(Oircuit Oourt, E. D. Pennsylroania. January 19, 1890.)
Where alicense contains I1l? power of the assent, of the lieens,ee, but
alice,nSofCal:lnot annul the Ul:(lllM e,datJaw for, any f the PWriJtir 00. v. Wolf, " "
Bill in equity by R. F. M. Chase against Lewis S. Cox, trading as . Said bill alleged a Lewis S. Cox & Co., for infringement of' license between the parties, terminated by default ,of licensee. Defendant filed a plea denying assent to the termination of the license,and"denying the termination thereof, or that defendant had ceased to pay royalty" sndtoconform to the ,provisions of the license whereb.y the license was qetlll'lliined.There was in the license no direct reservation oftha right to revoke the same. The plaintiff,hadgiven defendant notice "of his intent to revoke. W.: P. P1'et>k, Jr., for complainants,' cited Starlingv. Plow- Works, 32 Fed. Rep'. 290. JOB. Jilraiey, for respondents, cited Derurmure v. Tanite 00., 32, Fed. Rep. 544; :Purifier 00; v. Wolf, 28 Fed. Rep.
BUTLER, J., (after stating the facts a8 above.) In answer to the infringement charged the defendant pleads a license. The plaintiff admits the execution ofa license,butaaserts its annulment by mutual agreement, prior to the acts complained <If. This assertion presents the only material question raised. We do not find it supported by the proofs. ' On the averments of the bill show quite plainly that the plaintiff su:pposed he had a right to terminate the license by notice, (for &1legedcnoiHJompliance with its termsiby the defendant,) and that he relied upon ·this alone for reli&(fromits provisions. This case is governed by Pwrifler 00. v. Wolf,28 Fed·.Rep. 814, and DeMfMr6 v. Tanite 00.,32 Fed: Rep. 544. A suit at law upon the license will afford the plaintiff ad-eql1ate irem.edy for any just claim which he may have. A decree must therefore beentered sustaining the plea and dismissing. the bill with costs.
. 1 Reported
by O. B. TayIor,Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.
. CLEVELAND FORGE. &; BOLT. Co·. f.
CO. et al.
(04.rcuit Court, N. D. nUn0i8. December
al. . legl1l.g'that the corporation and the president have infnnged complamant's patent, is no ground of demurrer, though there is no speci1l.o allegation that he directed or panicipated in the infringement complained of.
IrnNTIoN$-A,<i'rtows .PO'B ImINCJ.BuBNT-PARTIBS-DBMURRER. . .Tqe joining ot the l'residel;ltot a corporation as co-d!lfendant, on
InEquity. On demurrer to bill. 'Cob1M'n &7 Thacher, fOfoomplainant. J; H. Raymood, for defendants."
BLODGETT, J., (oraUy.) . This is a bill in equity for aI\injunction and accounting against defendant corporation and its president, charging the irifringement of a owned by complainant. The bill charges that the defendant corporation, and A. B., its presiljent, "well knowing of complainant's rights under the patent, yet have willfully and intentionally infringed upon said patent." To this bill a general demurrer is filod by A.'B., the president, on the ground that there is no specific allegation in the bill that he personally directed or participated in the infringement complained of; that there is no case made for a. discovery against hint; and that singling him out from all the officers of the corporation, and making him a defendant, indicates a spirit of personal persecution .for which nQ foundation is laid in the bill; citing, in, support oithe demurrer, Nwkel Cb. v. Worthington, 13 fed. Rep. 393; Howard Plow- Work8, 35 Fed. Rep. 743; and B08Wn, etc., Co. v.Star Rubber Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 167. It has been t1:le practioe,'Of this court, ever l3ince. pat!'lntlitigation commencedhere,· when a corporation is charged with inf,ringexnent, to join the chief executive as a is, charging thecorporationabd the officer, in general terms, the infrinp;ement; and, while this practice has heenoccasionally objected to in behalf of the.officer, thil!listhe first time, so far as my knowledge memory serves me, that a demurrer has .been interposed by the officer 80 sued. The reason which has been urged for joining one or more of the officers as defendant or defendants in a bill of this kind is that an injunction, or other order of the court, is much more apt to secure obedience, if directed to an individual officer by name, than if it only ran againl:!t the officers and agents of the corporation by that general description, and I have always thought there was much force in the suggestion. It seems to me there is a direct moral effect upon a defendant who is by name restrained by an injunction, which would not be felt if the mandate ran only against the officers, agents, servants, etc. It puts the officer individually addressed by the process of the court upon notice that he must see to it that the process is obeyed, and that he will be held personally responsible fqr disobedience. And the president of the corporation, as