WALSTER V. UNITED STATES.
punishment to cases which are not clearly embraced in them. and, on the other, equally refusing, by any mere verbal nicety, forced construction, or equitable interpretation, to exonerate parties plainly within their scope,"
Letters like those in the present case, assuming that they were not to be intercepted by the postmaster before delivery to the Telegram Company, fall distinctly within the category of letters intended to be" delivered from any post-office," and satisfy that descriptive term in the section. The question is whether such letters are also within the other category of the section, and are described by the term "intended to be conveyed by maiL" If the latter descriptive term were the only one employed in the section to describe the letters which are the subject of embezzlement, the question would be less doubtful. As it is, there is certainly fair room for argument that both descriptive terms are not used to define the Same thing. Although the term "to be conveyed by mail" is hardly appropriate to describe a letter which is to be carried by hand .from one receptacle to another in the same post-office, yet its meaning is amplified by section 5468, which declares that the fact that a letter has been in any authorized depository for mail-matter, or in charge of any postmaster, or of any clerk, carrier, agent, or messenger of the postal service, shall be evidence that it was intended to be conveyed by mail. This section makes the depositing of the letter, irrespective of any other incident of transmission, the criterion whether it is intended to be conveyed by mail, and implies that a letter handed to a clerk in a post-office, for delivery at the same office to the person to whom it is addressed, may be intended to be conveyed by mail. Unless the word "deposited" has. some limited meaning, a letter handed by one clerk to another at any stage of tran·smission, for the purpose of forwarding its delivery, is intended to be conveyed by mail, within the meaning of section 5467. 5468 includes a letter deposited with any agent or messenger employed in any department of the postal service, and, in many cases whi9h are supposable, letters thus deposited would not be intrusted to such employe in the way mail-matter is commonly deposited. I conclude, therefore, that the word "deposited" is used in the sense of "intrusted," and refers to mail-matter left in any way for official transmission with an employe in the course of his employment; and that the letters intended to be conveyed by mail of section 5467 embrace all the other described classes of that section, and that the further enumeration is only another instance of the tautology which is not uncommon in legislative acts. The manifest purpose of the statute is to protect all letters confided to the care of the postal department for official transmission from embezzlement or improper appropriation by employes during the course of their transmission, and throughout the time they are in any .manner in the custody of the officers or agents of the department. It would seem to be a very unreasonable construction of the statut.e to hold a letter handed to the postmaster outside the office, and placed by hhn in a bag of outgoing mail-matter for transmission, would :tlot be within its protection. If such a letter would be the subject of the offense, clearly letters mailed,a,s these were would be also.
Certainly the.circumstance that the letter is a decoy letter is quite immaterial. If a letter is put in course of transmission, with a view of having it conveyed by mail, it matters not what the motive of the sender may be. This has been repeatedly decided. U. S. v. Cottingham, 2 BIatchf. 470j U. S. v. Faye, supra; U. S. v. Matthews, 35 Fed. Rep. 890; . U. S. v. Wight, 38 Fed. Rep. 106. The conclusion reached is sanctioned by the case of U. S. v. Matthews, 35 Fed. Rep. 891. In that case the letter was a decoy letter, not mailed in the ordinary way, but placed among the letters of a mail upon a dumping table for backing and distributionj and it was held that the facts were undoubtedly competent evidence to show that the letter was intended to be conveyed by mail, and were sufficient to bring the case within the statute, if it. had not appeared that there was a question whether it was not the intention of the inspector who caused the letter to be deposited to intercept it before it would be carried and delivered to its proper address. The instructions given to the jury were correct, and the instructions refused were correctly refused. It follows that none bfthe exceptions taken on the trial were well founded, and the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
KEEP 11. FULLER
(OITawtt Oourt, N. D. New York. July 14, 1890.)
PA'1'lINTS l!'OR INVENTIONS-INl!'RINGEMENT-PROl!'ITBo
A finding as to the profit realized in certain months from sales of a)1.ln1'rburlng article cannot be based solely on a comparison of sales during the corresponding months for the previous and following years.
Claims in letters patent for a stove grate "as a whole, when * * * constructed and combined to operate in the manner and for the purpose shown and described, " are for the entire grate, and not for an improvement on .the grate; and it being sold separately, and designed for use in many different patterns of stoves, the patentee, in case of infringement, is entitled to all the profits realized.. .
On exceptions to master's report.
N. Davenport, for complainant.
Esek Cowen, for defendants.
COXE, J. On the 20th of March, 1883, a decree was entered in this action in favor of the complainant sustaining, among others, letters pat;:. ent No. 139,583, granted to him June 3, 1873, for an improvement in stove grates. The defendants were held to be infringers, and it was referred to a master to ascertain and report the amount of profits and damages. On the 17th of June, 1889, the master filed a report in which he found that complainant's damages amounted to 6 cents, and that the defendants' profits resulting from the sale of the infringing grates from January 1,1876, to January 1, 1882, the dates fixed by the decree, ag-