-IN RE MILLER;
make certain, fixed, and definite the time of such removal, and to hasten trials, and not permit hurtful delays by removals. Recognizing the fact, as the lawyers of the committee who framed the law did, that in some of the states the time for pleading by defendants summoned to court was wholly regulated by positive rule of the court, in the absence of a stated statutory time, they employed the term, "or rule of the state court." The construction of this act which I have followed tends to make the time of such applications definite, uniform, and equal to all defendants, and, in my opinion, effectuates and carries out the policy of the law. As to the second ground of the motion to remand, it is to be observed that the action is for a tort against two railroad companies,-one the lessor, the other the lessee. It may be conceded to plaintiff's contention that the other defendant, the lessor, could not escape its liability for the injury and damage by letting its road to another. It may also be conceded that both are .liable. But the action is joiQt as well as several. The plaintiff had the right to proceed against either one of them, and would be entitled in the joint action to take judgment against one, and dismiss as to the other. In such a case the action is removable by the non-resident defendant. Greene v. Klinger, 10 Fed. Rep. 689; OZark v. Railway Co., 11 Fed. Rep,. 355; Kerling v. Cotzhausen, 16 Fed. Rep. 705; Boyd v. Gill, 19 Fed. Rep. 145; Soorp v. Whiteside,Id. 150; Stanbrough v. Cook, 38 Fed. Rep. 369. The motion to remand is sustained on the first ground.
E.n. South Oarolina.
Col'lJ'LIOTJ1IfG STATE. AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION.
Where a United States marShal is arrested, under iltate authority, on charge of forge"'l the fact that at the time of his arrest he was on his way to serve process lsSUtld .bY a United States commissioner does not oust the state authorities from jurisdiction, where it does not appear that he was arrested for any act done in pursuance of federal authority, or-With the intent to interfere with the service of the process in his hands. ' .
At Law. Petition for habeas corpus. On motion to remand the ;prisoner to the state authorities. A. Lathrop. Dist. Atty., for the motion. P. H. Nelson and W. St. Julian Jervey, for defendant. SIMONTON, J·. W. J.·Miller, a deputy United States marshal, wasar. rested and lodged in Lecxington jail. He had with him process issued by John Bauskett, United States and\\ras on his way to serve the process when arrested. A writ of habeas CO'l'pU8 out of this court was issued for him on the petition of George 1. Cunningham, marshal. The sheriff of.. Lexingtoq, who,};tad.'himju, custody,makesreturn to the ;wrii
of habeaa Corpu8, producing the prisoner, and stating that he had been lodged in jail under commitment by a trial justice of the state of South Carolina, upon charges of forgery and felony. It nowhere appears, in any affidavit read before me, that he was arrested under state authority for any act done in pursuance of federal authority, and warranted by it. Nor does it appear in any way that he was arrested by the state authorities with the motive or intent on the part of anyone to interfere with the service of the process of the United States. Under these circumstances, I cannot do anything but relIland him into the custody of the state authorities. In re Bull, 4 Dill. 323; Rev. St. U. S. § 753. In doing this, however, I desire to commend the action of the marshal in suing out the writ of habeas corpus. When any deputy marshal is arrested in possession of the process of a commissioner or of this court, the duty of the marshal is at once to learn in the most authoritative way the reason for such arrest, and the mode selected by him in this instance is the best. Let an order be prepared remanding the prisoner to the custody of the state authorities.
MuRPHY 'PJ. EAST PORTLAND
(Circuit Court, D. Oregon. June 9,1890.)
MUNIOIPAL CORPORATIONS-FISCAL MANAGEMENT-INDEBTEDNESS-ORDINANCE.
An ordinance of a municipal corporation, which provides for the payment of money by the town without providing the means wherewith to make snch payment, creates an indebtedness against such corporation, within the meaning of section 5, art. 11, of the constitution of the state. A court of equity will not enjoin a municipal corporation in the exercise of its legislative function, unless the proposed act is beyond the scope.of its power, and its passage would work irreparable injury. .
SAME-INJUNCTION OF LEGISLATIVE ACT.
3. SAME-INJUNCTION OF ORDINANCE CREATING INDlIIBTEDNESS-TuES-JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT. . In 11. suit by a tax-payer to enjoin the passage of an ordinance an indebt.
edness against the town on account of its alleged illegaUty, the matter In dispute is the sum Of the taxes which the plaintiff would probably have to pay in discharge of said indebtedness; and it rp.ust appear with reasonable certainty from the facta stated in the bill that such taxes exceed in value the sum of $2,000. (synabu8 by the Court.)
In Equity. Charles H. (farcy and Paul R. Deady, for plaintiff. Alfred F. Sears, Jr.) for defendants. DEADY, J. This suit is brought by the plaintiff, a citizen of Washington, fo enjoin the defendants, the municipal corporation of East Portland, the mayor and common council of the same, and the Oregon corporation, the East Side Water Company, from pasBing a certain ordinance, now pending before said council. It is alleged in the bill that the plaintiff is the owner of a tract of land within the limits of the town of East Portland, assessed therein at