It is probable the law contemplates aseparflte p011'orballot-box, but
1llldoubtedly the samepoli could be used as was .\lsed for county and
stlite officers. Reading the statute in this manner sOlves the probleml· The following authorities amply support the conclusion that only 3maJority of the yotes cast on the subject of the assessmertt were requirei:V: Commissioner v. Winkley, 29 Kan. 36; State v. Echo18 j 20Pac. Rep. 523; ,aiBB 00. v. Johnston, 95 U. S. 369; Walker v. OBWdld, 11 AU. Rep. 711; v.Palmer, 20 Wis; 572; Sanford v. Prentice,28 Wis. 358. My 'attention has been called by defendant to the case of Jones v. Lanca8ter 6 Neb. 474,and State v. Winkelmeier, 35 Mo. lOB. These cases ate in conflict, to some extent, with the cases before :cited, but arenotrin 'conflict with our views in the ,case at bar, inasmuohas the statutes were 'entirely 'different. The 'Nebraska constitution provided as follows:
, sball pro'vide,1 by general law. for township organization, under which any county may organize whenever a majority of the legal voters of sucb county voting at any election shall so,determine. .. Article 10,
§5. It will be observed the words used are, "a majority of the legal ',wters of said county." The Missouri statute used the words, "when ized by a majority of the legal voters of the respective cities." Nosuch words are ,used in the Kansas statute; under which this vote was had. Under similar provisions as the Nebraska and Missouri actsabovf:' referred to, the cases first above, cited hold that the assent of those not voting ontha subject was to be presumed by their silence to the action of the majority. It is not necessary for this court to discuss the different views expressed by the several courts in those cases, as this statute only requires,a majority of the votes cast for the purpose of the assessment, and fOl'that purpose there is a majority of 739 votes; so the defendant had full authority to issue the orders sued upon, and judgment must go fOltbe plaintiff.
et ale v.
(Circuit Oourt, E. D. New York. January 18,1800.)
PABTIES-J'OINDER-CONVERSION Oil' TRUST FuND.
Under Code mvllProc.N. Y.,,§4i6, proViding tbataU persons having an Interest in the subject of the action may be jomed as plalntU!s; and section 1204, that judgment may be given for or against one or more plaintiffs, and for or against one or more defendants, and that sucn judgment may determine the ultimate rights of the parties ou the same sidet as between themselves, persons having separate interests in a trust fund may jOln in an action against the trustee for ita 1088 or conversion.
On demurrer to complaint. Benj.E8te8, for plaintifflil.' JohnS. Davcwport, for defendant.
FEDJimAL REPORTER ,voL
:LAcoHBE,J. ,grandfather, Abraham Cargill, created a test:am.en,tary trust of $5,000, the income of which was payable to Sarah .C. Davenport, plaintiffs' mother; the fund at her death to belong to her childreil.. Defendant's father. was the executor and trustee under the .Cargill will, and held the said fund. Subsequently, and upon his death, the' defendant himsel f became and. acted as the trustee of the fund. Sarah C.Davenport died March 1, 1877, leaving three children, viz., these hv6:plaintiffs and Charles E.Davenport, each of whom thereby became entitled to one-third of said fund. Charles E. Davenport has since died. The complaint alleges that "defendant was guilty ofcarelessness and negligence. in and about the management, investment, and collection ofthe-Jund and of the income, whereby the plaintiffs have wholly lost theirinterests and shares, as well as interest from March 1st, 1877." For their of this fund, witp interest from said March 1, 1877, plaintiffs demartd judgment. . This is an action at law,(Robert.fv. Ely, 118 N. Y. 128, 20 N. E. Rep. 606,) and the question raised by the demurrer must be settled in oonformityto the state practice. The grounds of demurrer are, that causes of action have been improperly joined, and that there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff. Practically. these grounds are merely alternative statements of the same' objection, namely, that, inasmuch as each plaintiff:has a separate cause· ofaction for the loss or conversion of his or her individual share,theyrhaynot join as plaintiffs in a single action. The Code of Oivil Proced UTe, however, provides that all persons having an interest in the subject of the action, andin obtaining the judgmay be joined as plaintiffs. Section 446. It further provides that 'judgment may be given for or against one or more plaintiffs, and for':or against one or mOl'edefendants, and that suchjudgment -ma;y determine the' ultimaterightsiof: the parties on the same Side, as between themselves. Section 1204. The effect of these provisions seems to be that those who have several interests in a common fund may join in an action at law affecting that fund. Loomis v. Brown, 16 Barb. 325; Brett v. Society, 5 Hun, 149, affirmed, 64 N. Y. 651; Bliss, Code Pl. §§ 74-76. The demurrer is overruled with leave to answer.
STATEs '"·. SEMMER.
February 12, 1800.)
(C:crcuit Oourt,B. D. Nff.II)York.
CUSTOMS DUTIEs-CLASSIFIOATION-MANOFAOTURES OF GLASS.
state it is an unfinished product in the manUfacture of polished plate-glass, but was, according to some of the testimony, an article known to the trade and commerce of the United States at and prior to the date of the passage of the tari1f act Of March 8, 1883, as "ground-glass, "and used, although to a very limited exteIit, as such, is
to and inoluding the process of grinding and smoothing On both sides, in which
Plate-glass, which has passed through the various processes of manufacture up