specifically, and which Armstrong undertook to convey specifically. It is not necessary that we resort to the supposition that Armstrong was talking about some vague and uncertain right,-uncertain, at least, as to locality, and as to its relation to the surveys of the United States ,-which he was· intending to convey to Prentice, instead of the definite land which he described or attempted to describe. If such were his purpose in this conveyance, it is remarkable that he did not say so in the very few words necessary to express that idea, instead of resorting to two distinct descriptive clauses, neither of which had that idea in it, one of which is rejected absolutely by pJai'ntiff's counsel as wholly a mistake, and the other is too vague in its language to convey even what plaintiff claimed for it. We are not able, therefore, to hold with coullsel for plaintiff that,if this conveyance does not carry the title to any lands which can be'RScertained by that description in the deed, resort can be had to the alternative, that the deed was intended to convey' any land that might ultirriately come to Armstrong under the treaty, and under the selection, and under the assignment to Buffalo. There is a view of this sUbject which has given us cqnsiderable embarrassmept. If the east arid west courses of the first clause of the desC'ription in the Armstrong deed to Prentice were exactly reversed, the land described in it would be found on St.Louis bay, somewhere along the shores of that bay, adjacent to and above Minnesota point, and would include :much of the land which was patented by the United States to Armstrong and his associates insatisfactiol1of the treaty grant to Buffalo; and we should find ourselves called upon to decide whether, under all the circumstances,we would not be compelled to regard these two east and west lines as mistakes, and reverse them iil seeking for the land, because in that case we should certainly fall upon some of the land which Buffalo intended' to select, an<;l which the government of the United States has patented in satisfaction of that selection. But we are not called upon in this case to decide upon that subject, because all the'land sued for in this case lies"south of the southern section line of such a survey ,and is excluded fro:m it. Judgment for defendants.
Court, W.-D. Mi8sou1i, W. D. September I, 1890.)
In an on,oounty bonds and coupons thereto attaohed, the coupons constitute "Interest" Within ActCong. March 8,1887, as amended .August 18, 11:!88, that the United States circuit courts shall have jurisdiction Incertain cases where the in dispute exceeds $2,000 exclusive of " interea'" and COsW. .
Demurrer to petition.
II. BATES COUNTY.
T. K. Skinket, for plaintiff. ,Gate8 &; Wallace and John F. Smith, for defendant.
PHILIPS, J. The petition counts on two bonds of 81,000 each, past due, issued by the defendant county on behalf of Mount Pleasant townsh,ip in said county, in part payment of a subscription by said township to the capital stock of the Lexington, Chillicothe & Gulf Railroad Company. The petition alleges that said bonds provided for interest from the 18th day of January, 1871, at the rate of 10 per ,cent. per annum, said interest to be payable annually on the presentation and delivery at the designated bank of the coupons to said bonds attached; "that attached to each of said bonds were coupons for interest, to accrue as aforesaid, by each of which saId coupons the said county acknowledged to owe and promised to pay to bearer the sum of $100 on the 18th day of January of the year named in said coupon." The petition alleges, that plaintiff is the holder and owner of said two bonds and the coupons thereto attached, and prays judgment thereon. To this petition the defendant demurs, on the ground that this court has not jurisdiction of the subject-matter oithe action for the reason that it appears from the petition that the' matter dispute does not exceed, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of $2,000. By the act of congress;of March' 3, 1887, amended August 13,1888, to give this court jurisdiction, the subject-matter in dispute must exceed, "exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars.,'" As the principal of the bonds amounts to only $2,000, it is apparerit that to give the court jurisdiction the amount of the interest coupons must ,pe added to the principal of the bonds. The question presented is, is there anything in the character of the coupons to except them from' the designation of "interest" as employed in the statute? "Interest is compensation for the use of money for its detention." Border8 v. Barber, 81 Mo. 646. "It is the compensation which is paid by the borrower of money to the lender for its use, and generally by the debtor to his creditor in recompense for his detention of the debt. " Bouvier. Without some special reason appearing to the <Jontrary, We must assl'lme that the legislature employed the term "interest " in its usual acceptation. The petition declares that bonds-'the principal debt-were to bear interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per anDum. Instead of being expressed in the ordinary way in the face ofthe bond or note, the interest here is in the fonh of coupons attached to the bond. No question, presumably, would be made that, if the bond had <Jontained the usual recitation, "with interest at the rate often per cent., payable annually," etc., the interest could be added to the principal of tlie dr',t in order to bring the matter in dispute above $2,000. In that <lase jqrisdiction would arise upon the principal sum of the bond or note. Is it llny less interest because it takes the form 'of a coupon? "rrhEl term 'coupon' is derived from the French,-'couper,' to cutj and it is defined by Worcester to signify one of the interest certificates attachfld to transferable bonds, Hnd of ,which there are usually as many asthere are payments to be made; so called because it is cut off is pre-
I'EDERAL REPORTER, 'vol.
sented for payment." 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1489. And in toe preceding section this salilaauthor says: "hThe contract between the payor and the holder is containeli in the bond, but the coupons are furnished as convenientinstrutnentsto enable the holder to collect interest without presenting the bot1d -by separatinga.nd presenting the proper coupon. II So'in Everetsen v. Bank, 4 HUl1t692j it is said,: "COupons are su bstantijllly a minute repetition :ofwhat iscontainec:' inflome concise terms in the bond." It is in 'recognition of the idea that coupons are the incident to the principal and still adhere to it as interest, that the couttholds the of limitation applies to the coupon as to the bond itself. In Oity,,; Lamson, 9 Wall. 483, Mr. Justice NELsoN said: "The coupon is not,an independent instrument, like a promissory note for sum of is given for interest thereafter to become due upon the bond, which interest is purcel Of the bond, and partakes of its nature; and a higher security than a simple contract debt, is not barred the by lapse of time short ol'tWenty years; and, as we have seen, this contemporaneous coupon does not operate as an extinguishment of the interest, unless t1:lere has b"en an express agreement tothatetl'ect. These coupons are substantially copies from the body of thebond"in respect to the interest, and, as is well given to the ot the bond for the J?ulllPse-First, ofenabllng him to collect the Interest at the, ti me and, place mentioIied without the trouble O'fpresehting the bond every,time It becomes due; and, second, to enable tM 'holder to realize the interest due, or to become due, by negotiating theicoupons:,to the ,bearer in businffistl'ansactions, on whom the duty of c\.lJlectingthem devolves. .... ... '" bllt ,0nA contract, and that by the bond, which covenante(J pay the bearer five hundred dolwith at the rate of ten per cent. lars In twenty per annum. ThalJearer has the same, security for the intl:'rest that he has for the principal. The cOllpon is'slIn'ply a niooeagreed on betwet'n the parties for the convenience of the 'holder in:oollecting the 'interest as it becomes due."
"WhUe. therefore, to meet ,the' cQPstaptly widening demands of com- ' meree and munioipal development, 8uchcouponsperformnew and important functions, in comme,rcial tntnsaptions" they !lre in their legalesSellpe 110 leSS interest, t4e prqduct of the use, for money borrowed, than ifincorporated;alone in t4epody of the bOlld itself· . So. far from anythipgcc;mnected with, the history of the' act,9f March 3, ,. tbatcougresB did not employ the word as ageueric term inits.mpst comprehenllive sense, the design ofthe judiciary /lct, in qUllstion, incontradi.snnction ,of its predecessors, is to restrict the jurisdiction of the feden,t! cQ\lrtl!. In Dillon's Removal O(Causes, p. l04,hesays: "Und.,r the act of1875 itwll.S held that'it wassuffl'cle'rit If the amount In diSpute exceeded fl ve hundred: dollal's 'at' the time whtllithe right of removal acct'ued alld was applied for, and that interesh-when tIle right thereto ex- , is.t,,,4,aud was claiWe4.,....might h,8 In ql'tt'rm ining the amount or value , '; a<!tof provides that the aniOu,nt, in diS.putt) c,.eed two tho,usand dollars, '. ,\:lX, int,eres,t and costs.' So thatlDtel'est,can no longel' be COluputed 10 making up the necessary" amount. fl" ; " , : ' , - ' " " ' , ,
STANDARD . SUGAR REFINERY II; CAILTAN.O.
"':U''is the uut)rofcourts,inapplyingsuch a statute,.evenwhere the Janguage is inexplicit, t6 give it such constructionaa will effectuate the legislative will. "", . The foot that the coupon after maturity may or may not bear est, or the further fact that the coupon may be cut from the bond., and, after maturity, be suedllpon separately as a negotiable instrument, not affect its character as'cinterest when sued upon in connection with the bond towhieh Wis ·attached. In the instance of a simple promissory fdrannualpayments of interest an action will lie for,therecoveryof annual accrued interest,ihdependentof the debt. Stoner v. Evam,' ..4ll1·. Bu,t ,lf theholder.ofsu:eh"a note j;lQould not sue thereon the maturIty of the prineipal!debt,there,could be heard no debate on the propQsition that under the fedemlstatutein question the' juri$diction of the court sQould not bedetermined py the amount of the principal debt.' It lEi a non 8e<juuur,as cbrit'ended'by the learnedcbunsel foi-plaintiff, that if this demurrer be sustained' rio the validity of 'n1unicipalbonds could; ever be had in a Jederal ,COuf,tuJ;ltiIAhebonds thertlselveshad matu'l'Qdj 'and in many cfisesalarge:partofthe coupons in the mean time be barred by limitation." .'£he· positiopniain.tained upon .the opinion i,n City v.Lam.80n,8Wpra, that: the conpons "are 'substantially but copies from the body of the I bpn&.il1'il'especUQ,the in,terest,".-,..thatthereis r'butone contract **': contains the furtber, prClposition .that, in ao:actLon . concerning the vaIidityofthe coupon, the validity·of,thebond.itselUs And, of cOllsequence, an adjudication on the coupon would ,conc!udeanycontrovetsy as to the validity or>invalidity of the bqnd,in ,an action. between,the same, parties on the Isame:issues of fact. OromweU v.' County,a/Sac, 94 U. 8.;359. Nothing said' orldecided ,here has any reference to the right to· supplement the' principaL amount of .the, bond on some other -with coupons owned by the suitor representing bond in 'order to give jurisdiction to the It follows that .the demurrer is sustained.
STANDARD SUGAR REFINEllY17: CASTANO
SAiLB-Co1'lSTRUOTION OF, CONnl,A,CT.
, At Law. . , ". . .' . . ,. From the agreed statement of facts, it 'R,PPElarB is a cCQrpollatUoI) engageq! in th;e. business QJ refiningsu,garatJ30stoJil,and,that
, A contract for the sale of a cargo of from 700 to 800 tons of sugar, to be shipped ,. from a Certain port, is f1ilfllled \)y the delivery of 'Onl,y'iOO ·tons, though' shipped from said port as part of a cargo of toDIIe' ,: i; ,"