arated so long, it cedainly would be Jbore unusual for a paramour to furnish the money to support his mistress for so long a separation. So that.this'Jactis not sufficient to rebutthe presumptiol1of marriage; and this is especially so since it appears that he received her, and treated her,. ias.' his wife upon her return.. But it is insisted that the son she brought .:with her was, an illegitimate.child, and that, if the parties were legitimately married, A. H. Taylor would not have received her, and represented her as his wife. But the age of the child when she returned, and the time oithe absence, do not show that A. H. Taylor was not his lather, ,There is more force in the, conduct and declaration of the parties afterthe illicit imtercourse commenced, and was known. between Jane, the,reputecl wife oithe decedent, and R. T. Dunn; , This illicit intercourseestL'anged the, parties towards each other. After this, decedent did not like to admitlthat she was his lawful wife, llnd did not desire to be responsible for' her ,debts, or anything else growing out of the marHe undoubtedly hated her, and desired to repudiate her, for· this want of fidelity towards him, the first which the proof shows. Dunn had, by his arts as a ,seducer, won her affections; and in proportion as he had enamored her" and drawn all her affection::: from A. H.Taylor, in this proportion she hated him, and did not like to admit that she had broken her marriage vow. I do not believe there was a statutory marriage between the pa.rties; and it is possible that they did not, when, this changed ,relation between them occurred, believe that anything;short of a,statuto:ryand formal marriage, solemnized bya.min" ister ora civil officer, was legal marriage, although a cOlumolhlaw marriagehadexisted them; and hence they made the declaration that they had not been married. insisted on the part of complainants that the. bringing of the Hut suit in the. name of Jane, Hoskins, and the pleadings, verdict, and judgment in the'circuit court of Alcorn. county, are conclusive that these parthe name of Jane ties weremever married. The bringing of the suit Hoskinswae the only way in which.it could have been brought, and especially$oiuhder the changed relations which the parties had assumed towards each other; and while it is a circumstance, to be considered, tendil1gto show that a 1l1lirriage had not taken place between the parties, the history;.ofthe lawsuit j as shown. by the transcript, verdict, and judgment, fallefar short of establishing that A. H. Tllylor and Jane Hoskins were never married.' Taking the whole proof together, if the case were on,fiDal hearing, on proof regularly taken, ,1 would hesitate long in pronouncing that the' proof as now presented,if regularly taken, establishes, or does not establish, a valid marriage between these .parties; and this doubt ismueb' greater when on ex parte affidavits mostly written by>the.; iparties or their. ,counsel without cross.examination. But, as can Huffer .no great harm by balding for the present that the a prima jacie right to the estate in litigaantl.8eamistake'ltgai116tthem might work an injury to,complil.inants, 1 ,forthEi'pu,rpose of the motion, hold that they have a prima facie righUothe.prdperbyin litigation., ,),
This brings us to the consideration of the validity of the deeds or conveyance exhibited with the answer of John W. Taylor. There ian good deal of doubt, under the proof, as to whether or not the deed of 1871 was ever delivered so as to vest the title in defendant. !tis to my mind very clear that he did not intend that it should be known that such a deed had been made unless a controversy respecting a tax-title, and the plea of the statute of limitations, 'should arise; and I must hold it very doubtful as to the validity of the conveyance. But the question as to the validity of the deed of 1889 is much more difficult, and the correct deciflion of it is of all importance in this calmi for, if valid; the question of legitimacy, under the proof, becomes of'little importance to either party 1 as it will dispose of all ,the valuable interest involved in this litigation. This deed' is dated April 26, 1889, was written by the defendant, J ahn W. Taylor; at the' tlictation 'of A. H. Taylor,and was on the same day taken by A. H. 'Paylor, the grantol', to the clerk of.the chancery court of Alcorn county, and it was acknowledged said clerk'thllthehad signed and delivered on the day and year mentioned t I1Bhis official act and deed, and for the purposes 'therein mentioned. But it was not then filed, for record. .A. H. Taylor took the deed away with him. The clerk'did not rend the deed, and did not know its· :contents; nor was it known, '80 far as the proof showS'. that such an instrtlment had been executed to any one save the and the grantee until after the death of the grantor, when it was produced by the grantee, and placed on record. Very shortly after the dt>.ath ofA. H. Taylor the defendant stated to several persons that his father had made a' deed conveying all his estate tohhn. The defendant, in his answer; which is responsive to the bill, states as follows: ' ..A'nd for further diRcovery in this behalf, hi response 'to said bill, respondent says he found, without the assistance of any other person, the COli veyances referred to, of date April 26,1889, in his iron safe; where he himsiM hadpreviohsly placed the same, after he had written it at the request of said A. H. Taylor, decea\led, and aftt'r its execution, acknowledgment, and deliv.ery to him by said A. H. Taylor, deceast'd, for the purposes therein and that he came into possession of said instrument in no ,other way, and under no other circumstances."
This answer must he taken as true, unless rebutted and overcome sufficient evidence;' and, while the affidavit chancery court, stating ,that defendant Ulade some inquiry of him, aJter the death of decedent, as to or.not decedent had acknowledged a deed of conveyan<:e before him, may ,r.aise some doubt on the subject, it is not sufficient, with the other facts stated in the affidavits, to overturn the answer in this particulat·. While it is true that this conveyance, so far as it I>u:tports to be ll.CODveyance by the Tishomingo Savings Institution, stateS $9,000 as the consideration for the transfer, I am satisfied it was intended asa,deed,ofgIft. It is not shown that any moneywlts paid, or intelldedto be paid,' at a future time; and, as to that part of the comeyance the privt1te estate of the grnntor, itwasevidently intended 'as deed ofgift. The rule of law is that deeds ofgitt
and settlement between the"parties;'I:md in no way affecting the rights and delivered on Jess evidence. ,than ;of '9the.J1l, :will be he14 as !Spep P9qveyances. for valueland· which may ,affect the rights ofcteditors, the palltiee, : So that· Ido not believe:theobjecthm that it, was neveJridelivered, is maintained under, the pre8iprQof.. " . !tllS jpsisted on, the pll-rt of complainants that that portion ·of the, con'Veyance which purports to be . a conveyance by, the Tishomingo, 'Savings of the. IlElsets of tbat institution is inoper-ative:and v0id. This iQIJljitpij.oq i8(1. corppmte:1::lo,dy,' an 'artificial persoD,entirely,created by RJ!14 of the inqarpQratofS; aM!,its only be', exerciaedby tbeboard :of trustees' provided in the Pr charter" i ,The stockholders, or Shareholders, if Paidtheir!oopitalst9clt,is,re not furtberliable for the debts, or of : The property and means of the corpolle to. ,tf;l,meetthe liabilities ofihe corporation. corporll-tio;n QaIlllot ,itself of its pJ10perty and tneans only bU!liIl('SS for was, created, fot the payment of its U!'AHitjflll,)ncluding ,(Iividenda; on; i t8 ipcome; or; 'onnnal dissolutiOll, to :r,efppp"tp capitl11 stock: ,paid in", . ·. .In other words,. it cap-»otwoOOPlit sujcide, any other dispoaitiOll of its ,means in ita chartel'!,: which would ,bethe, rosult of holding this pIU·t,,9(,tbe "But. in addition tll,tbis,all other objec'Yay,' the conveyance, to . he ,validi':would have to have to all.9rl;ler or Gfthe:bollJ'd of trustees, aqg.: .'seal Qf the corporation.,. Sp that. without 'fur1 hold o1?jectioll is well taken. ,, objection is ,it, does not purport, the, act and"deed a.nd ,his property,andesta.te, ,and 1,8 ,therefore llloperahve andvoldas .8 con.veya.pce thereof. At the,conclusion of that portion of the conveyance :purpolfting toche a :conveyan<:e by the corpb,ratibnof its property ' .: ' . aIld''aMets; the second Clause is' as follows: II. Taylor;lpr1esident of Savings In" ",,':ACrid stltutlon, for the consideration of one dollar, do convey aud transfer to J. W. l'ud pO<lsessions,whateverj persQIl111 and real, ,?f, all IDY, and stQck in Chattanooga Land, and HaflWll.Y, Campan!:. l'J,ud .the Centra,l Land Company of Chattanooga;' Tenbessee; 'the' Sheffield Land, Iron, and Coal CO'mpany, Alabama; a'll.d't.J1IFfishomingo Sa.vings Ii1stitution of CoriJithi'Mississippi; also. all my note&t!:inortgages, deeds oUrust. and all my real estate. consisting of houses ,an4JAHa" and l;Jeing in of Mississippi and. New York. Wit... 0tl saill ·. this
l ' ,
".A.. H. a most unusual document, which, 1 am j ,P?wever, satisfied, that it was the pur.· col,1vey aU!)tPilpersonal estate.an4·proper.ty menins,trument..t9>tb,e., d.efendant, as'well
ROBINSON V. TAYLOR.
as that mentioned in the· first paragraph. lam further satisfied;frork all the proof in the cauEle,that, while A. H. Taylor intended that alfof said property and estate not disposed of, and vested in other property and means, remaining at his death, should by the operation of said conveyance pass to John W. Taylor, his son, the reason he did not place the deed on record was that he did not desire that it should be known until his death, or until he should desire to make it known, that he had divested himself of the title to the property and means described in this conveyance, fearing thM such knowledge by the public would interfere with his business, and knowing that in the mean time the rights of creditors and all others, except himself and son, the' grantee, could not be affected by the conveyance; and that theinstrilment'wasintended, as between the grantor and grantee, to convey the property described, and such as might be received in place of it, or its proceeds, to the defendant, and that the defendant should have complete control of it at the death of the grantor, or sooner if he desired; that in this particular it was intended, so far'as'itatrected the rights of others, to be a substitute for a last will and testament. If the cause were now on final heMing, under the sam'e testimony, it would be a question of uncertainty as ,to how far it should be decided;' and I will not now undertake to decide it the one way ,or 'the other. ,To decide it in favor aithe complainantS might do the defendant injusticej it of the .defendant might do and, OD the other hand, to injustice to ,the complainallts. And its decision now is not necessary' to not now dethe disposition of the present motion., .So the cided. The remaining questions are shall a receiver be appointed;. and wh,at portion of the estate and property described in the bill shall be plac.ed in his charge, Hone shaH be appointed? The question of the appointment ofareceiver in any case-is left 110 the sound discretion of the court, and such appointment is only made to preServe the property and assets for the benefit of all parties in interest. Sometimes it is necessary: to collect the debts due; sometimes, to continue the business. This is especially so in raih-olld cases, manufacturing establishments, and other' cases in which an immediate cessation of the business would work an injury, sucha8 the completion and gathering of cropsjand, in othE,l[ cases, where real estate is to be leased out, rents collected, and taxes paid. The SaVings Institution isnotfqJarty to this suit, Consequently the.receiver, if one is appointed, will not be, entitled to interfere with that corporation, its means, 01' Its Theo,thE,lr estate and assets described in tha bill consist of towri lots', lands, enpita] ,-stock in thecOrpomtions mentioned,and deBts due decedent's estate or': the delEmdant, as the: cause n;tay be finally decided.' It is necessary thi,tt': the real estate be reutedout,' the rents and 'other debts collected, and" the taxes paid j and it may t.o the interests' of all parties that' pomons of th'ereal ,'estate be sOld, and that debts be' stocks" or Some part t>f be sol?, and, otlie,l' changes Whldh cannot'· well be' done, only' by the approvi
al of the Cl'llrt. For these reasons, more than any others, I am 01 opinion that it is best that a receiver be appointed to manage the estate and' assets .under the order of the court, which necessity exists regardless of: the solvency oitha defendant. But as the defendant is admitted to be c\>mpeten't to manage the estate, and,as nothing is shown why he should not appointed, a decree will be entered, appointing him as such receIver, upon his entering into bond, with two or more sureties, in the penal of $25,000, payable to the United States, for the use of whosoever may be entitled to the same, and conditioned for the faithful disof his duties as such receiver, as directed by the orders and deof the court. .Said bond and sureties to be approved by a judge court,. or t of ajudge, by the clerk of the court.
(Of!rcuUCoUrl, , " .D. Mississippi. N. " 'l' '. .,
BBTWBBN BLAVBs·.··OluLDR»'N·ENTITLBD to mHllRIT. , .,. Act 'r"n!J,. May tllat ".all. free persons of color Who were Hvlng , together 6S husband aM wite in thIS state; whUe in a state of slavery, lIereby to.be man and their children legitimately entitled to an'inherit'., 6P.qe in, l¥Iypropert,yhereto!Qre acquillldl or tb:at hereafter be acquired, by'. \ salllpl1tents, to as .full·an extent as thll chIldren of WhIte citizens are entitled I by laws of this,state, " makes legitimate and capable of lnherltillg the · of ,lave parents,. .ml10rriage under the restrictions growing' "ou\: of the'lnstitl1tlclIi ot'sravery, though one of the parents may have died during slavery. , . '. '
D.q.Stant/.ifer. J. T·. F· A. Montgor:ner.!J, for.respqnd,ents.
forcomplainanll. ,,: Sullivan Whit:field,andM.
The now presented :for decision arise upon.thede. ward Godfrey, R. C. Kyle, James Ty.son, and W..T.. dethis cause, ,to ,complainllnt's bill. The bill, in 81.lbsf;ance, , statesthat, lin yel:\r 1851, Sam Stone and. Cynthia Ruffin, with the. oftheir master,they botlJ thenJ)eing slaves, were, in the state, state ofTerniessee, lawf1.lUymarried; ipati l1 the year 1852 the complainant, was" asthe fruit <>i said marriage, born, being the said Stone and Cynthia Ruffin, as far as the same the ll}ws(?f of '.l'ennessee"where her PllfC?ts then, lIved, that some months after herpJrtb her. .her father, said Sam Stone, ever afterwards, Q,n.d up to her;as his. lawful child, as muclilso as could 'be dQ.!le:under hi.s.9oudition ass. ,slave, and under ,the l!Jws Qf said, state; a,nd her slaves untileml;l;,Qcipa.ted by to the .constitution of the United States,.' tp reside in sllid state llil thereofq.ptU aQme ;