the chancery On December 3, 1880, the trustee court of Richmond, asking the aid of that court in the administration of his trust. On the same day a resident creditor filed a bill in his own name, in the same court, against the, defendant company and the said trustee, and asked leave therein to' subsequently make all the directors and stockholders parties to the suit, when their names should be thereafter ascertained. This bill also asked for all proper accounts and a receiver, and that all the creditors might be ascertained, the fund collected and distributed, and the trust deed set aside j and further asked for a personal decree for the amount paid the company by the complainant, on the ground that the company had forfeited its contract by refusing to give the complainant a paid-up policy in exchange for his original policy. On December 11, 1880, the complainants, non-resident creditors, exhibited their bill in this (mit, to which they made the companY,tb trustee, and the stockholders all parties defendant, and asked, in the name of themselves and of all creditors who might come in, that the trust deed should be set aside, the funds collected and distributed, a receiver appointed, and for all the general and special relief usually asked for in creditors' bills. A rule was thereupon made by this court, calling upon these defendants to show cause, December 20th, Why a receiver should not be appointed. It further appeared, upon the return-day to this rule, that the bill of the trustee had never been filed in the state court; that the cause had not proceeded to issue in either of the Buits in thlLt. court; and that such court had not appointed a receiver, or taken custody of the effects of the defendant company, or made any order . by which it took cognizance or assumed jurisdiction of the controversy between the parties to the respective suits. BeJ,d, under these circumstances, that the institution of the mere incipient steps of the two suits in the state court would not defeat the jurisdiction of thi& court.