BEADLE tl. BEADLE.
signment to contest In this case the validity or the force and effect of the quitclaim. This brings us to the question whether the said quitclaim deed was in equity an absolute and unconditional conveyance of all the interest of complainant in the land, or a conveyance, as between the parties in trust, made for convenience, and leaving the respondent bound to account for proceeds of sales, and to reconvey upon final settlement any interest of complainant's remaining in theland. This question has been to some extent'anticipated in what has been said. We have seen that the deed was executed for the purpose of facilitating the conveyance of portions of the property to purchasers by vesting the legal title fully in respondent. The quotations already made from the contemporaneous correspondence between the parties show this. This conclusion is confirmed by the acts and declarations of respondent subsequently to the execution of the quitclaim deed. He did not assume to be the owner of the property. He did not claim possession, nor deny the right of the complainant. On the contrary, he went on that the two were still jointly interested. Perhaps the most conclusive proof upon this point will be found in the letter of the respondent which is in evidence, marked "Exhibit R," in which he says: "This satisfaction piece and your quitclaim being recorded, there will be no question in my giving a warranty deed; and, just as soon as we can sell and pay some of the debts resting on me, we can settle and divide, or hold it together; just as we are a mind to. I see nothing to hinder, if you are satisfied to do so."
It is clear that the execution of the quitclaim deed, under the circumstances developed in the proof, did not divest complainant of his interest in the lands devised under the will, but said interest was vested in respondent only in trust, and he was bound in equity to account to complainant therefor. 3. It remains only to consider the effect of the contract, a copy of which is attached to the answer, dated June 20, 1877. By this instrument the respondent agreed to furnish "good and sufficient warranty deeds" for the land in question, when called upon by complainant to do so, as he should sell or dispose of lands. Complainant was to pay respondent $11,000 for his interest, the whole amount to be paid within five years; and to pay at least $600 per annum, together with all money or securities received for the sale of said real estate. Whenever $2,000 was paid, the complainant was to have a deed for the house and block upon which he resided. By reference to the pleadings, it will be seen that neither party is seeking in this sult to enforce this contract. It seems to be assumed that it has been abandoned and rescinded by the parties to it. It seems pretty clear that it was repudiated by the respondent as early as the 15th of March, 1878; for on that day he wrote to complainant that he was resolved to sell the land and the buildings, and would want possession when he made a deed. The time for carrying out the contract had not expired, and this notice could have been given only Upon the theory of. an abandonment .of the. contract. .It is, however, .
FEDERAL REPOnTER, vol.
enough for the to thai the court is not asked to specifically enforce it. It is offered in evidence only as tending to establish the claim of the to the entire'ownership of the real estate.' It contains a reference to the land as " now owned by" Mishael Beadle; but this recital is not, in my judgrnent, sufficient to overcome the proof already referred to, establishing the fact that he did not, in fact, own the whole of said land. Upon the wh61ecase, my conclusion is that all the exceptions to the master's report, by both parties,' should be overruled I and' that the said report should be confirmed and decree rendered as recommended. It is accordingly so ordered. The caseW'll! be recommitted to the master to state an account in accordance with his findings, and with power to take further testimollY touching the matter of the account between the parties.
RoBERTSON ,'II. HEDDEN,
(Cih'cuit Court, S. D. New. York. October 24, 1889.)
1. CUSTQMS Dt1'hi!:s-CoTTo:N CLOTH.
The term "cotton cloth, " as use,Un' Bchedule I of the tariff act of March 8, 1888, "means anylwoven fabric of cottQn used for garments or ,purposes. Following Ul/lmann v. Hedden, 88 Fed. Rep. 95.
The act of March 8,1888, for countable cottons, neoossarilyimport that the'clothshali be homogeneous, Bothat the number of threads persquare'lnch will notdifler in dlflerent parts of the fabric. Where a cotton cloth has 1igUreswoven in it upon the loom at the sam:e time with the fabric itsel:r, the count must' inolude tile threads of the figure, as well as the threads of the ground-work.
Madras curtain ,goods, made 'ot, cotton, with figures woven ill them ill the loom, , are dutiable, Dot under the countable clauses of Scneduleloftlle tarifl act·of March 8,1888, but under the general provUlion of that act and scl/.edule,for"manufactures 'of cotton not specially enumerated or provided for. II ' , ' , "
At Law. . Action to recover duties. Plaintiff imported from Sdotland a class of fabrics generally known as tfMadrasCtirtain Goods.» 'They were composed of cotton, woven in looIps, and *ere figured, the figures beirig woven in the same loom and at the thne as the clotll, alid covering portions 'of the fabric. The collector had classified the goods as cotton cloth, and had assessed duties under the countable clausell' df Schedule I of the tariff act of March 8, 1883, according to the ntimber of threads to the square inch in the ground-work the fabric, a.rid the value per square yard. , Against this assessment plaintiff protested, claiming the goods were manufactures ot'cotton not specially enumerated or provided for, and dutiable at 35 per cent. 'ad valorem. Upon the trial it was shown that the figures were woven in, the cloth in the process of manufacture by means of the Jacquard machine, llnd that, if .the threads of the figure were counted