within the prohibition iIitended to be imposed by the law-maker. It is evident, I think, that the use of the word "patent" on any article is not an offense unless it is 80 used as to import that the article is protected by letters Standing alone, the worci"patent" would no doubtim· ply that an article to which it was affixed· was patented; but used in connection with other word-s it might not have that signification. The inhibition against the use of the word "patent" is, in my judgment, aimed at.'the use of' the word ,in l;uch manner as to import that an article is then and there 'protected· by letters patent. If not so used as to convey to the public that idea, no offense is committed·. SUppose a manufacturer should brand or stencil on an article the words folloWing: "A patent was heretofore obtained on this machine, but it has expired." Would it be pretended that the use of the word" patent" in that connection was· an. of..; fettse fOl'dwhich spenalty might be imposed ? Ithink not. Now the wOTds employed in the case at bar, "Patent applied for," did not signify that the article was then and thereprotect.ed by letters patent. It conveyed no such representation to the public. In point of fact, patents are applied for on many articles that are never granted.. Perhaps as manyapplications for patents are denied asll.regrallted. I am persuaded that the case does not fall within. the statute, and the demurrer is accordingly sustained. . ..
November lIS, 1889.'
. , PlabitUfeontracted with an authO,.ress to copyright .and publlsh her 'Work. to use his best efforts to secure a speedy swe, and to pay her 12 cents per copy sold. Spe to furp,i,sh the manusllril't, and agreed not to cause to be publishedanytbing , .wbich mid,t injure the sale of Plaintiff BOught to restrain the publica. lion of 'tWe'"samewotk, emanating from ber since, in.a newspaper. Elhe to the suit, appeared that the sallt of tne book or nearly ceased, and· that· plaititifr. had not continued his dorta to BelL Be«!, tha& would be refused. "
,Barnum, for plaintiff. ToWnsend, D'yett & Einstein, for defendant.
WHEELER, Tliillis amotion for a preliminary injunction to restrain infringement qf the plaintiff's copyright of a. book written by Mrs. ' book\V,as copyrighted under an agreelllentbetween them that she should furnish the manuscript of the work, which he use his "v:erY,'1?estexertions and. facilities'to sa1e'or," and payher'12 cents on. each copy sold; and that she would not cause to be published, name or otherwise, anything which might injure or interfere with the sale of the book. The publication sought to be restrained is of thesamew()rk, emI
her'since,\in!a She has an in the copyright, but is not made a party to the suit, either by being'joined as a plaintiff in protecting it, or as a defendant for inequitably violating her agreement not to injure or interfere with the sale of 'I'he proofs brought ,forward on the hearing of tpe mption'tend to show that the plaintiff has notcqntinued the efforts required by the agreement for the sale of the Qook, that sales have quite or nearly ceased. Damages from any further. apprehended publication by the defendant would be comparatively slight. Whether the plaintiff is: so carrying out the agreement on his part to entitle himto equitable relief without joinlng the author, or against publication coming from her, is so doubtful in the present aspects of the case as to make preliminary restraint of what will be of sllch slight injury appear to be unwarrantable, in the exerci1l6 of the discretion inv,olved in granting or refusing such Motion
(Dt8trlet Oourt, S. D. Georgia, E. D.November 12, 1889.)
SmpPlNG-LIMITED LIABILt'ry ACT-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERNAL COMMERCII.
The act of June 19,1886/ W'tendin!l' the benefits. of limited liability legislation to vessels engaged in inland rinvigation, baving been assailed for alleged unconstitutionality, held, that the act is valid, in view of the power of congress to regulate commerce, law.amended,excepted from, its.<\peJ:ation inland naviga. tion only, and not internal commerce, as insisted.
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';l'he of the law, p.Qtt() internal ,,' .to inlanll,naVIgation. So mucbfor W.edirectpurpose of the act. .
SAME·. " ., . ..","'. " '.' ,. ,
If jnternalcommerce it is. incidentally The purpose of,the ..legilliaturebeing warranted by, the constitution, it is Wholly iInma", terial to consideration of its &etiontllat it has a. pas.:. of state legisla4on. ., f. SAME. ,,:.>, . .. Even though the subjects of this extended limUation of liability, or the territory in which it is effective, are partially within the region of state control, where the subjects are separable, and are partly under the national control, thl;l act'will be by the. ver :tb.e power of co. . ex.tends and as to all .. those obJects to whIch It attaches; and this rule is easn;yappUcable i nthiS case.
SAME-ApPLICATION TO SAVANNAH
As to the Savannah river, it is a public navigable stream. The voyages of the Katie and hel: are interstate in character, an,d Of, conS!'IlSs is undoubted.,· .' ., " , .. . '. . The act ,is warranted. also by tpe admiralty clause of,the constitution, Bnd tlw power of congress to modify by statute the application of admtralty doctrines." '
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G... SAME-CoNGREI;l8Il)NAL. POWERS-ADMIRALTY.
The ,ent1re.1'm:PoS8 oftha liIIJited to eDcourage .mYI'lSt-. ments itl shipping; and tbe:v may De uteJided wherever \he ofthe' United StIl;teshave jurisdiction.' '.', . . , ' ",' " (8Yllab'U8bY the. 0,QW1.) ,. .'