,acti0ns'Detween,himselfand a deee8serl person, when the witness has an iliterest in the result of the suit, he is or is not a party: to the -:OO<llilrd,. Hence it is important todeterrp.ine, in the firstinstarice, whether the' competency' qfCFeciliul'l to testify as to transactions between' himself and the decedent is: to be tested by federal or state law. The rule is tba.t,where congress·has.legislated on the subject,-that is, has enacted a law covering the particular casej-such law must prevail ill the federal courts;:notwithstanding it differs from the state law; Potter v. Bank, 102, U.·S. 165; 1/'UIUrance Co. v.Schaefer, 94 U. S. 458;, Rice v. Martin, 8 Fed. Rep. 476. The state laws control in determining the competency of witnesses only in cases like that of Packet Co. v. Clough, 20 Wall. 537, which do not fall within any provision of the federal laws. The case at bar is clearly within the terms of section 858. The effort :i& Crecilius asa witness on :the ground of interest; but the first ·celause·ofthe section declares that interest shall he:nodisqualification "in 'any civil «ction," andthe onlyexoeption to that rule. is that mentioned. in the proviso,-that a person called as witness shalt not be allowed to to any transactions with or statement by a decedent, if the suit is.against his executor. or administrator, and the witness is himself an party' to the' suit, unless the witness is called upon to testify by the executor or administrator. The case at bar seems to be strictly .like tile calle of Potterv. Bank, BUpra, in which a person situated as Orecilios:is, with respect to the litigation, was held to be a competent witness. Whatever/view, theref(}re, the court:might entertain as to the competency Of the tin4er the state Ia W, it is compelled to that he is cO'mpetentwitness by the federal statutes. Judgment will al.icordinglygo against thee'xecutrix for the.Rlllount of the comptroller's assessment; that is, for 83,500, with intel'est at 6 pel,' cent. per annum, to be frQm September 24, 1889, to this date. . ;,'
S'J,'J\,BLER '1>. VILLAGE OF ALEXANDRIA.
(OWOfl,U Coun, D. Minnesota.
May Itl. 189M
MUNIOIPAL CORPORATIONS-SERVIOB OJ' PROOESS-SPECIAL LAW .... VILLAGB OJ' ALBXANDRIA·
. (jbaxWr of the village ot Alexandria, (Act Minn. March IS, 1881,) S 2t. ))fOVldestbaf., wbil1\ any suit is comme.nCEld against thil village, the service therein sha1l-'b8'made by'eop1,lett with the recotder, the general law (Gen. Laws Minn. l6ali. 4lHliIBl ptesoriping ;for I>el'vice 01 8utllIjlOns on municipal corporations on "the may.QI' ()l' chillf exeQ-q\lve officer of such ,col'Jl!lration" does not apply, and a service upon tlteVillage of Alexandria, by leaving a 'copy with the president of the council ' .
cAtJA,w., ·Motion to set aside summons· R6ytr0lds, for plaintiff· . . ,ll. JenkiRl, for· defendant. ".
·, .Re1Molds, ,Srewart&i Gso.' H.
., KEVENEY V. MAGONE.
NEJ.SON;. J. Service of summons is set aside. The charter of'the village of Alexandria, incorporated by act of the legis!ature of Minnesota approved March 5, 1881, provides in section 21, as follows:
"When any suit or action shall be com mt> need against said vllJage. the service therein shall be made by copy left with the recorder of said village."
By the General Laws of Minnesota approved February 28,1885, (chapter 153,) the manner prescribed for the service of summons upon mu-. nicipal corporations is that it "6ha11 be served upon the mayor or chief executive officer of such corporation," etc. The service was made in this case upon the "village of Alexandria, by handing to and leaving with N. P. Ward, president of council, a true and correct copy hereof, personally," etc. As there was a special law with regard to the village of Alexandria, contained in section 21 of the charter, the General Laws of 1885 did not supersede it. See Amyv. Oityoj Watertown, 130 U. S. 3U8, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530. Ordered that summons be set aside.
et at. v.
(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. April 22, 1890.)
CuSTOMS DUTIES-CONSTRUCTION OF LAWS-CLASSIFICATION-CORK CARPETJNG.
Cork carpet or carpet,ing, used to cover floors, and composed of ground waste cork bark, linseed-oil, gum, and a loosely woven jute fabric as a back, such cork bark, ,though greater in bulk than the bulk of its other component materials com· bined;beirig one-eleventh only of its entire value, is not dutiable as "cork manufactured," under the provision for "corks and cork 1;)ark, manufactured, contained in Schedule N of the tarilt act of March 8,1883, (22 U. S. St.. 612; Tarif[ Index, New, par. 422.)
At Law. Action to recover back duties. During the year 1888 the plaintiffs made nine importations from Kirkcaldy, Scotland, into the port of New York, of so-called "cork carpet or carpeting:" This cork carpet or carpeting was classified by the defendant, as collector of customs at that port, as, or as assimilating to, "oilcloth," under the provision for "all other oil-cloth except silk oil-cloth," contained in Schedule J of the tariff: act of March 3, 1883, (22 U. S. St. 507; Tariff Index, New, par. 340,) and pursuant to this provision duty was thereon at the rate of 40 per cent. ad valorem. Against tbis classification and exaction the plaintiffsdulyprotested, claiming that, by force of treasury decision S, 1,436, made February 28,1873, and of the provision for "corks' and cork bark, manufactured," contained in Schedule N of the same tariff act, (22 U. S. St. 512; Tariff Index, New, par. 422,)this cork carpet or carpeting was dutiable atthe rate of25 per centum ad valol'ei)'I,· . Thereafter the plaintiffs, .having Imide due appeals, duly bronght this suit to recover the. difference between the duties at the rate exacted by the defendant as said collector, and duties at the rate claimed ' by thtlm in their protests. UpOll the trial of this suit it appeared that